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Does knowledge about climate change predict concern? 
Concern for climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
Alana Cornforth 
Abstract 
The knowledge-deficit theory suggests that if people are not concerned about climate 
change, it is because there is a deficit in their knowledge of climate change—they do 
not properly comprehend the scientific consensus. So do people with higher levels of 
knowledge about climate change feel more concerned than those with lower knowledge 
levels? Existing research has been inconclusive but suggests differences between 
perceived and actual knowledge. This thesis comprises two studies. Study 1 tests the 
effect of perceived knowledge on concern for climate change with a nationally 
representative, randomly selected sample of 269 New Zealanders. Study 2 tests the 
effect of actual knowledge about climate change on concern with a sample of 452 New 
Zealanders recruited via snowball sampling. Results supported the knowledge-deficit 
theory for concern for climate change, but only when actual knowledge was tested. 
Participants in both Study 1 and Study 2 with high perceived knowledge did not have 
correspondingly high levels of concern, but Study 2 participants with high actual 
knowledge of climate change did also have high levels of concern. Other variables 
tested that consistently predicted high concern for climate change were perceived 
efficacy (the perception that one’s actions will influence group outcomes) and 
environmental values. Demographic variables were not strong or consistent predictors 
of concern, but overall, younger female participants tended to display higher levels of 
concern than older male participants. 
KEY WORDS: climate change, global warming, attitudes, knowledge-deficit theory, 
concern, knowledge, information, perceptions, perceived efficacy 
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1 Introduction  
Environmental policies are strongly based on the assumption that making people aware 
of environmental problems and telling them how they can address them will lead to 
attitude and behaviour change. This is called the A-I-D-A (awareness, information, 
decision, action) model, which is derived from knowledge-deficit theory (Barr & Gilg, 
2007; Howell, 2011).  
When applied to climate change, the knowledge-deficit theory suggests that if people’s 
perceptions of climate change diverge from the scientific consensus, it is because they 
do not know enough about climate change. Therefore, providing more and better 
information is expected to correct this problem. 
However, despite the ever-increasing scientific consensus, research shows that public 
levels of concern for climate change have decreased around the world in recent years 
(HSBC Climate Partnership, 2010; Jones, 2011a; ShapeNZ, 2010; The World Bank, 
2009). This suggests that either the scientific consensus is not getting through to the 
public, or that it is, but that simply having knowledge of the problem is not enough to 
motivate concern.  
Knowing which of these scenarios applies would help decision-makers, policy-writers, 
and climate change advocacy groups determine the most effective strategies for 
increasing public concern for climate change. This thesis contributes to the growing 
body of research on whether the knowledge-deficit theory applies to concern for climate 
change. 
Introduction to climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
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1.1 Aim  
To investigate whether the knowledge-deficit theory applies to concern for climate 
change.  
1.2 Research objectives 
1. Review the available literature on the knowledge-deficit theory, climate change 
knowledge, and concern for climate change. 
2. Analyse existing data from the 2008 New Zealand Social Attitudes Survey to 
examine the relationship between perceived knowledge of climate change and 
concern. 
3. Collect and analyse data from groups of New Zealanders to examine their actual 
knowledge of climate change. Examine the relationship between actual knowledge 
of climate change and concern using this data. 
4. Discuss the overall findings in relation to predictions. Draw empirically based 
conclusions on the relationship between perceived and actual knowledge of climate 
change and concern and use these to reflect on the theories and research studied in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Propose suggestions for further research. 
5. Discuss the implications of this research. 
1.3 Thesis structure  
Chapter Explanation Research objective(s) 
Chapter 1 
Introduction  
Chapter 1 introduces this thesis and reviews research into 
climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory. 
? Sections 1.1–1.3 present the aims, objectives, and structure 
of this thesis. 
? Section 1.4 reviews literature on the knowledge-deficit 
theory and concern for climate change. 
? Section 1.5 outlines the scientific consensus on climate 
change.  
? Section 1.6 explains reasons for studying concern by briefly 
reviewing psychological research on the attitude-behaviour 
link. 
Objective 1 
Review the available 
literature on the 
knowledge-deficit theory, 
climate change 
knowledge, and concern 
for climate change. 
Chapter 1 
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Chapter Explanation Research objective(s) 
Chapter 2 
Public 
knowledge and 
concern 
Chapter 2 broadens the focus of Chapter 1 to more widely 
examine public knowledge of climate change (Section 2.1) and 
public concern for climate change (Section 2.2). 
? Section 2.1 examines how the public learns about climate 
change, the quality of media reporting on climate change, 
and reviews research examining public knowledge of 
climate change. 
? Section 2.2 reviews studies examining public concern for 
climate change and looks at different variables—
demographics, values and worldviews, trust in experts, and 
perceived efficacy. It examines whether and how these 
factors affect concern for climate change. 
? Section 2.3 summarises the main findings and identifies 
gaps in the existing research. 
Objective 1 
 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology for this thesis. 
? Section 3.1 presents the overall research questions. 
? Section 3.2 describes the overall research design. 
 
Chapter 4 
Study 1 
Chapter 4 reports the first study, an analysis of existing 
New Zealand data to examine the relationship between perceived 
knowledge and concern for climate change. 
? Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present the research justification, aim, 
and predictions for Study 1. 
? Section 4.3 describes the methodology used for the Social 
Attitudes Survey and the present analysis. 
? Section 4.4 outlines the results. 
? Section 4.5 presents a discussion of the findings specific to 
Study 1. 
Objective 2 
Analyse existing data 
from the 2008 New 
Zealand Social Attitudes 
Survey to examine the 
relationship between 
perceived knowledge of 
climate change and 
concern.  
Chapter 5 
Study 2 
Chapter 5 reports the second study, a survey of groups of 
New Zealanders to determine their knowledge of climate change 
and to examine the relationship between actual knowledge and 
concern for climate change.  
? Sections 5.1 and 5.2 describe the research justification, aim, 
and predictions for Study 2. 
? Section 5.3 describes the methodology. 
? Section 5.4 outlines the results. 
? Section 5.5 presents a discussion of the findings specific to 
Study 2. 
Objective 3 
Collect and analyse data 
from groups of New 
Zealanders to examine 
their actual knowledge of 
climate change. 
Examine the relationship 
between actual knowledge 
of climate change and 
concern for this data. 
Introduction to climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
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Chapter Explanation Research objective(s) 
Chapter 6 
Discussion 
Chapter 6 discusses the results of both Study 1 and Study 2 in 
relation to predictions and to the theories and findings described 
in Chapters 1 and 2.  
? Section 6.1 discusses the main overall findings of this 
thesis.  
? Section 6.2 discusses qualifications and limitations of this 
research.  
? Section 6.3 proposes potential avenues for future research.  
Objective 4 
Discuss the overall 
findings in relation to 
predictions. 
Draw empirically based 
conclusions on the 
relationship between 
perceived and actual 
knowledge of climate 
change and concern for 
climate change and use 
these to reflect on the 
theories and research 
studied in Chapters 1 and 
2. 
Propose suggestions for 
further research. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Chapter 7 is a brief conclusion of the implications of the main 
findings. 
Objective 5 
Discuss the implications 
of this research. 
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1.4 Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
There is an often-assumed causal linear relationship between knowledge and behaviour, 
that is, that knowledge causes behaviour. One way this has been conceptualised is as a 
knowledge or information ‘deficit’—the reason people do not act in desired ways when 
confronted with a problem is that they do not know enough about the problem or how to 
act to solve it. According to knowledge-deficit theory, the logical solution to this is to 
give people information on how or why they should act.  
1.4.1 Public information about climate change 
There is now an unprecedented amount of information available about climate change. 
Numbers of news articles are steadily increasing (Bell, 1994; Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui, 
2009; Trumbo, 1996). Bell (1994) collected and content analysed all stories on climate 
change from New Zealand radio broadcasts and daily newspapers between March and 
September 1988. He found that climate change was the biggest ongoing environmental 
news in New Zealand media and the coverage showed ‘little sign of diminishing’ (p. 
259). A search of ScienceDirect shows that the number of scientific papers published 
each year on climate change is also increasing (see Figure 1). (ScienceDirect is one of 
the largest online science databases, with peer-reviewed articles from over 2,500 
journals.) 
Figure 1: Increasing number of papers being published in peer-reviewed journals 
 
Introduction to climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
 6 | Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
(Graph created from data found at ScienceDirect, 2011) 
Climate change has also been the subject of several mainstream movies, such as The 
Day After Tomorrow (2004), Ice Age: The Meltdown (2006), An Inconvenient Truth 
(2006), The Great Global Warming Swindle (2007), and The Age of Stupid (2009), as 
well as numerous documentaries and popular science books. A search of online 
bookshop Amazon found 9,457 results for ‘climate change’ and 7,788 results for ‘global 
warming’.  
The explicit or implicit goal of these books, movies, and articles is to increase public 
knowledge of climate change. Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz (2008) state that ‘an 
underlying assumption is that providing information about global warming—in effect, 
taking the scientific consensus and popularizing it—will lead to increased public 
concern about the risks of global warming’ (p. 113). If the knowledge-deficit theory 
applied to climate change perceptions, we would expect to see the increasing 
information about climate change leading to correspondingly higher levels of concern 
for climate change, which is not the case (Jones, 2011a; Kellsted, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 
2008; Newport, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2009; ShapeNZ, 2010). Of course, this 
reasoning assumes both that people are encountering information and that the 
information they encounter is accurate, which (as described in Chapter 2) is not 
necessarily the case.  
The knowledge-deficit theory has been criticised as reducing the complexities of public 
understanding of science to a simple one-way communication from scientists to the 
public (The Royal Society, 2004; Wright & Nerlich, 2006).  
The Royal Society summarises the elements missing from the knowledge-deficit theory: 
The [knowledge-deficit theory] did not adequately conceptualise how publics’ 
views and attitudes towards science were embedded within wider social, political 
and institutional understandings, and risked discounting the role of local 
knowledge and different public values in science debates (2004, p. 10). 
The Royal Society’s findings suggest that the wealth of information available about 
climate change will not be sufficient in motivating concern for climate change. 
Research into the effectiveness of information campaigns supports this theory.  
Chapter 1 
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1.4.2 Public information campaigns 
Public information campaigns are an attempt to bridge the deficit in knowledge between 
experts and the public. 
Ineffective information campaigns 
Research increasingly shows that although information campaigns can increase people’s 
knowledge, they often have no effect, or only short-term effects, and do not usually 
produce long-lasting attitude or behaviour change (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & 
Rothengatter, 2007; Barr & Gilg, 2007; Lowe et al., 2006; McKenzie-Mohr & W. 
Smith, 1999; Owens, 2000; Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui, 2009; Schultz, 2002; P. Stern, 
1999). Because information campaigns seem intuitively appropriate, and are relatively 
easy and cheap to run, they are widely used, despite a lack of evidence of their 
effectiveness (Schultz, 2002). Reasons given for the ineffectiveness of information 
campaigns are that they often ignore people’s motivations for acting or thinking the way 
that they do, and they do not examine behaviours in their wider social, political, and 
cultural contexts (Barr & Gilg, 2007; Bulkeley, 2000; Lowe et al., 2006; Owens, 2000; 
The Royal Society, 2004; Wright & Nerlich, 2006). 
Research has shown that people can often interpret the same information in very 
different ways, according to their own worldviews (Crompton, 2010; Heath & Gifford, 
2006; Kahan, Braman, & Jenkins-Smith, 2010; Whitmarsh, 2011). This helps to explain 
why there are so many conflicting attitudes and beliefs about climate change, in spite of 
a clear scientific consensus. In their survey of 1,265 randomly selected households in 
southwest England, Barr and Gilg (2007) found that increased awareness of 
environmental problems was unlikely to lead to behaviour change, which required 
changes in attitudes, structures, values, and commitments towards the environment. 
Effective information campaigns 
There are occasions when information campaigns can be effective—when a lack of 
knowledge is the real barrier to getting people to act (Nolan, 2010; Schultz, 2002; Stern, 
1999) In his review of how the knowledge-deficit theory applied to household recycling 
programmes in the United States, Schultz (2002) found that information campaigns 
were effective at changing recycling behaviour in three circumstances: 1) when a new 
recycling programme started and people did not know the new procedures, 2) when 
Introduction to climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
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changes were made to an existing programme and people needed to know the new 
procedures, or 3) when recycling procedures were complicated or hard to remember. 
Stern (1999) similarly found that information campaigns could be effective if they 
applied lessons from research on communication, social norms, and human decision-
making, such as presenting information in the context where the target behaviour will 
occur (for example, energy-use feedback systems that present consumers with frequent 
data on their energy use and financial costs). However, with most environmental 
behaviours, people usually already have the knowledge but not the motivation (Lowe et 
al., 2006; Nolan, 2010). With climate change, the distance between actions and 
consequences is so great that it is particularly difficult to design effective information 
campaigns. 
Another example of effective information campaigns (that are increasingly being used) 
is social norms marketing campaigns (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & 
Griskevicus, 2007). These campaigns use normative messages (messages about other 
people’s behaviour) to target socially significant behaviours—such as alcohol 
consumption and recycling. Such campaigns attempt to reduce undesired behaviour by 
letting people know that the undesired behaviour is not as widespread as they think 
(Schultz et al., 2007). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the effect of social 
norms on concern for climate change, although this is a promising area that would 
benefit from further study. 
1.4.3 Does knowledge predict concern? 
There are three possible causal relationships within the knowledge-deficit theory. When 
applied to concern for climate change, these relationships are as follows.  
1. Knowledge causes concern.  
2. Concern causes knowledge (when someone feels concerned, they learn more about 
climate change). 
3. Something else causes knowledge and concern (Schultz, 2002).  
The main focus of this thesis is on testing the first relationship—whether knowledge 
predicts concern. Study 1 and Study 2 examine the first relationship. The third 
relationship is examined by including other variables (demographics and information 
Chapter 1 
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and identity variables) in Study 1 and 2 analyses to assess their effect on concern. The 
next sections review research examining the knowledge-deficit theory and concern for 
climate change. 
Research contradicting the knowledge-deficit theory 
Existing research that contradicts the knowledge-deficit theory appears to solely consist 
of findings based on participants’ perceived knowledge levels. Perceived knowledge is 
self-reported knowledge, where participants assess their own knowledge levels. It can 
also be thought of more as confidence in one’s own knowledge, rather than an objective 
assessment of actual knowledge levels. 
Perceived knowledge 
A counter-intuitive finding challenging the knowledge-deficit theory that motivated the 
research in this thesis, was Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz’s finding in their 2008 survey 
of 1,093 Americans. They found a negative relationship between knowledge and 
concern. Participants with greater perceived knowledge of climate change had 
significantly lower levels of concern and responsibility for climate change than those 
with lower knowledge. Study 1 replicates the methods used for this research in a 
New Zealand context. 
Similarly, Whitmarsh (2011) found, both in her 2003 survey of 589 Britons and her 
2008 survey of 551 Britons, that perceived knowledge about climate change did not 
predict scepticism or uncertainty. This result led her to reject the knowledge-deficit 
theory as an explanation of why public perceptions of climate change diverge from the 
scientific consensus.  
Research supporting the knowledge-deficit theory 
More research was found supporting the knowledge-deficit theory than contradicting it. 
Studies supporting the knowledge-deficit theory used both perceived and actual 
measures of knowledge. 
Introduction to climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
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Perceived knowledge 
In their nationally representative survey of 185 Canadians, Heath and Gifford (2006) 
found that perceived knowledge of climate change significantly positively predicted 
whether participants believed that climate change was occurring and whether they 
believed it had negative effects. They did not find perceived knowledge a significant 
predictor of behavioural intentions.  
In a follow-up study to Kellstedt et al.’s research, Malka, Krosnick, and Langer (2009) 
analysed nationally representative data from surveys of 1,002 Americans in 2006 and 
2007, as well as longitudinal data from a 1997–1998 survey of 497 Americans. Malka et 
al. found that perceived knowledge of climate change only predicted concern in those 
participants who trusted scientists, or for Democrat and Independent participants; but 
not for participants who were sceptical about scientists or for Republican participants 
(Malka et al., 2009). This conditional support for the knowledge-deficit theory suggests 
that trust in experts and political party support are better predictors of concern than 
perceived knowledge. This thesis also examines the effect of these variables on concern 
for climate change. 
In their survey of 192 New Zealanders, Aitken, Chapman, and McClure (in press) found 
that participants with high perceived knowledge of climate change were significantly 
more likely to perceive climate change to be a severe problem requiring urgent action 
than those with low perceived knowledge, providing support for the knowledge-deficit 
theory. Their study also found that participants with high perceived knowledge were 
significantly more likely to have already engaged in climate-mitigating behaviour than 
those with low perceived knowledge. 
Actual knowledge 
All of the studies reviewed that examined actual knowledge and concern for climate 
change supported the knowledge-deficit theory, differing only in the strength of the 
relationship, the length of time that participants remained concerned, and whether there 
was any corresponding effect on behaviour. 
In support of the knowledge-deficit theory, researchers have found that knowing the 
causes and consequences of climate change is a powerful predictor of both concern for 
climate change and behavioural intentions, even when controlling for existing beliefs in 
Chapter 1 
Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory | 11 
negative consequences of climate change and ‘salience measures’—people thinking 
climate change is important and then becoming informed (Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 
2000; Leiserowitz, N. Smith, & Marlon, 2010; Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2007). 
In another follow-up study to Kellstedt et al., Nolan (2010) found support for the 
knowledge-deficit theory by testing actual knowledge about climate change. Nolan 
surveyed 41 American filmgoers attending a free public showing of An Inconvenient 
Truth. She surveyed knowledge and concern levels of participants before and after they 
saw the movie. She also surveyed American university students as a control group of 
participants who would not otherwise have seen the movie. Nolan found that 
participants in both studies had marginally higher knowledge and were significantly 
more concerned about climate change after watching the movie than they were before 
they watched it. After watching the movie, participants were also more willing to 
reduce greenhouse gases. Nolan surveyed the participants again, 1 month later, finding 
that there was no change in post-viewing increased levels of concern, but there was a 
marginal increase in post-viewing knowledge levels, and a marginal decrease in 
motivations to reduce greenhouse gases.  
Nolan concluded that this divergence from Kellstedt et al.’s results was because 
Kellstedt et al. relied on self-reported knowledge of climate change, while Nolan’s 
study used objective measures of climate change knowledge. However, Nolan had very 
low numbers of participants (41 participants in the first study and 31 in a second study), 
making it difficult to draw conclusions from her findings. 
 Exposure to information 
Several studies have examined whether exposing participants to information about 
climate change increased their concern. Although these studies all implicitly examined 
the knowledge-deficit theory, the researchers did not actually assess participants’ 
perceived or actual knowledge levels.  
Lowe et al. (2006) surveyed 300 filmgoers in the city of Norwich in the United 
Kingdom who had just watched The Day After Tomorrow, a dramatised account of the 
abrupt transformation of Earth’s climate into a new ice age. Lowe et al. found that the 
film increased viewers’ concern for climate change, at least in the short term, but that 
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viewers found it difficult to distinguish fact from fiction, and beliefs in the likelihood of 
abrupt climate change were actually lower after watching the film.  
Leiserowitz (2004) also examined the effect of The Day After Tomorrow on viewers’ 
perceptions of climate change in a nationally representative survey of 529 Americans, 
some of whom had watched the movie and some of whom had not. He found that 83 
percent of participants who had watched the movie said they were somewhat or very 
concerned about climate change, compared to 72 percent of those who had not watched 
the movie (Leiserowitz, 2004). However, Leiserowitz did not survey concern levels 
before participants watched the movie, meaning that viewers could have already had 
high baseline concern levels, and it is hard to know how much The Day After Tomorrow 
increased their concern.  
Howell (2011) also surveyed 162 randomly selected moviegoers in Edinburgh before 
and after they saw the movie The Age of Stupid, over 21 screenings in March 2009, to 
examine their attitudes and behaviour toward climate change. The movie is a dramatised 
account of Earth in 2055, destroyed by climate change, with documentary footage about 
climate change interspersed throughout. Howell found that the movie increased 
participants’ concern about climate change, their motivation to act, and their levels of 
perceived efficacy (belief that their actions could make a difference), although these 
effects had not lasted 10–14 weeks later. Howell found that the film also promoted self-
reported behaviour change (particularly awareness raising and decisions to take flight-
free holidays). Participants’ behaviour was constrained by situational barriers, 
particularly participants living in rented accommodation with limited options for 
improving home energy efficiency (Howell, 2011). Howell’s participants also already 
displayed very high levels of concern and knowledge before watching the film. 
Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui (2009) analysed Japanese daily print media coverage of 
climate change from 1998–2007, concluding that increased media coverage of climate 
change corresponded with increased public concern, particularly when the articles were 
on the front pages of newspapers. They also found, in line with previous research, that 
the concern produced by each newspaper article was very short-lived—lasting only 
until the next paper was published (Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui, 2009). 
? 
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Research into the relationship between knowledge of climate change and concern 
provides mixed results, although most research appears to support the knowledge-
deficit theory. Studies using different measures of knowledge—perceived or actual—
have produced different results. Studies that have used perceived measures of 
knowledge have produced contradictory results, suggesting that perceived knowledge of 
climate change is not a reliable predictor of concern. All of the studies that have used 
measures of actual knowledge have produced at least partial support for the knowledge-
deficit theory.  
This thesis builds on existing research by examining the relationship between 
knowledge and concern with measures of both perceived (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) 
knowledge of climate change, as well as testing the effect of other variables, such as 
demographics, environmental values, and perceived efficacy on participants’ concern 
levels. 
1.5 Scientific consensus on climate change 
One of the most confounding things about public levels of concern for climate change is 
that they appear to be decreasing, in spite of the ever-increasing scientific consensus. 
‘Climate change’ in this thesis does not refer to long-term natural climate change, but to 
the anthropogenic (human caused) climate change that has occurred over the last 
100 years, as a direct result of human activities increasing the concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and causing average global temperatures to rise and 
the climate to change in dangerous and unprecedented ways (Pachauri & Reisinger, 
2007; Reisinger, 2009). This thesis is based on the findings of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC’s findings show that there is a global 
scientific consensus on climate change. This section briefly describes this consensus.  
The IPCC is the world’s leading authority on climate change. The United Nations 
Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization established the 
IPCC in 1988 to advise governments and ‘provide the world with a clear scientific view 
on the current state of climate change and its potential environmental and socio-
economic consequences’ (IPCC, 2010). The IPCC produces seven-yearly reports 
reviewing and assessing international research on climate change. Thousands of 
scientists from around the world voluntarily contribute to the IPCC’s work, which 
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incorporates an extensive peer-review process. The IPCC’s most recent report at the 
time of writing, the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, states that ‘warming of the climate 
system is unequivocal… Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures 
since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations’ (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007, pp. 30-39). In the IPCC’s 
terminology, ‘very likely’ means that the probability is greater than 90 percent. Since 
2001, the national science academies of 32 countries, including New Zealand, have 
issued joint declarations confirming the IPCC’s findings on anthropogenic global 
warming, and urging countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (G8 + India, Brazil, 
and China, 2005; G8 + 5, 2007; 2008; 2009; The Royal Society of New Zealand, 2010).  
To determine the extent of the scientific consensus in peer-reviewed science articles, 
Oreskes (2004) analysed 928 papers published in scientific journals between 1993 and 
2003 that had the keywords ‘climate change’ in their abstracts. She found that none of 
them disagreed with the IPCC’s position on anthropogenic climate change (75 percent 
accepted the scientific consensus and 25 percent took no position). Since this study, the 
IPCC released another round of assessment reports in 2007, showing that the evidence 
supporting their 2004 findings has grown, making the scientific consensus even 
stronger.  
Further reinforcing the IPCC’s findings, a 2007 study published in Nature by a group of 
international scientists compared the IPCC’s 2001 projections of temperature and sea 
level rise to observed measurements in 2007. The authors found that the observed 
increases for both were in the upper projected ranges, concluding that the IPCC may 
have underestimated changes, particularly for sea level rise (Rahmstorf et al., 2007). 
This shows that the IPCC’s projections are conservative, particularly as the reports do 
not include projections of dangerous non-linear tipping points in the climate system (for 
reviews of tipping points see Lenton, 2009; Lenton et al., 2008).  
In 2007, the Statistical Assessment Service at George Mason University in the United 
States surveyed 489 randomly selected climate scientists from the American 
Meteorological Society and the American Geophysical Union. Like Oreskes, they found 
evidence of a strong consensus—84 percent ‘personally believed’ that anthropogenic 
warming was occurring and 74 percent agreed that ‘currently available scientific 
evidence’ showed this (Lichter, 2008, p. 1). Another survey, by Doran and Zimmerman 
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(2009), further reinforced the scientific consensus by finding that 90 percent of the 
3,146 earth scientists they surveyed agreed that ‘mean global temperatures have risen 
compared to pre-1800 levels’, and 82 percent agreed that ‘human activity is a 
significant contributing factor in changing mean global temperatures’ (p. 23). However, 
out of the 79 scientists who listed climate science as their area of expertise, and had 
published more than 50 percent of their recent peer-reviewed papers on this subject, 76 
(96.2 percent) agreed that ‘mean global temperatures have risen compared to pre-1800s 
levels’, and 75 out of 77 (97.4 percent) agreed that ‘human activity is a significant 
contributing factor in changing mean global temperatures’. That is, the scientists with 
the most authority on climate change were the most convinced of anthropogenic climate 
change. The authors concluded that ‘it seems that the debate on the authenticity of 
global warming and the role played by human activity is largely nonexistent among 
those who understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term climate processes’ 
(p. 23).  
More recently, Anderegg, Prall, Harold, and Schneider (2010) analysed the publications 
and citation data of 1,372 climate researchers and, again, found evidence of a strong 
scientific consensus. They found that 97 to 98 percent of the climate researchers they 
surveyed supported the IPCC’s findings on anthropogenic climate change. Like Doran 
and Zimmerman, Anderegg et al. found that the researchers who were less convinced or 
unconvinced of anthropogenic climate change had substantially less climate expertise 
and scientific prominence than the convinced researchers. Anderegg et al. identified 
‘prominent climate researchers’ as those writing about climate change with both a large 
number of publications and a large number of citations, although this is only one 
indicator of scientific credibility.  
Taken together, the support of national science academies, peer-reviewed publications, 
and climate scientists from around the world for the findings of the IPCC makes it clear 
that there is no real debate about anthropogenic climate change—at least among those 
qualified to participate in such a debate. Although, as Chapter 2 will show, this is often 
not the view presented by the media, or perceived by the public.  
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1.6 Why study concern instead of behaviour?  
A potential challenge to this research is ‘why study concern instead of behaviour?’ 
There are three main reasons:  
1. There is a theoretical link between attitudes and behaviour.  
2. Public concern is one factor that may drive political change.  
3. The research that Study 1 replicates focused on concern rather than behaviour and 
Study 1 needed to replicate it to allow comparison. 
1.6.1 Attitudes predict behaviour 
Research implies that high concern for climate change should predict climate change-
mitigating behaviour. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to test both the information-
concern link and the concern-behaviour link. This thesis focuses on testing the link 
between information and attitudes (concern) only, as there is a more robust body of 
evidence supporting the link between attitudes and behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Barr & 
Gilg, 2007; Guagnano, P. Stern, & Dietz, 1995; Schultz & Oskamp, 1996; P. Stern, 
1999). 
Psychologists understand that behaviour results from varying combinations of forces 
acting on an individual—both internal forces (a person’s attitudes, values, beliefs, 
norms) and external forces (all physical, financial, social, and legal sources of support 
or opposition to the behaviour). Different psychological models emphasise different 
relationships between these forces, and terminology varies (they are also referred to as 
‘situational and psychological variables’ or ‘positive and negative external conditions’) 
(Ajzen, 1991; Barr & Gilg, 2007; Guagnano, P. Stern, & Dietz, 1995; Schultz & 
Oskamp, 1996; P. Stern, 1999). 
In his influential theory of planned behaviour, Ajzen (1991) found that behavioural 
intentions could be accurately predicted by attitudes, norms, and perceived behavioural 
control. He also found that actual behaviour could in turn be predicted accurately from 
behavioural intentions. Later research has built on this by focusing on the enabling or 
disabling effects of different internal and external forces acting on attitudes and 
behaviour (Barr & Gilg, 2007; Guagnano et al., 1995; Schultz & Oskamp, 1996; P. 
Stern, 1999), illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.  
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Figures 2 and 3 show how having strong attitudes, combined with a set of enabling 
internal and external forces is likely to predict behavioural intentions, which in turn are 
likely to predict actual behaviour. This suggests that having high concern for climate 
change is likely to predict intentions to perform climate-friendly behaviours—for 
example, riding a bike to work instead of driving a car. This behavioural intention is 
likely in turn to lead to actual behaviour, when enabling external and internal forces are 
acting. These forces could include: the knowledge that driving a car contributes to 
climate change, the perception that riding a bike will actually make a difference in some 
way, and the existence of bike lanes making the behaviour easy and safe. Barr and Gilg 
(2007) note that a different combination of internal and external forces will apply to 
each decision made by each individual. 
Schultz and Oskamp (1996) point out that people with strong attitudes are more likely 
to engage in more difficult behaviours (behaviours less under their control), while 
people with weaker attitudes will be more likely to engage in easier behaviours 
(behaviours more under their control). This implies that people with high levels of 
concern for climate change are more likely to engage in more difficult climate change-
mitigating behaviours. Climate change policy directed at individual behaviour change 
should focus on increasing public concern, as well as on identifying and increasing 
enabling forces and identifying and reducing disabling forces. 
Figure 2: Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz’s model of the effects of attitudes and conditions on 
behaviour 
 
(Guagnano et al., 1995, p. 703) 
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Figure 3: Barr and Gilg’s model of values and behaviour 
 
(Barr & Gilg, 2007, p. 365) 
1.6.2 Public concern drives political change 
As well as psychological theories linking attitudes and behaviour, an important function 
of public concern is to create space for political action. Advocacy groups harness public 
concern to promote government action and changes to policy. This is particularly 
important for climate change, as individual action (while important) is insufficient to 
address the problem. Governments too require the ‘consent of the governed’ to take 
action with short-term costs and long-term benefits. Strong, coordinated 
intergovernmental action is needed to curb greenhouse gas emissions (N. Stern, 2000), 
and strong public concern is central to ensuring this happens.  Kempton (1993) found 
that public concern could be a strong driver of political action, though only in specific 
circumstances. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to test the complex link between 
public concern and political action. 
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2 Public knowledge and concern  
Chapter 2 broadens the focus of Chapter 1 to examine the two main themes of this 
research in detail: public climate change knowledge (Section 2.1) and public concern 
for climate change (Section 2.2).  
? The first part of Section 2.1 examines how the public learns about climate change, 
and the quality of media reporting on climate change. The second part reviews 
research, mainly survey and poll results, examining public knowledge of climate 
change. 
? The first part of Section 2.2 reviews research on concern for climate change, also 
based mainly on surveys and polls. The second part looks at variables that might 
affect concern, other than knowledge.  
? Section 2.3 is a brief section describing the overall findings of the literature and 
identifying relevant research gaps. 
Literature is sourced mainly from peer-reviewed journals, although, as there is not yet 
an extensive literature available on this topic, information from less reliable sources 
such as newspaper articles, organisational reports, and various polls and surveys are 
also used (these instances are identified in the review). Journal articles were identified 
using general and academic search engines and databases and from bibliographies of 
other peer-reviewed papers on similar topics. 
To keep this research as focused as possible, social norms and the broader risk 
assessment literature are not addressed, but these would be useful areas for further 
research and literature reviews. 
2.1 Climate change knowledge 
What does the public know about climate change? To answer this question, Section 2.1 
reviews research examining how the public learns about climate change, and aspects of 
the quality of media reporting on climate change, before moving on to review studies of 
public knowledge of climate change. 
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2.1.1 The public’s information sources 
Research in New Zealand, the United States, and Britain (1993) shows that the public in 
these countries learn about climate change almost exclusively through the media, 
particularly from television and newspapers.  
Bell (1994) reports an unpublished nationally representative survey of 
61 New Zealanders that he conducted in 1989, which found that most New Zealanders’ 
knowledge of climate change came solely from the ‘principal daily media’, but he does 
not differentiate between different types of media (p. 259). Updated research is needed 
to identify which specific sources the New Zealand public gains most of its climate 
change information from today.  
Whitmarsh (2009) conducted a postal survey of 589 participants from southern England 
in 2003. She found that respondents’ main sources of climate change information were 
television (selected by 91.5 percent of respondents), newspapers (85.1 percent), and 
radio (65.7 percent). The least popular sources were the internet (selected by 
13.2 percent of respondents), journals (18.7 percent), and libraries (7.1 percent) 
(Whitmarsh, 2009).  
Similarly, and more recently, in their nationally representative survey of 2,030 
Americans, Leiserowitz, Smith, and Marlon (2010) found that respondents’ main 
sources of climate change information were also television (selected by 88 percent of 
respondents) and newspapers (71 percent), followed by family and friends (69 percent), 
books or magazines (68 percent), and the internet (65 percent) (Leiserowitz, N. Smith, 
et al., 2010).  
Whitmarsh’s and Leiserowitz’s studies both found that television and newspapers were 
the main sources of climate change information, although they found very different 
results for the internet as a source of information. Comparatively low numbers of 
British participants used the internet, while much higher numbers of Americans did 
(13.2 percent compared to 65 percent). This is probably because Whitmarsh’s survey 
was paper-based and conducted in 2003, when the internet was not as widely used as in 
2010. Contrastingly, Leiserowitz, Smith, et al. conducted their survey in 2010, when 
internet use was far more prevalent, and it was an online survey, meaning that all 
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respondents were internet users. This makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about 
British or American use of the internet as a source of climate change information.  
Whitmarsh (2009) also found that although mass media sources were the main sources 
of climate change information, participants had low trust in these sources. She found 
that respondents believed scientists to be the most trusted source of climate change 
information (Whitmarsh, 2009). This indicates that her participants received most of 
their information from sources that they did not trust, perhaps suggesting that they were 
predisposed to be sceptical of the information that they encountered on television and in 
newspapers.  
2.1.2 The media’s information sources 
The studies described above indicate that the mass media are overwhelmingly the 
public’s main source of climate change information. So what are the media’s sources 
for this information? This is not a widely researched topic, although there are two 
studies that suggest that journalists get most of their information from other journalists 
rather than directly from scientists or from scientific publications (Trumbo, 1996; 
Wilson, 2000). 
Wilson (2000) surveyed 249 reporters from the North American Society of 
Environmental Journalists, to determine where they sourced the information they 
reported about climate change. He found that 37 percent of their information came from 
newspapers, followed (distantly) by interviews with scientists (20 percent) and peer-
reviewed science journals (15 percent). All other sources were used very rarely, and 
included magazines (8 percent), television (3 percent), previous schooling (2 percent), 
government officials (2 percent), and politicians (1 percent) (Wilson, 2000). Wilson 
described how reporters’ heavy reliance on each other creates a climate change news 
‘food chain’, concluding that ‘while more than 50,000 journals and one million 
scientific papers are published each year, these journalists are not using them as primary 
sources of scientific information on climate change’ (p. 4).  
Wilson’s findings are particularly interesting as his sample was already selective, 
comprising entirely environmental journalists. If journalists specially dedicated to 
communicating science to the public rely so heavily on sourcing information from other 
media sources over information sourced directly from scientists or journals, then it is 
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reasonable to assume that non-environmental journalists rely as much, if not more, on 
other media sources. Further research is needed to determine this, as well as the extent 
to which this affects the quality of the information reported. 
Trumbo’s (1996) earlier research reinforces Wilson’s finding that the media do not use 
scientists as the main source of information about climate change. Trumbo conducted a 
content analysis of 252 articles on climate change from five major United States 
newspapers. He found that over time, as climate change became more politicised, the 
volume and number of stories on climate change increased, but there was a significant 
decline in the percentage of scientists quoted in stories. Instead, media sources shifted 
from scientists to policy advisers and special-interest groups (Trumbo, 1996).  
This departure from scientific sources to policy and special-interest group sources could 
mean that the information the public encounters is less accurate and more biased or 
subjective. The public could perceive this and have less trust in what they read and 
perhaps higher scepticism about climate change since they are exposed to opinions or 
appeals rather than to scientific facts. Presenting climate change information as a policy 
discussion could also cause people to interpret the information according to their 
political views. Further research is needed to link media information with public 
knowledge of, and concern for, climate change. 
2.1.3 Quality of media information on climate change 
Research shows that the more media coverage there is of a topic, the more the public 
prioritises it (Antilla, 2010). However, there is little research investigating the quality of 
the information on climate change reported by the media. If the knowledge-deficit 
theory applies to climate change, then if people are ill informed they are unlikely to be 
concerned, or to perhaps be concerned about the wrong thing. Conflicting information 
about climate change (such as multiple projected future temperatures) has been shown 
to lead people to hold onto their existing beliefs and distrust information sources 
(Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2009). As newspapers and television news appear to be the 
public’s main sources of climate change information, it is important to know how 
accurately journalists report the science and represent the scientific consensus. Lichter 
(2008) found that only 3 percent of randomly selected climate scientists surveyed 
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trusted newspaper or television coverage of climate change. Several studies described 
below suggest this mistrust may be justified. 
Bell (1994) found, in his content analysis of New Zealand newspaper and radio stories 
on climate change in 1988, that basic scientific facts were ‘overwhelmingly accurate’, 
although one out of six stories on climate change contained ‘significant misreporting’, 
including scientific and technical errors, misquotations, exaggerations, omissions, and 
distorted emphasis (p. 259). As this research was done over 20 years ago, updated 
analysis is needed before drawing any conclusions, as scientists’ understanding of 
climate change is far greater and more complex today. In Wilson’s more recent study, 
he found that only one-third of the environmental reporters surveyed believed that ‘the 
global warming theory is accepted by most atmospheric scientists’ (2000, p. 7). In fact, 
most reporters believed that scientists ‘strongly debated’ the topic. As these were 
environmental journalists, it seems likely that non-environmental journalists could 
perceive there to be even more debate. 
One of the main criticisms of media coverage of climate change is the journalistic norm 
of ‘balanced reporting’—the tendency to tell both sides of a story—which, although 
appropriate in many non-scientific stories, distorts and misrepresents the scientific 
consensus on climate change, giving the mistaken appearance of controversy and 
disagreement between scientists (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; 2007; Cox, 2010; Lowe et 
al., 2006). For this reason, Cox (2010) suggests that journalists should not attempt to 
run a parallel peer-review process, but should reflect the scientific consensus—a 
position arrived at by a well-established and rigorous peer-review process. 
To investigate the effect of the journalistic norm of ‘balanced’ reporting on climate 
change, J. Boykoff and M. Boykoff (2004) content analysed 636 articles (randomly 
selected from a total of 3,543 articles) on climate change from four prominent American 
newspapers from 1988 to 2002. They found that 53 percent of these articles were 
structured on the journalistic norm of balanced reporting, giving equal attention to the 
view of anthropogenic climate change as to the opposing view that temperature 
increases could be entirely explained by natural fluctuations. They found that 35 percent 
of the stories emphasised anthropogenic climate change but still presented both sides of 
the ‘debate’, while 6 percent of stories expressed doubt in anthropogenic climate change 
and a further 6 percent exclusively discussed anthropogenic climate change.  
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This study shows that, by using the journalistic norm of balanced reporting, these 
newspapers gave the mistaken impression of great debate among the scientific 
community about whether humans contribute to climate change, presenting information 
that significantly diverged from the accepted scientific position of the IPCC. J. Boykoff 
and M. Boykoff (2004) concluded that:  
Adherence to the norm of balanced reporting leads to informationally biased 
coverage of global warming. This bias, hidden behind the veil of journalistic 
balance, creates both discursive and real political space for the US government to 
shirk responsibility and delay action regarding global warming’ (p. 134).  
In a later study, Boykoff and Boykoff (2007) found other journalistic norms that 
similarly prevented clear and accurate communication of climate change. Specifically 
they found that journalists’ use of first-order journalistic norms (personalisation, 
dramatisation, novelty) significantly influenced their use of second-order journalistic 
norms (authority, order, balance). They noted that ‘scientists generally employ a lexicon 
of caution and speak in a language of probability, which usually does not translate 
smoothly into the crisp, unequivocal commentary that is valued in the press’ (2007, p. 
1192). Other research echoes this finding that science often gets lost in translation from 
scientific journals to news headlines (Lowe et al., 2006).  
Antilla (2005) content analysed 544 climate science articles from 255 United States 
newspapers to provide ‘a snapshot of the socially constructed news of climate science 
during the time period of 1 March 2003 to 29 February 2004’ (p. 341). Antilla found 
that not only did journalistic balance often led to biased reports, but some newspapers 
repeatedly used climate change sceptics as primary sources causing ‘the exponential 
spread of misinformation’ from one paper to another (p. 350).  
? 
The knowledge-deficit theory implies an unbroken flow of information from experts to 
the public. It does not account for the intermediary role of the media in interpreting and 
communicating the scientific consensus on climate change to the public. Kellstedt et al. 
(2008) also note that the mass media complicate the matter: 
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The knowledge-deficit model—as well as the behavior of global-warming 
activists—leads us to suspect that increasing levels of information will heighten 
risk perceptions. But, on the other hand, the media’s framing of the global warming 
issue as an unsettled controversy leads us to expect that information levels will not 
produce increasing concern for global warming (p. 116). 
This thesis contributes to research like Kellstedt et al.’s by examining the relationship 
between knowledge and concern for climate change. The studies discussed above show 
that the information that the public encounters on climate change in the media is by no 
means accurate or unbiased, suggesting that public knowledge of climate change may 
be low. The rest of this chapter reviews research, mostly polls and surveys, examining 
public knowledge of climate change and public concern for climate change to see 
whether the scientific consensus is filtering through. If so, we would expect to find that 
the public had both high knowledge and high concern for climate change, providing 
intuitive support that the knowledge-deficit theory applies to concern for climate 
change. 
2.1.4 Public knowledge of climate change 
As well as the ‘informationally biased’ information presented in the media, another 
reason public knowledge of climate change may be low is because climate change 
information is highly technical and relies on models requiring complex mathematical 
and scientific knowledge for interpretation, which makes it very difficult for people 
untrained in climate science to understand. Budescu, Broomell, and Por’s (2009) 
research illustrates this. They asked 223 American university students to estimate the 
probability of environmental and climate events described in selected sentences from 
the 2007 IPCC report. The researchers found that participants did not understand the 
risks of climate change well, and that they underestimated the risks. Participants’ 
estimates significantly deviated from the IPCC’s, even when participants had access to 
the IPCC’s guidelines for interpreting these risks (Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009). 
Budescu et al.’s participants were all university volunteers, meaning that they were 
more educated than the general public. Perhaps the general public would have even 
greater difficulty interpreting the risks.  
Psychological factors have also been shown to affect people’s knowledge of climate 
change. Joireman, Truelove, and Duell (2010) found that participants’ beliefs in climate 
change were very unstable and could be manipulated in psychological experiments. 
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Specifically, they found that heat-related primes (exposure to words like ‘hot’, ‘boil’, 
‘sun’, ‘fry’, etc) could increase participants’ beliefs in climate change. They also found 
that providing participants with high anchors for possible future temperatures made 
participants more likely to believe in climate change and more willing to pay to address 
climate change (they asked some participants whether they thought temperatures would 
rise by exactly 1ºF—a low anchor—and asked others whether they thought 
temperatures would rise by exactly 10ºF—a high anchor). Joireman et al.’s participants 
were all university psychology students who may have been more attuned to the effects 
being investigated. Future research should use a more representative sample to see 
whether stronger, or different, effects were found.  
Similarly, Li, Johnson, and Zaval (2011) surveyed 582 Americans and 290 Australians 
to assess climate change perceptions. They asked respondents to say whether the day 
they were completing the survey on was colder or hotter than usual. They found that 
participants from both countries who perceived the day’s temperature to be hotter than 
usual had higher beliefs in, and concern for, climate change than those who perceived 
the temperature to be colder than usual. Contrastingly, Joireman et al. (2010) found that 
participants’ beliefs in climate change were significantly positively correlated with low 
outdoor temperatures.  
Even the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ affect people’s understanding. 
Whitmarsh (2009) found that participants responded differently to the terms ‘climate 
change’ and ‘global warming’, with 4 percent of participants believing them to be 
separate phenomena (believing, for example, that global warming causes climate 
change). Whitmarsh also found that 23.1 percent of participants expressed concern for 
‘global warming’, while only 16.2 percent expressed concern for ‘climate change’ and 
that self-reported knowledge about ‘climate change’ is lower than about ‘global 
warming’ (Whitmarsh, 2009). 
Collectively, these studies all suggest that public knowledge of climate change is 
unstable and easily manipulated, perhaps pointing to general confusion and low 
understanding of the science. This thesis contributes to this research by examining 
levels of public knowledge of climate change. 
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Perceived knowledge of climate change 
Dunlap (1998) analysed Gallup survey data from Canada, the USA, Mexico, Brazil, 
Portugal, and Russia and found that most participants had low levels of perceived 
knowledge about climate change. Participants who said they understood climate change 
‘very well’ ranged from 3 percent of Portuguese participants who said they understood 
climate change ‘very well’ to 11 percent of American participants and 13 percent of 
Canadian participants (Dunlap, 1998). Dunlap (1998) also found that, in all six 
countries, younger, well-educated, male participants had the highest levels of perceived 
knowledge about climate change.  
In their 2006 survey of 959 New Zealanders and 893 Australians, Hatfield-Dodds and 
Jollands (2006) similarly found that female and younger participants had lower 
perceived information than male and older participants. They also found that perceived 
knowledge of climate change and support for climate change policies varied by job 
type. Specifically they found that farm owners and managers had higher perceived 
knowledge and lower stated support. They found that farmers displayed the highest 
perceived knowledge levels of all the groups, but also the lowest levels of concern for 
climate change (Hatfield-Dodds & Jollands, 2006).  
More recently, Leiserowitz, Smith, et al. (2010) similarly found that only 11 to 
14 percent thought they were ‘very well informed’ about climate change (how the 
climate system works, causes, consequences, potential solutions to climate change), 
while 51 to 52 percent said they were ‘fairly well informed’. In the 12 years between 
Dunlap’s and Leiserowitz et al.’s studies, the number of Americans considering 
themselves ‘very well informed’ about climate change remains unchanged at around 
11 percent. It would be interesting to know the characteristics of the participants with 
high perceived knowledge of climate change in Leiserowitz et al.’s study. Future 
research could further examine whether a correlation exists between young, well-
educated men and lack of concern for climate change, or whether young educated men 
tend to overestimate their perceived knowledge of most things.  
Taken together, these studies show low levels of public perceived knowledge of climate 
change. This thesis contributes to this research by examining New Zealand public 
perceptions of climate change knowledge in both Study 1 and Study 2. 
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Actual knowledge of climate change 
The rest of Section 2.1 reviews surveys examining public knowledge of climate change. 
Research shows that most people do accept anthropogenic climate change, but that 
generally people underestimate how strong the scientific consensus is (Jones, 2011a; 
Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, Mailbach, & Smith, 2010; Leiserowitz, Smith, et al., 2010; 
Wilson, 2000). Public knowledge of the nature, causes, and consequences of climate 
change is also low (Bord et al., 2000; Joireman et al., 2010; Leiserowitz, Smith, et al., 
2010; O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999; Pidgeon, Lorenzoni, & Poortinga, 2008). 
Kahlor and Rosenthal surveyed 805 Americans in 2005 to identify factors that predicted 
high knowledge of climate change. They found that the strongest predictors of climate 
change knowledge were: the number of information sources participants used to find 
information on climate change (the greater number of information sources, the higher 
level of knowledge), how well participants thought they understood information about 
climate change they had previously encountered in the media, general education levels, 
and self-reported efforts to seek out climate change information (Kahlor & Rosenthal, 
2009).  
In their 1997 survey of 1,218 Americans, Bord et al. (2000) found that knowledge of the 
causes of climate change is particularly important—being able to identify true and false 
causes of climate change was the most powerful predictor of  intentions to take 
voluntary actions and of support for hypothetical government policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. They found that people are just as willing to act on 
inaccurate information as they are on accurate information—participants who believed 
that unrelated environmental threats (such as pesticides) contributed to climate change 
were more likely to believe in climate change. Although belief in false causes was 
correlated with belief in climate change, it was only weakly related to intentions to take 
voluntary actions, and not at all related to support for government policies. The authors 
concluded that ‘translating public concern for global warming into effective action 
requires real knowledge’ (Bord et al., 2000, p. 205). In this vein, the next sections 
review surveys of actual public knowledge of climate change. 
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Understanding there is a scientific consensus  
Studies examining public perceptions of the scientific consensus on climate change 
show that people tend to underestimate the scientific consensus, perceiving much 
greater debate between scientists than there really is (Jones, 2011a; Leiserowitz, Roser-
Renouf, et al., 2010; Leiserowitz, Smith, et al., 2010; Newport, 2010; The World Bank, 
2009). 
The World Bank (2009) polled 13,518 respondents from 15 countries (see Figure 4), 
using a combination of face-to-face, telephone, and internet surveys. In only nine of the 
15 countries did more than 50 percent of respondents perceive most scientists to ‘think 
the problem is urgent and enough is known to take action’ (p. 7). In four countries 
(Japan, America, Indonesia, Russia), minorities perceived a scientific consensus.  
Figure 4: World Bank survey responses on perceptions of scientific consensus 
 
(Graph created with data from The World Bank, 2009) 
American researchers (Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, et al., 2010; Leiserowitz, N. Smith, 
et al., 2010) also found that participants generally underestimated the scientific 
consensus on climate change. Leiserowitz, Smith, et al. (2010) found that 39 percent of 
respondents said that most scientists think that climate change is happening, while 
38 percent said there was a lot of disagreement among scientists. This is similar to the 
World Bank’s findings for America (38 percent perceived there to be a scientific 
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consensus, while 43 percent believed scientists’ views to be fairly evenly divided) (The 
World Bank, 2009).  
Gallup, an American polling organisation, conducts a yearly survey of American 
attitudes toward the environment. Gallup’s March 2010 poll found that over the last 
two years the American public has become more likely to believe that scientists are 
uncertain about climate change. In 2010, 52 percent thought that scientists ‘believe that 
climate change is occurring’—down from 65 percent in 2006–2008. In 2010, 36 percent 
of the Americans surveyed believed that scientists were unsure about climate change, 
and a further 10 percent said most scientists believed climate change was not occurring 
(Newport, 2010).  
These studies show that people appear to be misinformed about the scientific consensus 
on climate change, perceiving there to be great debate among scientists that does not 
exist at the scale that they perceive. More research is needed to confirm this and 
broaden the research to other countries like New Zealand.  
Understanding the climate is changing 
Previous research shows that majorities of the public in Britain and America accept 
anthropogenic climate change (Jones, 2011a; Kirby, 2004; Krosnick, 2010; Leiserowitz, 
Smith, et al., 2010; Newport, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2009; Pidgeon et al., 2008), 
although longitudinal American surveys show that beliefs in human and natural causes 
fluctuate, and have decreased overall since 2007 (Jones, 2011a). 
A 2004 BBC poll of 1,007 Britons found that 64 percent attributed climate change to 
human activities while 18 percent said it was too early to determine whether humans are 
responsible (Kirby, 2004). In their 2005 nationally representative survey of 
1,491 Britons, Pidgeon, Lorenzoni, and Poortinga similarly found that 91 percent of 
participants believed the climate was changing, and that many participants could 
correctly identify some of the main human causes. The authors concluded that, in 
Britain, public scepticism about climate change had almost completely disappeared 
(Pidgeon et al., 2008).  
Leiserowitz, Smith, et al. (2010) found that 63 percent of Americans understood that 
climate change is happening, 19 percent said it was not happening, and 19 percent did 
not know. Fifty percent said that if climate change is happening it is caused mostly by 
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human activities, 35 percent said that if it is happening it is caused by natural changes, 
7 percent rejected the question and said that climate change was not happening.  
Gallup’s March 2011 poll representative of 1,021 Americans found that since 2003, the 
American public has become less certain that temperature increases are due to human 
activities (see Figure 5). The poll found that Americans have also become less 
convinced that the effects of climate change are already happening (18 percent in 2011 
said the effects would never happen—up from 9 percent in 1997) (Jones, 2011a).  
The Pew Research Center’s 2009 survey of 1,500 Americans found similar evidence of 
decreasing beliefs in anthropogenic climate change. Their August 2006 survey found 
that 77 percent of respondents agreed that there was ‘solid evidence that the earth is 
warming’, this dropped to 71 percent by April 2008 survey, and down to 57 percent by 
October 2009 (Pew Research Center, 2009).  
Figure 5: Gallup respondents’ beliefs in anthropogenic climate change 
‘From what you have heard or read, do you believe increases in the Earth’s temperature over the last 
century are due more to the effects of pollution from human activities or natural changes in the 
environment that are not due to human activities?’ 
 
(Jones, 2011a, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146606/concerns-global-warming-stable-
lower-levels.aspx)  
However, Krosnick (2010) questioned the validity of surveys showing trends of 
decreasing belief in climate change (specifically the 2009 Pew Research Center survey 
and the 2010 Gallup poll discussed above), as he claims the questions are worded 
ambiguously. Respondents were often asked their perceptions of scientific evidence or 
the news, not their personal opinions about climate change, meaning the same question 
could be interpreted in different ways. Krosnick’s own survey, designed to avoid 
ambiguity, still found a slight decrease in participants’ beliefs in climate change. He 
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surveyed 699 participants in a 2010 Stanford University climate change telephone 
survey (nationally representative of the United States). He found that 74 percent of 
respondents agreed that the earth’s temperature had increased over the last 100 years, 
down from 84 percent in 2007 and 80 percent in 2008, and that 75 percent of 
respondents said that human behaviour was mostly responsible for any warming.  
Understanding the causes 
Research examining public understanding of the causes of climate change has found 
that participants overestimated natural causes and underestimated the contribution of 
personal actions (such as cars and household emissions) and also falsely attributed 
blame to the ozone hole and ‘general pollution’ (Bord et al., 2000; Dunlap, 1998; 
Kempton, 1997; Leiserowitz, N. Smith, et al., 2010; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; 
Pidgeon et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 2009). People tend to merge climate change 
information into pre-existing ‘mental models’—thought processes explaining how 
things work. The two main mental models that people tend to assimilate climate change 
into are the ozone hole model and the general pollution model (Bord et al., 2000; Böhm 
& Pfister, 2001; Kempton, 1997).  
This mingling of separate issues and confusion about causes inevitably leads to people 
misunderstanding solutions and being unable to perceive the real risks. For example, 
many people mistakenly believe that banning aerosol spray cans would help mitigate 
climate change. (Bord et al., 2000; Böhm & Pfister, 2001; Dunlap, 1998; Kempton, 
1997; Leiserowitz, N. Smith, et al., 2010; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Pidgeon et al., 
2008; Whitmarsh, 2009). Other commonly misperceived (or overestimated) causes of 
climate change include volcanic eruptions, the sun, acid rain, toxic wastes, the 
American space programme, insecticides and nuclear power (Bord et al., 2000; 
Leiserowitz, N. Smith, et al., 2010; Whitmarsh, 2009).  
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) reviewed studies that assessed the climate change 
knowledge of Europeans and Americans, concluding that both Europeans and 
Americans had limited knowledge of the causes of climate change.  
In Britain, the 2004 BBC poll found that, of the 64 percent of respondents who 
understood that humans are responsible for climate change, 67 percent referred to 
transport emissions as a cause, 66 percent referred to deforestation, and 57 percent to 
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coal and oil-based electricity generation (Kirby, 2004). In 2005, Pidgeon, Lorenzoni, 
and Poortinga (2008) surveyed 1,491 Britons. When asked, unprompted, what the 
causes of climate change were, the main causes cited were air pollution (cited by 
39 percent of respondents), transport (31 percent), burning fossil fuels (29 percent), 
industrial emissions (19 percent), the ozone hole (19 percent), deforestation 
(15 percent), and nuclear power (5 percent). Whitmarsh (2009) found that, when asked 
unprompted to describe the causes of climate change, survey respondents referred to 
general pollution (cited by 22.8 percent of survey respondents), natural causes 
(16.6 percent), ozone layer depletion (19.8 percent), transport emissions (11 percent), 
industrial emissions (9.8 percent), fossil fuels (9.2 percent), deforestation (8.3 percent), 
and carbon dioxide or carbon emissions (6.1 percent). 
American researchers found similar results. Bord, O’Connor, and Fisher (2000) found 
that participants underestimated the large contribution of individual and domestic 
activities (cars, utilities, household heating and cooling) to greenhouse gas emissions. 
Leiserowitz, Smith, et al. (2010) asked participants to rate how much each item on a list 
of activities and processes contributed to climate change. The items that participants 
believed contributed ‘a lot’ to climate change were cars and trucks (chosen by 
49 percent of participants), burning fossil fuels for heat and energy (41 percent), 
deforestation (38 percent), the ozone hole (34 percent), toxic wastes (32 percent), 
aerosol spray cans (25 percent), nuclear power plants (23 percent), volcanic eruptions 
(20 percent), the sun (19 percent), acid rain (18 percent), the space program 
(10 percent), and cows (9 percent).  
In 2009, American researchers surveyed 248 Americans, replicating a mental models-
based climate change survey they had conducted of 177 Americans in 1992. They found 
that in 2009, respondents were much less likely to refer to the ozone hole and much 
more likely to refer to energy use. They found that in spite of these changes in 
perceptions, ‘changes are smaller than one might expect’ (p. 1521) and many 
respondents in 2009 still did not understand that climate change is mainly caused by 
increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, or that fossil fuel combustion 
is the main source of these concentrations (Reynolds, Bostrom, Read, & Morgan, 2010). 
The two studies did not involve the same participants.  
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It is difficult to directly compare the different studies examining public knowledge of 
climate change causes, as they all asked slightly different questions, though broad 
trends are apparent. Whitmarsh (2009) found that different survey methods (qualitative 
versus quantitative) affected participants’ levels of climate change knowledge—if 
researchers did not give participants a list of possible causes to choose from, their 
knowledge was lower (Whitmarsh, 2009). Overall it seems that participants generally 
overestimated natural causes and underestimated the contribution of human activities. 
Large numbers of participants incorrectly believed that climate change is caused by the 
ozone hole and general pollution.  
Understanding the consequences 
Existing research has found that people are least informed about the existing and 
projected impacts of climate change on human health (Leiserowitz, 2005; Sundblad et 
al., 2009). In their 2005 survey of 903 Swedes, Sundblad et al. (2009) found that 
participants’ knowledge of the weather, sea, and glacier-related consequences of climate 
change was higher than their knowledge of human health consequences (increase and 
spread of tropical diseases, increase of heat-related illnesses and deaths, etc). In his 
2003 nationally representative survey of 673 Americans, Leiserowitz (2005) found that 
participants made no associations to the impacts of climate change on human health 
(from temperature increases, impacts of extreme weather events, air pollution, water 
and food-borne diseases, vector and rodent-borne diseases, etc). He also found that very 
few Americans associated climate change with extreme weather events. Leiserowitz, 
Malbach, et al. (2010) found that 75 percent of Americans had not heard of coral 
bleaching, and 77 percent had not heard of ocean acidification. 
? 
Collectively, research into public knowledge of climate change finds that, overall, most 
people accept anthropogenic climate change, although perceive there to be more 
scientific debate than exists. The British and American publics also appear to 
underestimate human causes of climate change and overestimate natural causes. Health 
consequences of climate change appear to be the least well understood by the Swedish 
and American publics. Study 2 of this thesis contributes to existing research by 
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examining New Zealanders’ knowledge of the state, causes, and consequences of 
climate change. 
2.2 Concern for climate change 
How concerned is the public about climate change? What variables other than 
knowledge affect concern? To answer these questions, this section reviews surveys and 
polls on public concern levels, and examines the effects of variables such as 
demographics, values and worldviews, trust in experts, and perceived efficacy on 
concern for climate change. This will enable results to be located in a wider context and 
for New Zealand participants’ concern levels to be broadly compared to those in other 
countries.  
2.2.1 Global levels of concern for climate change 
While the scientific consensus on climate change is increasing, not only are people’s 
beliefs in anthropogenic climate change and the scientific consensus decreasing, levels 
of concern about climate change also appear to be decreasing (Dunlap, 1998; HSBC 
Climate Partnership, 2009; Jones, 2011a; Kellsted et al., 2008; Kirby, 2004; Lorenzoni 
& Pidgeon, 2006; MoRST, 2010; Newport, 2010; Radio New Zealand, 2010; ShapeNZ, 
2010; Whitmarsh, 2008). 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) reviewed European surveys of public perceptions of 
climate change in the 12 European Union member states from 1988–2002. They found 
that, although the results were not directly comparable over time, they provided a 
general indication on changing public perceptions of climate change, illustrating a trend 
of increasing concern from 1988 to 1992 and then declining concern from 1992 to 2002 
(see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: European Union member countries’ concern for climate change: 1988–2002 
 
(Graph created from data in Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006) 
In the World Bank’s 2009 poll described earlier, majorities from all 15 countries saw 
climate change as either a ‘very serious’ or ‘somewhat serious problem’ (see Figure 7). 
Participants from the low-income countries were more likely to see climate change as a 
‘very serious problem’ than participants from the high-income countries. In nine of the 
15 countries, majorities of participants believed climate change was already harming 
people in their country (The World Bank, 2009). 
Figure 7: Perceptions of climate change in 15 countries  
 
(Graph created from data in The World Bank, 2009) 
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The Pew Research Center’s 2009 survey found that the proportion of Americans who 
thought climate change was a ‘very serious problem’ dropped from 47 percent in April 
2008 to 36 percent by October 2009 (Pew Research Center, 2009).  
Nielsen and the Oxford University Environmental Change Institute conduct an annual 
climate change perceptions survey. The most recent survey, of 27,548 online 
respondents in 54 countries in October 2009, found that 37 percent of respondents said 
they were ‘very concerned’ about climate change (dropping from 41 percent in 2007). 
The country with the highest percentage of very concerned respondents was the 
Philippines, with 78 percent; the lowest was Estonia with 10 percent. The survey found 
that concern declined between 2007 and 2009 in 35 out of the 54 countries surveyed, 
falling most in Poland (by 23 percent) and Canada (by 22 percent) (Nielsen, 2009a). 
HSBC commissions a yearly (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) cross-cultural survey, the 
Climate Confidence Monitor. It is an online survey of 1,000 people in each of 
15 countries, measuring concern, confidence, commitment, and optimism about climate 
change. This longitudinal survey found that concern levels decreased in most countries 
between 2008 and 2010, although all countries—except for America, France, and Hong 
Kong—showed increases in concern from 2009 to 2010 (see Figure 8). The results also 
point to a difference between countries with different levels of economic development. 
Respondents from the more economically developed countries like the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, and France consistently 
showed the lowest levels of concern, while participants from the less economically 
developed countries like Mexico, Malaysia, India, Brazil, and China showed the highest 
concern levels (HSBC Climate Partnership, 2010).  
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Figure 8: Concern for climate change in 15 countries: 2007–2010 
 
(Graph created from data in HSBC Climate Partnership, 2010) 
Leiserowitz, Smith, et al. (2010) found that 55 percent of American participants said 
they were ‘very worried’ (16 percent) or ‘somewhat worried’ (39 percent) about climate 
change; and 45 percent said they were ‘not very worried’ (26 percent) or ‘not at all 
worried’ (19 percent).  
Gallup’s March 2011 poll asked participants to choose whether they thought the 
seriousness of climate change is ‘generally exaggerated in the news’, ‘generally 
correct’, or ‘generally underestimated’ (see Figure 9). Results showed that Americans 
who believe that the seriousness of climate change is ‘generally exaggerated’ climbed 
from 31 percent in 2005 to 48 percent in 2010, dropping slightly to 43 percent in 2011 
(Jones, 2011a). Although beliefs that the seriousness of climate change is exaggerated 
have decreased since 2010, the overall trend has been one of increasing scepticism, so 
time will tell whether this trend has been reversed. Jones notes that 2011 is the third 
consecutive year where ‘a substantial plurality has believed global warming’s effects 
are not as bad as they are portrayed, a departure from prior years, when Americans were 
about evenly split between the three points of view’ (p. 1). 
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The Gallup poll also found that the percentage of Americans who say they ‘personally 
worry a great deal’ or ‘a fair amount’ about climate change has fluctuated from a high 
in 2000 of 72 percent, to a near all-time low in 2011 of 51 percent. 
Figure 9: Gallup respondents’ perceptions of climate change in the news 
‘Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view, is the seriousness of global warming generally 
exaggerated, generally correct, or is it generally underestimated?’ 
 
(Jones, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146606/concerns-global-warming-stable-
lower-levels.aspx)  
In their longitudinal study (November 2008–July 2010), Leiserowitz et al. (2010; 2011) 
segmented the United States public into six groups, ranging along a ‘spectrum of 
concern’ about climate change. The groups were (from most to least concerned): the 
Alarmed (convinced of reality and danger of anthropogenic climate change, strongly 
supported individual and political action), the Concerned, the Cautious, the Disengaged, 
the Doubtful, and the Dismissive (convinced climate change is not happening, and that 
if it were, it would be due to natural causes; strongly opposed any action). They found 
that the largest proportion of Americans was consistently in the Concerned group (see 
Figure 10). In spite of this, between 2008 and 2010 the proportion of Americans in the 
Doubtful and Dismissive groups increased, though the most recent survey in July 2010 
(not depicted in Figure 10) found that they slightly decreased. Between 2008 and 2010 
the proportion of Americans in the Alarmed and Concerned groups decreased, though 
they marginally increased in July 2010 (Leiserowitz & Smith, 2011). Although concern 
in July 2010 was still lower than in November 2008, the July 2010 results suggest 
perhaps a stabilising, or reversal, of the trend in declining concern, though further 
longitudinal research is needed to establish this. It would also be interesting to repeat 
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this study in other countries to compare the proportions of people in the different 
groups. 
Figure 10: Proportion of US population in each of the six concern groups  
 
(Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, et al., 2010, p. 9)  
New Zealand public concern for climate change 
The ShapeNZ (2010) environmental issues survey is an online survey nationally 
representative of 1,066 New Zealanders. This survey found that public attitudes towards 
climate change followed a similar trend to those in America, with a decline in the 
number of New Zealanders who believed that climate change ‘is a problem to be dealt 
with now or urgently’—dropping from 76 percent in 2008 to 65 percent in 2010. The 
number of New Zealanders who believe that climate change is ‘not a problem at all’ 
increased from 8 percent in 2007 and 9 percent in 2008, to 17 percent in 2010. 
Similarly, the Nielsen and Oxford University (2009a) survey discussed earlier found 
that only 19 percent of New Zealand respondents were ‘very concerned’ about climate 
change. This was the fifth lowest concern level out of the 54 countries surveyed, equal 
with Russia. 
A 2010 New Zealand telephone poll of 500 people, commissioned by the business 
lobby group Greenhouse Policy Coalition (made up of some of New Zealand’s largest 
greenhouse gas emitters), found that in 2009, 42 percent of respondents agreed that 
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climate change was a serious issue. In 2010 that percentage dropped to 36 percent. New 
Zealand climate change experts pointed out that the poll’s questions were biased and 
leading (Radio New Zealand, 20 September 2010). 
The Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (2010) surveyed 1,200 
New Zealanders on their attitudes towards science and technology. This survey was a 
repeat of a survey done in 2002 and again in 2005. The survey found that the proportion 
of New Zealanders believing that climate change would benefit from research had 
decreased since 2002, although majorities still believed research into climate change 
would be ‘quite beneficial’ (30 percent) or ‘very beneficial’ (28 percent) (see 
Figure 11). Very few New Zealanders believed that research into climate change was 
‘not at all beneficial’ (4 percent) or ‘not very beneficial’ (9 percent), although the 
proportion of people in these groups has increased since 2002 (MoRST, 2010).  
People’s beliefs of whether climate change would benefit from research do not 
necessarily correspond to their concern about climate change. It is likely that there is a 
correlation between belief in increased research and concern, although people who do 
not think that research would be beneficial could be concerned about climate change but 
think that the science is already robust and conclusive enough without further research. 
Or perhaps people who believe that climate change would benefit from further research 
believe this because they are unconvinced by anthropogenic climate change. 
Figure 11: New Zealanders’ changing beliefs in the benefits of research into climate change 
 
(Graph created from data in MoRST, 2010) 
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? 
Although the surveys described in this section are not directly comparable, they appear 
to show a general global trend that concern for climate change increased until 2007 or 
2008, and then declined from 2008 to 2009 or 2010. The limited data available suggests 
that this trend applies for New Zealand public concern for climate change. The more 
recent international surveys reviewed suggest that this trend is stabilising or perhaps 
reversing since mid-2010, though longer-term research in a wide variety of countries is 
needed to confirm this.  
Potential causes for decreasing concern could be information fading from the news 
about the 2007 IPCC report, ‘Climategate’ (discussed further in Section 2.2.2), and the 
effects of the global financial crisis in the late-2000s causing increased concern for the 
economy, but decreased concern for climate change. This thesis contributes to this 
research by examining New Zealand public concern for climate change at four separate 
time-points from June 2008 to October 2010. 
Climate change as a personal and domestic risk 
Research shows that people generally don’t think that they personally will be affected 
by climate change. People tend to see climate change as a temporally and 
geographically distant phenomenon and, when surveyed, rarely mention personal 
causes, consequences, or solutions (Bord et al., 2000; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; 
Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, Doria, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2006; Milfont, 2010; Whitmarsh, 
2009). Psychologists refer to these biases as ‘environmental hyperopia’ (people tend to 
be more worried about environmental problems when they are further away, meaning 
they have higher concern for global environmental problems than local ones), and 
‘optimism bias’ (a general tendency to believe that undesirable events are more likely to 
happen to other people, but less likely to happen to oneself) (Milfont, 2010; Uzzell, 
2000).  
Illustrating this, a 2004 BBC poll found that although 90 percent of respondents thought 
the United Kingdom would feel some impact (47 percent expecting ‘a lot’ of effects, 
and 43 percent ‘a little’), 43 percent said they did not expect climate change to have 
much effect on them personally, with 9 percent saying it would have no effect on them 
at all (Kirby, 2004). Similarly, Bord et al. (2000) found that American participants did 
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not perceive climate change to have significant personal impacts (50 percent believed 
climate change to be a societal risk, while only 23 percent believed it to be a personal 
risk). They also found that participants rated climate change much lower than other 
environmental risks such as hazardous chemicals (24 percent personal risk, 67 percent 
societal risk), air pollution (39 percent personal risk, 66 percent societal risk), and water 
pollution (34 percent personal risk, 63 percent societal risk). Leiserowitz’s 2003 
nationally representative survey of 673 Americans, also found that 68 percent were 
most concerned about the impacts of climate change on people around the world and on 
other animals or ecological systems—only 13 percent were most concerned about 
impacts on themselves, their family, or local community (Leiserowitz, 2006). Sampei 
and Aoyagi-Usui’s (2009) nationally representative monthly survey of 2000 participants 
in Japan from July 2005 to September 2007, found that the public rated climate change 
more of a global risk than a domestic risk. 
Leiserowitz (2006) noted that issues that the public had higher concern for—both 
environmental and non-environmental—were all issues with clearly understandable 
local effects or relevance. He found that ‘most Americans lacked vivid, concrete, and 
personally relevant affective images of climate change, which helps explain why 
climate change remains a relatively low priority national or environmental issue’ (p. 
55).  
Lorenzoni et al. (2006) reviewed studies of public risk perceptions of climate change in 
the United Kingdom and United States, and found that both publics had similar 
perceptions—they considered climate change ‘a distant threat, of limited personal 
importance’ (p. 265). Similarly, Whitmarsh (2008) found that the British public did not 
consider climate change a direct, personal threat. 
Contrastingly, Agho, Stevens, Taylor, Barr, and Raphael (2010) found in their 2007 
nationally representative telephone survey of 2004 Australians that 56.3 percent were 
‘extremely concerned’ that they or their family would experience negative 
consequences of climate change.  
The high personal concern exhibited by the Australian public in Agho et al.’s study 
could be because the study was conducted in 2007, the year the latest IPCC report was 
released, which meant climate change would have been in the news and presumably 
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Australian media would have drawn public attention to the report’s projected climate 
change consequences for Australia by 2020–2030 (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007), or it 
could be that Australians generally have higher concern for climate change than the 
American or British public (this appears to be confirmed by HSBC’s survey, see 
Figure 8). Australia also experiences droughts, floods, and bush fires, which could lead 
the public to be more concerned about these increasing due to climate change.  
Together, these findings provide support for environmental hyperopia and optimism 
bias operating on public concern for climate change. 
Climate change as a priority 
Researchers have also found that participants did not consider climate change to be an 
urgent priority, often ranking it low on lists of public concerns and even low on lists of 
environmental concerns (Jones, 2011b; Kirby, 2004; Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni & 
Pidgeon, 2006; MoRST, 2010; Radio New Zealand, 2010; Saad, 2011; Whitmarsh, 
2008).  
Illustrating this, the BBC’s 2004 poll asked participants to choose the most important 
issues facing the United Kingdom. Respondents chose: health (88 percent), crime 
(88 percent), education (86 percent), terrorism (73 percent), poverty (71 percent), 
immigration (68 percent), and climate change (53 percent) (Kirby, 2004). Similarly, 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon’s (2006) review of European and American climate change 
surveys found that although people were generally concerned about climate change, 
they were more concerned about other issues in their daily lives, such as health, safety, 
family, and finances. Whitmarsh (2008) also found that the British public did not 
consider climate change a priority concern. Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui (2009) found 
similar results in Japan. When asked to cite the most serious issue in Japan, participants 
(nationally representative of the Japanese public) did not rank climate change highly, 
placing it below ‘pension’, ‘falling birthrate and aging population’, and ‘economy’.  
Similarly, in New Zealand, The Greenhouse Policy Coalition’s 2010 poll (the business 
lobby group described earlier) found that participants ranked climate change last out of 
a list of 10 issues facing people in New Zealand (Radio New Zealand, 2010). A more 
reputable source, the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (2010) found that, 
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overall, of the nine scientific and technological issues listed, respondents thought that 
climate change and space research would benefit least from research.  
The 2011 Gallup poll, in the United States, found ‘the widest margin in 30 years in 
Americans’ prioritizing economic growth (54%) over environmental protection (36%)’ 
(Jones, 2011b, p. 1). When Gallup first asked the question in 1984, 61 percent 
prioritised environmental protection and 28 percent prioritised economic growth. This 
gap has gradually decreased, narrowing dramatically in the 2000s, and then economic 
growth climbed above environmental protection between 2008 and 2009. 
Research has also found that even when asked to rank environmental problems, climate 
change was still not prioritised. Böhm & Pfister (2001) found that, when asked to 
identify global environmental risks from a list of 16 options, only 15.3 percent of 
German respondents selected climate change, behind air pollution (selected by 
40 percent of respondents), ozone depletion (32.7 percent), nuclear power 
(25.9 percent), deforestation by pollution (23.5 percent), and water pollution 
(15.6 percent). In Lorenzoni and Pidgeon’s (2006) review of studies examining 
European and American climate change perceptions, they found that in 2004, climate 
change was the third environmental issue that members of the European Union were 
most concerned about (cited, with air pollution, by 45 percent of respondents), 
following water pollution (47 percent) and ‘human-caused disasters’ (46 percent). It is 
interesting that climate change was considered separately to the category ‘human-
caused disasters’. 
Gallup’s 2011 poll found that respondents said they worried least about climate change 
out of a list of nine environmental problems (toxic waste contamination and water 
pollution ranked jointly first). This is the same finding as in the 2001 poll, where 
climate change ranked last out of eight environmental problems (and pollution of 
drinking water ranked first), although in 2001 63 percent worried ‘a great deal / fair 
amount’ about climate change, while in 2010 this had dropped to 51 percent (Saad, 
2011). 
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? 
Collectively, the studies described show that the public does not consider climate 
change a personal threat or a priority concern. However, these studies were from more 
economically developed, mostly Western countries, with large per-capita greenhouse 
gas emissions (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and New Zealand). It 
would be interesting to see more surveys done in countries that are more vulnerable, 
and less able to adapt, to climate change. It would also be interesting to see studies 
linking concern levels with perceived vulnerability to climate change. 
2.2.2 Variables (besides knowledge) affecting concern 
The rest of this chapter looks briefly at variables other than knowledge that previous 
research has found to varyingly affect concern for climate change. Study 1 and Study 2 
include most of the variables discussed below, to examine their effect on concern for 
climate change alongside knowledge levels.  
Demographic variables 
The effects of demographic variables on concern for climate change vary, depending on 
the study. Increasingly, perceived efficacy, environmental values, worldviews, and 
political ideology are shown to be better predictors of concern for climate change than 
demographic variables. As a corollary, the explanatory power of demographic variables 
is often modest in models measuring climate change perceptions (Kellstedt et al., 2008; 
Whitmarsh, 2011). For example, Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf et al. (2010) found that 
their six groups of differing levels of concern for climate change did not differ much 
demographically—the differences lay in their personal values, beliefs, and political 
orientations.  
Age 
Research (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Xiao & McCright, 2007) tends to find that age is 
negatively correlated with concern for environmental problems such as climate change, 
with younger people showing higher levels of concern. Heath and Gifford (2006) found 
that older participants were more likely to believe in natural causes of climate change 
and in non-negative consequences. They found that older participants were more 
apathetic about environmental issues in general. However, O’Connor, Bord, and Fisher 
(1999) found that while younger (American) participants had higher intent to take 
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voluntary actions to mitigate climate change, older participants were more likely to vote 
for policies imposing social sacrifices to address climate change. 
The Nielsen Company and Oxford University Environmental Change Institute survey 
found that, of the North American participants, those aged 55–59 years and 30–34 years 
were the most concerned about climate change (Nielsen, 2009b). It found that 39 
percent of North American participants aged 55–59 were ‘very concerned’ about 
climate change, compared to 21 percent of North American participants under 20 who 
were ‘very concerned’. 
Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis include measures of age to contribute to this research. 
Gender  
Research generally shows that women are more concerned about environmental 
problems such as climate change than men are (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, & Grover, 
2008; Davidson & Freudenburg, 1996; Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 
2000; Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994; Leiserowitz, 2006; McCright, 2010; Mobley, 
Vagias, & DeWard, 2010; P. Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993; Xiao & McCright, 2007) and 
that belief in climate change is lower in men than women (Joireman et al., 2010).  
Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994) surveyed 1,275 white Americans and 214 non-white 
Americans in their nationally representative survey of environmental health risks. They 
found what has come to be known as the ‘white male effect’, concluding that ‘white 
males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions—on 
average, they perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other 
people’ (p. 1101).  
O’Connor, Bord, and Fisher (1999) found that female participants expressed higher 
intent to take voluntary actions to mitigate climate change than men. Even when the 
researchers controlled for risk perception and environmental beliefs, they found that 
‘male environmentalists are less likely than female environmentalists to take voluntary 
actions for mitigate [sic] climate change’ (p. 467). They also found that, if they 
controlled for general beliefs towards government and the environment, men (and older, 
better educated voters) were more likely to vote for policies imposing public sacrifices 
to address climate change than women (and younger voters) (O’Connor et al., 1999). 
This could perhaps reflect differing access to income. 
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In his analysis of the 2001–2008 environmental Gallup polls, McCright (2010) found 
that women had greater knowledge of climate change than men, although women 
underestimated their knowledge more than men did. 
In their survey of 621 Swedes, Sundblad et al. (2007) found that female respondents 
were more worried about climate change than male respondents, although both female 
and male participants had similar perceptions of the likelihood of serious negative 
consequences of climate change. 
Collectively these studies show that women tend to have higher concern for climate 
change and other environmental risks than men do. Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis both 
analyse the relationship between gender and concern to contribute to this research. 
Ethnicity 
Studies have also found that ethnic minorities (within America) tended to perceive 
climate change as a greater risk, and that white American participants had lower belief 
in climate change (Joireman et al., 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006). Illustrating this, 
Leiserowitz and Ackerlof (2010) found that Hispanics, African Americans, and people 
of other races often showed the highest levels of support for hypothetical climate 
change policies, even when the policies imposed greater costs on the public. White 
Americans showed the lowest levels of concern for climate change.  
Study 1 of this thesis includes a measure of ethnicity to contribute to this research. 
Education 
Research shows that people with higher education levels not only know more about 
climate change, but are also more concerned about climate change and more likely to 
support research into climate change and government policies to address it than the less 
educated (Bord et al., 2000; Kahlor & Rosenthal, 2009; MoRST, 2010; Mobley et al., 
2010; O’Connor et al., 1999; Xiao & McCright, 2007). Whitmarsh (2011) found that 
participants with high education levels were less likely to be sceptical or uncertain 
about climate change. Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis include measures of education to 
contribute to previous research.  
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Geographic location  
Research shows that although people from less economically developed countries often 
have lower general environmental concern than people from more economically 
developed countries (Mohai & Bryant, 1998), they have higher levels of concern for 
climate change (HSBC Climate Partnership, 2009; Kellsted et al., 2008; Nielsen, 2009a; 
The World Bank, 2009). This perhaps reflects that these countries will be 
disproportionately affected by climate change.  
People living in cities and people geographically vulnerable to climate change have 
been found to display higher levels of concern than those living in rural areas and in less 
vulnerable regions (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, et al., 2008; MoRST, 2010). 
The Ministry of Research, Science and Technology’s 2010 survey discussed earlier 
found that 62 percent of respondents from major New Zealand cities believed that 
‘research into climate change’ was beneficial, compared to a lower New Zealand-wide 
proportion of 58 percent (MoRST, 2010), reinforcing findings that people living in 
cities are more concerned about climate change than those living in rural areas. 
Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, and Grover (2008) investigated the relationship between 
physical vulnerability and public perceptions of global climate change in the United 
States via 1,093 geocoded telephone interviews. They found that respondents who lived 
on higher ground or further away from coasts were significantly less concerned about 
the risks of climate change than those living closer to coasts or on lower ground. Brody 
et al. note that most Americans associate climate change with rising sea levels, which 
may explain this risk perception. However, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) report an 
unpublished qualitative study by Bickerstaff, Simmons, and Pidgeon (2004) that found 
that even participants living in areas vulnerable to climate change ‘had difficulties 
relating the impacts of climate change (which many were aware of) to their local area or 
day-to-day life’ (p. 81). Similarly, Whitmarsh (2008) found that flood victims in 
southern England did not have higher concern for climate change than non-flood 
victims. 
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Values and worldviews 
People’s worldviews and underlying values are increasingly being seen as some of the 
most powerful predictors of concern for climate change (Crompton, 2010; Kahan et al., 
2010; Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; Whitmarsh, 2011). Leiserowitz (2006) describes 
worldviews as representing different rationalities, or sets of ‘pre-suppositions about the 
ideal nature of society’, which leads people with different worldviews to identify and 
interpret risks in different ways, and to prefer different policy responses (p. 49). 
Kahan, Braman, and Jenkins-Smith’s 2009 survey of 1,500 Americans found that 
participants formed opinions about climate change that were inconsistent with the 
scientific consensus because they ‘systemically overestimate the degree of scientific 
support for positions they are culturally predisposed to accept’ (2010, p. 25). Kahan et 
al. proposed that people’s identification with hierarchical and individualist worldviews 
versus egalitarian and communitarian worldviews leads them to fit their perceptions of 
scientific consensus (as well as how they search for, interpret, and recall information) 
with their pre-existing values—polarising extreme opinions even further.  
Leiserowitz (2006) found that values were the strongest predictor of participants’ 
preferences for climate change policies—stronger than political ideology or political 
party support. He found that ‘support for national and international climate policies was 
strongly associated with pro-egalitarian values, while opposition was associated with 
anti-egalitarian, pro-individualist and pro-hierarchist values’ (p. 63). 
Similarly, Whitmarsh (2011) found that ‘beliefs about climate change are 
fundamentally linked to existing values and worldviews’ (p. 8). She also found that 
worldviews and values (for example, economic development versus environmental 
protection) affected participants’ perceptions of the meaning and credibility of climate 
change information, and the trustworthiness of the people presenting it. 
Environmental attitudes and values  
Environmental attitudes and values are some of the biggest predictors of concern for (as 
well as belief in) climate change (Bord et al., 2000; Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, et al., 2008; 
Heath & Gifford, 2006; Joireman et al., 2010; Kellstedt et al., 2008; Nilsson, von 
Borgstede, & Biel, 2004; O’Connor et al., 1999; Whitmarsh, 2011). 
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O’Connor et al. (1999) found that stronger general environmental beliefs were 
significantly related to higher willingness to take both voluntary and voting actions to 
address climate change. Bord et al. (2000) found that participants with high 
environmental values were much more likely to believe in climate change, but did not 
have higher intentions to engage in specific climate-friendly behaviours. Bord et al. 
concluded that behavioural intentions require accurate knowledge of the specific causes 
of climate change (Bord et al., 2000). 
Heath and Gifford (2006) examined the relationships between three environmental 
attitudes (ecocentric—belief in intrinsic value of nature, anthropocentric—belief in 
instrumental value of nature for humans, and environmentally apathetic) with four 
variables (beliefs in causes and consequences of climate change, behavioural intentions, 
self-efficacy, and free-market ideology). They found that ecocentrism was positively 
correlated with the first three variables, but negatively correlated with support for free-
market ideology. They did not find any significant correlations for anthropocentrism. 
They found that environmental apathy was most strongly negatively correlated with 
beliefs about causes and consequences of climate change and intention to act. They 
proposed that ‘environmental apathy may be the most fruitful [negative] predictor of 
global climate change beliefs and related behavioral intentions’ (p. 63).  
Brody et al. (2008) found that environmental values had a strong positive effect on 
participants’ climate change risk perceptions, with respondents with higher 
environmental values being significantly more concerned about climate change. 
Similarly, Kellstedt et al. (2008) found that participants with high environmental values 
were significantly more concerned for climate change and felt significantly more 
responsible for, and able to address, climate change. Whitmarsh’s research (2011) also 
reinforced these findings, as she found that environmental values (and with political 
ideology) had ‘by far’ the strongest correlations with scepticism and uncertainty about 
climate change (participants with low environmental values tended to be the most 
sceptical about the reality and severity of climate change).  
Study 1 measures environmental values using the new ecological paradigm (described 
in more detail in Section 4.3.3). 
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Political ideology 
Research generally finds that people who identify themselves as politically conservative 
are less concerned about environmental risks (Mobley et al., 2010; Xiao & McCright, 
2007). Research specifically focused on climate change also finds similarly that people 
who identify as politically conservative are less concerned about the risks of climate 
change and are less likely to accept that climate change is happening than people who 
identify themselves as politically liberal (Leiserowitz, 2006; Leiserowitz, Roser-
Renouf, et al., 2010; Malka et al., 2009; Whitmarsh, 2011). 
Heath and Gifford (2006) found that support for free-market ideology was significantly 
positively correlated with beliefs that climate change is not occurring, that it is not 
caused by humans, that it will have positive consequences, and with lower behavioural 
intentions to address it.  
Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, et al. (2010) found that, out of the six groups illustrating the 
scale of concern for climate change in America, participants belonging to the Doubtful 
and the Dismissive groups were much more likely to be politically conservative or 
Republican, while members of the Alarmed and Concerned groups were much more 
likely to be politically liberal or Democrats. Participants in the Dismissive group were 
the most likely to be part of the Tea Party movement (40 percent), followed by the 
Doubtful (23 percent). The other groups had few Tea Party members.  
Whitmarsh (2011) found that political ideology (along with environmental values) was 
by far the biggest predictor of scepticism and uncertainty about climate change. 
Participants with rightwing political views were generally the most sceptical about the 
reality and severity of climate change. 
As Figure 12 shows, Gallup’s March 2011 poll found large differences between 
Democrats’ and Republicans’ climate change perceptions. Democrats had much higher 
beliefs in, and concern for, climate change than Republicans.  
Collectively, the studies described point to a strong difference in the way politically 
liberal and politically conservative participants respond to climate change information, 
suggesting that climate change perceptions are highly politicised. Contributing to this 
research, Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis examine political party support and Study 1 also 
examines political ideology. 
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Figure 12: Concern for climate change by American political parties 
 
(Graph created from data in Jones, 2011a) 
Trust in experts 
Research tends to find that the public trusts scientists more than other sources of 
information about climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2010c; Nielsen, 2009a; 
Whitmarsh, 2009).  
Importance of trust 
The Ministry of Research, Science and Technology’s (2010) science and technology 
survey identified a group of New Zealanders termed ‘the Disengaged’, who had less 
trust in scientists than other New Zealanders, and the lowest beliefs in the benefits of 
science and technology. Forty-eight percent of the Disengaged did not support the 
government funding of science ‘unless we can be sure of its economic benefits’ (p. 35), 
compared to 19 percent of the rest of the participants. The report found that the 
Disengaged did not differ much from each other demographically but were unlikely to 
have any science education.  
Similarly, trust in climate change experts is an important factor for belief in climate 
change. Krosnick (2010) found that American participants who distrusted scientists 
were more likely to form conclusions on climate change by observing nature and the 
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weather—cold weather or colder average temperatures led them to conclude that 
climate change was not happening. Participants who trusted scientists discounted 
fluctuating weather and temperatures when forming their opinions about climate 
change. Krosnick found that the recent decline in participants who believed in climate 
change (84 percent in 2007, to 74 percent in 2010) was due to an increase in the number 
of participants who distrusted scientists. 
Similarly, Leiserowitz and Smith (2011) found that members of the Alarmed and 
Concerned groups of American participants trusted scientists more than any other 
information source, while members of the Doubtful and Dismissive groups were most 
likely to trust their own friends and family as sources of climate change information. 
Kahan et al. (2010) found that participants responded to expert opinion according to 
how the experts fitted with their cultural worldview. Hierarchical individualists 
responded more positively to an older, clean-shaven man in a suit than to a bearded man 
in a denim shirt—while the opposite was found for egalitarian-communitarians. By 
presenting climate change information that people may be culturally disposed to oppose 
via an expert they are culturally primed to trust, cultural cognition effects could be 
reversed, resulting in less-biased interpretations of climate change information (Kahan 
et al., 2010).  
This research identifies the importance of trust in determining public beliefs and 
perceptions of science and climate change, as well as potentially allowing the strong 
effects of values and worldviews to be overcome. Study 1 of this thesis also examines 
the relationship between concern for climate change and trust in experts to contribute to 
this research. 
‘Climategate’ and IPCC errors 
Two events that have been seen to increase public scepticism about climate change and 
lower trust in scientists were the highly publicised IPCC errors and so-called 
‘Climategate’. The IPCC’s 2007 Working Group II report included an unsupported 
projection that the Himalayan glaciers could disappear by the year 2035 (Bagla, 2010). 
IPCC leader Rajendra Pachauri admitted that the error would not have occurred if the 
IPCC had strictly followed its own procedures (Bagla, 2010). However, an open letter 
signed by hundreds of climate scientists in support of IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report 
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states, ‘none of the handful of mis-statements (out of hundreds and hundreds of 
unchallenged statements) remotely undermines the conclusion that “warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal” and that most of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid-twentieth century is very likely due to observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations’ (Yohe, Schneider, Rosenzweig, & 
Easterling, n.d.).  
In November 2009, hackers made public about 1,000 emails from the Climatic Research 
Unit of the University of East Anglia, England. The hackers presented the emails as 
evidence undermining climate change data and showing scientists supposedly 
conspiring to silence those scientists who did not support the scientific consensus on 
climate change (Krosnick, 2010; Muir, Boulton, Clarke, Eyton, & Norton, 2010). Three 
separate independent reviews subsequently exonerated the East-Anglia climate 
scientists, with the final report concluding ‘we find their rigour and honesty as scientists 
are not in doubt… In particular we did not find any evidence that might undermine the 
conclusions of the IPCC assessments’ (Muir et al., 2010, p. 11). 
There has been a lot of speculation about the effect of the errors and the hacked emails 
on people’s climate change perceptions and trust in scientists, particularly as the media 
coverage of the initial scandals was much more comprehensive than its coverage of the 
exoneration of the East Anglia climate scientists. Figure 13 illustrates New Zealand 
media coverage of pre and post-exonerating enquiries on ‘Climategate’. As Figure 13 
shows, all the media organisations analysed had much less coverage of ‘Climategate’ 
once the scientists were exonerated, except for Stuff.co.nz. Stuff.co.nz and Radio New 
Zealand had the lowest coverage of either event (Griffin, 2010). 
Several American studies specifically investigated the effect of these highly publicised 
events on public perceptions of climate change. Krosnick (2010) found no overall 
decline in American respondents’ trust in environmental scientists (average trust in 
scientists was 68 percent in 2008, 70 percent in 2009, and 71 percent in 2010). He 
found that only 9 percent of respondents had heard about the hacked emails and 
believed it meant they couldn’t trust scientists, and only 13 percent had heard about the 
IPCC errors and believed it meant they couldn’t trust scientists (Krosnick, 2010). 
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Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf et al. (2010) found that these events influenced the 
perceptions of American participants who were already sceptical of climate change and 
already distrusted scientists—primarily individuals with strong individualistic 
worldviews or those who were politically conservative. Of the six groups they identified 
with differing levels of concern for climate change, the Dismissive and the Alarmed 
were most likely to have heard about and followed the news about the hacked emails 
and the errors in the IPCC reports. These stories made the Dismissive and the Doubtful 
groups less trustful of scientists and more convinced that climate change is not 
happening. The stories did not affect the Alarmed groups’ views on climate change or 
trust in climate scientists.  
These findings again illustrate the importance of trust in forming climate change 
perceptions. ‘Climategate’ took place between Study 1 and Study 2 of this thesis, 
perhaps suggesting that there will be a decline in public trust in scientists. 
Figure 13: Keith Ng’s graph showing New Zealand media coverage of ‘Climategate’  
Pre-exonerating enquiries (blue) and post-exonerating enquiries (red) 
 
(Griffin, 2010, http://sciblogs.co.nz/griffins-gadgets/2010/08/21/how-the-media-lost-
interest-in-climategate/)  
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Perceived efficacy 
Perceived efficacy (also referred to as ‘agency’, ‘self-efficacy’, ‘personal efficacy’, and 
‘perceived behavioural control’) is one of the most important predictors of pro-
environmental behaviour (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, et al., 2008; Eden, 1993; Heath & 
Gifford, 2006; Howell, 2011; Kellstedt et al., 2008; Kerr, 1989; Kerr & Kaufman-
Gilliland, 1997).  
Perceived efficacy is a person’s perception that their behaviour will have a significant 
effect on the outcome of a large group (Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kerr, 1989). When 
people do not perceive their behaviour to have much impact on a collective outcome, 
they are less likely to engage in that behaviour (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). A 
perceived lack of efficacy in social dilemmas essentially leads to Hardin’s ‘tragedy of 
the commons’, where people ‘rationally’ pursue their own self-interest at the expense of 
the collective interest of the group (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997).  
Kerr (1989) showed that group members facing social dilemmas believed that self-
efficacy declined as group size increased—even when experiments were designed to 
ensure that this was not the case, and even when experiments were designed so that the 
opposite was true. This is a particular concern for climate change, given the global 
nature of the problem (group size = 6.8 billion!). 
Unsurprisingly, studies show that high levels of perceived efficacy are some of the 
strongest predictors of concern for climate change (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, et al., 2008; 
Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008). Brody et al. (2008) found that 
respondents with high levels of efficacy and responsibility to mitigate climate change 
were more concerned about the risks of climate change. Kellstedt et al. (2008) found 
that high perceived efficacy was the biggest predictor of concern for climate change. 
Heath and Gifford (2006) found that perceived efficacy was the biggest predictor of 
participants’ intentions to take actions to mitigate climate change, concluding, ‘it 
appears that before individuals are ready to act against climate change, they must 
believe that even a small thing one individual can do will make a meaningful 
difference’ (p. 64). 
In Aitken, Chapman, and McClure’s (in press) survey of 192 New Zealanders, they 
found that participants who scored highly on powerlessness (‘the feeling that climate 
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change is too big for my actions to have an impact’) and the commons dilemma 
(‘feeling that other individuals will not change their actions even if I do’) were less 
likely to have taken action to mitigate climate change (p. 6). They also found that 
participants’ perceptions of the commons dilemma and their perceptions of the risks of 
climate change (concern for climate change) were more effective at motivating action 
on climate change than perceived knowledge levels. These concepts of powerlessness 
and the commons dilemma can be seen to represent the opposite of perceived efficacy, 
and reinforce findings that low perceived efficacy will lead to low concern for, and 
behavioural intentions to mitigate, climate change. 
Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis examine the relationship between perceived efficacy and 
concern for climate change to build on this research. 
2.3 Summary of research and gaps identified 
The first half of this review showed that the public has low knowledge of climate 
change—underestimating the strength of the scientific consensus, overestimating 
natural causes, underestimating human causes, and confusing causes of climate change 
with other environmental problems like stratospheric ozone depletion. The second half 
of this review showed that public concern for climate change is generally high, but 
varies between countries and individuals, and appears to have decreased overall since 
2008. The public generally doesn’t consider climate change to be a priority concern or 
personal threat.  
The inconsistency between the increasing scientific consensus and the low levels of 
public knowledge and decreasing concern suggest it is unlikely that the 
knowledge-deficit theory applies to concern for climate change. Further longitudinal 
research from a wide variety of countries into concern and knowledge levels is required, 
as is research into the comparative effects of worldviews and values, demographics, and 
political ideology on concern for climate change. 
Few existing studies of climate change perceptions include measures of knowledge. As 
described in Chapter 1, those that do include these measures do not produce conclusive 
findings on the relationship between knowledge of climate change and concern, though 
hint at differences between perceived and actual measures of knowledge. This thesis 
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seeks to contribute to the growing body of research on this subject. Next, Chapter 3 
describes the methodology and research questions for this thesis.  
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Research questions 
The following two main research questions and sub-questions address some of the 
research gaps identified in the literature review and the aim of this thesis: To determine 
whether the knowledge-deficit theory applies to concern for climate change. 
1. Does perceived knowledge of climate change predict concern? 
2. Does actual knowledge of climate change predict concern? 
o What are the comparative climate change knowledge levels of groups of 
New Zealanders? 
o Which knowledge types (state, causes, consequences, types of 
consequences) are best and least understood? 
3. Do other variables affect concern more than knowledge of climate change? 
3.2 Research design 
The best way to address these research questions and to meet the research objectives is 
by conducting and comparing two quantitative survey-based studies, one examining 
perceived knowledge of climate change and the other measuring actual knowledge of 
climate change. Two previous studies were selected and adapted for New Zealand 
participants.  
3.2.1 Study 1: Perceived knowledge and concern for climate change 
The first study is based on Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz’s study (2008) that examined 
American participants’ perceived knowledge and concern for climate change. Study 1 
uses existing data from the 2008 New Zealand Social Attitudes Survey, analysed 
following Kellstedt et al.’s method. Multiple regression analysis was performed to 
examine the effects of various demographic, information, and identity variables on 
participants’ levels of concern for climate change (see Section 4.3 for detailed 
methodology of Study 1).  
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3.2.2 Study 2: Actual knowledge and concern for climate change 
The second study is based on Sundblad, Biel, and Gärling’s study (2009) that examined 
Swedish participants’ actual knowledge of climate change (See Section 5.3 for detailed 
methodology of Study 2). An online survey of groups of New Zealanders’ actual 
knowledge of climate change was conducted, and data was analysed following 
Sundblad et al.’s method. Analysis of variance was performed to compare participants’ 
knowledge of the state, causes, and consequences of climate change, as well as their 
confidence in this knowledge. Knowledge was adjusted by confidence to provide more 
accurate knowledge scores.  
Kellstedt et al.’s multiple regression analysis was then performed, this time using a 
measure of actual knowledge, to examine whether this would provide different results 
to the measure of perceived knowledge used in Study 1. 
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4 Study 1: Perceived knowledge and concern for 
climate change 
As Chapters 1 and 2 have shown, previous research into the effect of perceived 
knowledge on concern for climate change is inconclusive and studies produce 
contradictory results (Aitken et al., in press; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kellsted et al., 
2008; Malka et al., 2009; Whitmarsh, 2011). If the knowledge-deficit theory applies, 
perceived knowledge of climate change will be positively correlated with concern for 
climate change. Previous research has found that perceived knowledge positively 
predicted beliefs in negative effects of climate change (Aitken et al., in press; Heath & 
Gifford, 2006; Malka et al., 2009), and, contrastingly, that there was no significant 
relationship between perceived knowledge of climate change and scepticism or 
uncertainty about climate change (Whitmarsh, 2011). 
4.1 Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz (2008) 
Kellstedt et al. conducted a telephone survey of 1,093 randomly selected American 
participants from July to August 2004 to examine the effects of perceived knowledge of 
climate change, as well as various demographic and identity variables, on participants’ 
levels of concern for climate change. Their main findings are described below.  
1. Participants with higher perceived knowledge of climate change were less 
concerned about the risks of climate change and felt less responsible for, and less 
able to address, climate change than participants with lower perceived knowledge.  
2. Participants with higher confidence in scientists were also less concerned about the 
risks of climate change and felt less responsible for, and able to address, climate 
change than participants with lower confidence in scientists (Kellstedt et al., 2008).  
3. Perceived efficacy and environmental values were the best predictors of concern for 
climate change. 
The first two findings appear counter-intuitive and led Kellstedt et al. to reject the 
knowledge-deficit theory for concern for climate change, and conclude that it is an 
inadequate model for ‘understanding mass attitudes about scientific controversies’ 
(2008, p. 123). Study 1 of this thesis replicates Kellstedt et al.’s study in a New Zealand 
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context. It expands on their study by using a longitudinal design with three time-points 
over a 12-month period. 
4.2 Study 1 predictions 
The aim of Study 1 is to determine whether the knowledge-deficit theory applies to 
concern for climate change, using a measure of perceived knowledge of climate change. 
To address the relevance of the knowledge-deficit theory, the following main prediction 
will be tested.  
1. There will not be a significant1 relationship between perceived knowledge of 
climate change and concern for climate change. 
Contrary to Kellstedt et al.’s finding that high perceived knowledge was negatively 
correlated with concern for climate change, it is predicted that there will not be a 
meaningful relationship between perceived knowledge and concern. This in line with 
previous research (Aitken et al., in press; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Malka et al., 2009), 
and others finding it does not (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 2011) and the overall 
research prediction that actual knowledge will predict concern but not perceived 
knowledge.  
A number of sub-predictions will also be tested. 
2. Participants with high perceived efficacy will have high concern for climate change. 
3. Participants with strong environmental values will have high concern for climate 
change. 
4. Female and younger participants will have high concern for climate change. 
5. Participants with high confidence in science and trust in experts will have high 
concern for climate change. 
                                                          
1 When discussing results, relationships between variables are referred to as ‘significant’ or ‘non-significant’. 
Statistical significance describes the probability that a result would have come about by chance. It is described as a 
value between 0 and 1, labeled ‘p’. The following significance levels are commonly used in academic research: 
? p < 0.001, meaning there is a 0.1 percent chance of getting the results by chance 
? p < 0.01, meaning there is a 1 percent chance of getting the results by chance 
? p < 0.05, meaning there is a 5 percent chance of getting the results by chance. 
?  
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That is, it is expected that environmental values and perceived efficacy will be better 
predictors of concern than perceived knowledge level (Bord et al., 2000; Brody, Zahran, 
Vedlitz, et al., 2008; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008; Nilsson et al., 2004; 
O’Connor et al., 1999; Whitmarsh, 2011), and that female and younger participants will 
display higher concern than older and male participants (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, et al., 
2008; McCright, 2010). The effects of these demographic variables are expected to be 
weaker than the effects of environmental values and perceived efficacy (Kellstedt et al., 
2008; Whitmarsh, 2011).  
In contrast to Kellstedt et al., and in line with other research (Krosnick, 2010; 
Leiserowitz & Smith, 2011), it is expected that participants with high trust in experts or 
confidence in science will have high concern for climate change. 
4.3 Study 1 method  
Study 1 uses data collected by Dr Taciano Milfont as part of his 2008 New Zealand 
Social Attitudes Survey (Milfont, 2008). The Social Attitudes Survey incorporated 
Kellstedt et al.’s survey questions, enabling close replication of their analysis but with 
this New Zealand data. 
4.3.1 Procedure 
Participants completed the Social Attitudes Survey at three time-points over a 12-month 
period (June 2008–June 2009). 
Collecting data 
Time 1: June 2008 
On 9 June 2008, Time 1 of the Social Attitudes Survey was posted to 2,995 people 
randomly selected from the New Zealand electoral roll. Each person also received a 
consent form; a freepost return envelope; a cover letter that explained the Social 
Attitudes Survey and that invited the person to participate; and, to encourage 
participation, an entry form for a draw to win $500 worth of grocery vouchers. The cut-
off date for participants to return completed surveys was 9 August 2008. 
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Time 2: November 2008 
On 10 November 2008 (the first business day following the 2008 New Zealand general 
election), Time 2 of the Social Attitudes Survey was posted with a freepost return 
envelope, a covering letter, and an entry form for a draw to win $50 worth of grocery 
vouchers to participants from Time 1 who had agreed to participate in Time 2. The cut-
off date for participants to return completed surveys was 10 January 2009. 
Time 3: June 2009 
On 5 June 2009, Time 3 of the Social Attitudes Survey was posted with a freepost 
return envelope, a cover letter, and an entry form for a draw to win $100 worth of 
grocery vouchers to the participants from Time 2 who had agreed to participate in 
Time 3. The cut-off date for participants to return completed surveys was 
5 August 2009. 
Analysing data 
Regression analysis 
Three linear multiple regression analyses in SPSS (a statistical analysis program) were 
performed for each survey time, and the results compared to Kellstedt et al.’s results.  
Baseline models 
The first multiple regression analysed concern for climate change against a set of 
independent variables (ethnicity, gender, education, income, age, religious service 
attendance, political party support, political ideology, and environmental values) for 
each time-point. This provided a baseline model of concern for climate change.  
Expanded models 
The second regression analysed concern for climate change against an expanded set of 
independent variables (adding perceived knowledge level, perceived efficacy, media 
trust, trust in experts, and confidence in scientists) for each time-point. This provided an 
expanded model of concern for climate change.  
Perceived efficacy models 
The final regression analysed the perceived efficacy variable against the expanded set of 
independent variables for each time-point.  
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Reliability analysis 
Some of the variables used in this study are index variables. Index variables comprise a 
group of related variables. For example, the variable measuring ‘environmental values’ 
comprised 15 statements representing different aspects of the human-environment 
relationship, measured by the new environmental paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap, Liere, 
Mertig, & Jones, 2000). Reliability analysis measures and tests how internally 
consistent these 15 statements are at measuring the same underlying attribute 
(‘environmental values’). The Cronbach’s alpha statistic is the most commonly used 
measure of internal reliability. A general rule of thumb is that Cronbach’s alpha must be 
greater than 0.70 for a variable to be reliable (Pallant, 2010). 
Other statistics reported are eigenvalue statistics and factor loadings. Eigenvalues 
indicate the amount of total variance explained by a variable; and factor loadings are the 
correlation coefficients. 
4.3.2 Participants  
To ensure a nationally representative sample, the participants for Study 1 were 
randomly selected from the 2007 New Zealand electoral roll, using a Microsoft Excel 
random number generator. The selected households were split across the 69 New 
Zealand electorates, with sample sizes proportional to electorate size (Blackwell, 2009). 
Three thousand households were selected, resulting in an initial sample of 2,995, as five 
addresses turned out to be invalid. The final number of participants to complete and 
return all three surveys was 269 (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Number of participants who completed the survey at each time-point  
Participants Time 1 
June 2008 
Time 2 
November 
2008 
Time 3 
June 2009 
Total number of participants who responded to survey  581 377 355 
Number of participants providing data for this thesis 
(who completed the survey at all three time-points) 
269 269 269 
This section describes the characteristics of the Study 1 participants, comparing them to 
the general New Zealand population, as measured in the 2006 census (the most recent 
census at the time of writing). 
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Sample characteristics  
Ethnicity 
It is difficult to compare participants’ ethnicity with the general New Zealand 
population, because the Social Attitudes Survey and the 2006 census used different 
ethnicity classifications. Table 2 provides the main comparisons, showing that P?keh? 
were over-represented while New Zealanders of M?ori, Pacific Island and Asian 
descent were under-represented (Statistics New Zealand, 2006a). 
Table 2: Ethnicity distribution for Time 1, compared to national data 
Ethnicity Time 1 (%) 2006 census data (%) 
P?keh? 86.2 64.8 (‘European’) 
Other 11.8 11.6 
M?ori 2.2 14.0 
Pacific Peoples 1.5 6.6 
Asian 1.5 8.8 
Gender 
Female participants were over-represented at all three time-points (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2006a). The ratio of female to male participants varied marginally at each 
time-point because some participants did not indicate their gender at each time-point of 
the survey (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Gender distribution over the three time-points, compared to national data 
Gender Time 1 (%) Time 2 (%) Time 3 (%) 2006 census data (%) 
Female 66.5 66.2 66.7 
(N = 267) 
51.2 
Male 33.5 33.8 33.3 
(N = 267) 
48.8 
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Age 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 89 years and the median age increased consistently 
from Time 1 to Time 3 (see Table 4), as expected given the 12-month survey period. 
The participants’ median age was much higher at all three time-points (54, 55, 56 years) 
than the national median age of 35.9 years. This is because the survey was only sent to 
participants aged 18 or older, while the census records data on people of all ages 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2006b). 
Table 4: Age distribution over the three time-points 
Age  Time 1 (years) 
(N = 268) 
Time 2 (years) 
(N = 268) 
Time 3 (years) 
(N = 268) 
Mean  54.2 54.6 55.2  
Standard deviation  15.9 15.9 15.9  
Median  54.0 55.0 56.0 
Range  18–89 18–89 19–89  
Education 
Participants without a high school education and participants with NCEA / school 
certificate as their highest level of qualification were under-represented. Participants 
with polytechnic and university qualifications were over-represented (see Table 5).  
Table 5: Education levels for Time 1, compared to national data 
Education level  Time 1 (%) 2006 census data (%) 
Less than high school 19.3 22.4  
(‘No qualification’) 
NCEA / school certificate 24.6 35.5  
(‘Levels 1, 2, & 3 certificate’ and ‘overseas 
secondary school qualification’) 
Polytechnic 21.2 17.6 
(‘Level 4 certificate’ and ‘levels 5 & 6 diploma’) 
Undergraduate degree 18.9 10 
Postgraduate degree 15.9 4.2 
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Income 
Participants earning over $100,000 were over-represented, as were participants earning 
under $10,000 (see Table 6) (Statistics New Zealand, 2006c).  
Table 6: Income levels for Time 1, compared to national data 
Personal income (NZ$) Time 1 (%) 2006 census data (%) 
< 10,000 20.6 14.2 
11,000–20,000 18.1 19.5 
21,000–40,000 20.6 26.5 
41,000–100,000 31.3 21.2 
> 101,000 9.5 3.3 
Regional distribution  
The participants’ regional distribution was similar to the general population, although 
Auckland was under-represented and Canterbury and Wellington over-represented (see 
Table 7) (Statistics New Zealand, 2006b, 2006d).  
Table 7: Regional distribution for Time 1, compared to national data 
Region Time 1 2006 census data (%) 
Auckland 23.1 32.4 
Canterbury 14.6 13.0 
Wellington-Wairarapa 13.4 11.1 
Waikato 7.1 9.5 
Otago 7.1 4.8 
Manawatu-Wanganui 6.0 5.5  
Bay of Plenty 5.6 6.4 
Taranaki 5.6 2.6 
Hawke's Bay 5.2 3.7 
Northland 3.4 3.7 
Marlborough 2.6 1.1 
Southland 2.2 2.3 
Gisborne 1.1 1.1 
Nelson 1.1 1.1 
West Coast 1.1 0.8 
Tasman 0.7 1.1 
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Political party support 
Participants had higher support for the New Zealand centre-right political party, the 
National Party, at all three time-points, than they did for the centre-left party, the 
Labour party (see Table 8). This is consistent with the political situation in 
New Zealand at the time, as the government changed from Labour to National in 
November 2008, 10 days before Time 2. Time 2 levels of support for National were the 
highest. 
Table 8: Support for the Labour Party and the National Party 
Time-point Support or strongly support Labour 
(%) 
Support or strongly support 
National (%) 
Time 1 37.7 43.7 
Time 2 46.4 59.1 
Time 3 40.5 53.1 
? 
Although many of the participants’ main socio-demographic characteristics are similar 
to the general population, it is important to bear in mind that the Study 1 participants 
were, on average, whiter, richer, older, and better educated than the New Zealand 
population at the time of the 2006 census. 
4.3.3 Instruments 
The main instrument for Study 1 was the Social Attitudes Survey (human ethics 
approval granted on 22 May 2008: School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee 
number: 0835 May). See Appendix A for a reproduction of the relevant pages. All 
measures and variable scores were computed following Kellstedt et al.’s method. 
Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable in this study was concern for climate change, measured by 
calculating participants’ average scores for six questions / statements on climate change 
risks, creating an index variable. Three questions measured concern for public risks of 
climate change and were assessed on a 4-point scale from 1 (no risk) to 4 (extreme 
risk). Three statements measured concern for personal risks of climate change and were 
assessed on a 4-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). See Table 9 
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for the specific survey questions and statements that made up the variable, the factor 
loadings of the questions, and the eigenvalue and Cronbach’s alpha scores.  
Table 9: Factor analysis of concern for climate change variable 
Survey question / statement Factor loading  
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
What is the risk of global warming and climate change exerting a 
significant impact on public health in your town or city? 
.775  .817 .805 
What is the risk of global warming and climate change exerting a 
significant impact on economic development in your town or city? 
.803 .797 .825 
What is the risk of global warming and climate change exerting a 
significant impact on the environment in your town or city? 
.829 .822 .827 
Global warming and climate change will have a noticeably negative 
impact on my health in the next 25 years. 
.752 .789 .783 
Global warming and climate change will have a noticeably negative 
impact on my economic and financial situation in the next 25 years. 
.662 .715 .763 
Global warming and climate change will have a noticeably negative 
impact on the environment in which my family and I live. 
.682 .750 .780 
Eigenvalue  3.402 3.674 3.817 
Cronbach’s alpha  .846 .873 .885 
Independent variables 
Knowledge and efficacy variables 
Perceived efficacy  
As described in Chapter 2, perceived efficacy is a person’s perception that their 
behaviour will have a significant effect on the outcome of a large group. Responses to 
three statements were averaged to create an index variable combining perceptions of 
responsibility and efficacy, indicated on a 4-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
4 (strongly agree) (see Table 10). 
Table 10: Factor analysis of perceived efficacy variable 
Statement Factor loading 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
I believe my actions have an influence on global warming and climate 
change. 
.860 .869 .867 
My actions to reduce the effects of global warming and climate 
change in my community will encourage others to reduce the effects 
of global warming through their own actions. 
.782 .808 .838 
Human beings are responsible for global warming and climate change. .735 .743 .792 
Eigenvalue 1.891 1.959 2.081 
Cronbach’s alpha .703 .729 .778 
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Perceived knowledge level 
Participants were asked to indicate how well informed they considered themselves to be 
about climate change on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all informed) to 
10 (very well informed).  
Media trust 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of trust in climate change information 
provided by four different media sources: newspapers, television news, radio, and 
internet, indicating their level of trust in each on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not 
at all trustworthy) to 10 (very trustworthy). Cronbach’s alpha scores were 
.913 (Time 1), .911 (Time 2), and .928 (Time 3). 
Trust in experts 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of trust in climate change information 
provided by six different types of experts: university academics, scientists, government 
agencies, non-profit organisations, environmental interest groups, and other interest 
groups. Participants indicated their level of trust in each on an 11-point scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all trustworthy) to 10 (very trustworthy). Cronbach’s alpha scores were 
.902 (Time 1), .909 (Time 2), and .908 (Time 3). This differed from Kellstedt et al., 
who did not include academics or scientists in their analysis. 
Confidence in scientists 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of confidence in scientists’ understanding 
of climate change on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (very unclear understanding) to 
4 (very clear understanding).  
Identity and ideology variables 
Environmental values  
Environmental values were examined using the new ecological paradigm (NEP) scale. 
The NEP scale was first published in 1978 by Dunlap et al., and was revised in 2000 
(Dunlap et al., 2000). The Social Attitudes Survey used the full 15-item version of the 
NEP, while Kellstedt et al. used an abbreviated 8-item version. Participants indicated 
their level of agreement or disagreement with 15 statements about the relationship 
between humans and the environment, on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
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disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (see Table 11). The reverse-scored items were reversed 
before computing the alpha and mean score for this variable. The Social Attitudes 
Survey only measured environmental values at Time 1, so participants’ Time 1 NEP 
scores were used for the regression analyses for Time 2 and Time 3. 
Table 11: Factor analysis of the new environmental paradigm (NEP) variable 
Statement Factor 
analysis 
We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. .590 
Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. -.541 
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. .515 
Human ingenuity will insure [sic] that we do not make the earth unliveable. -.654 
Humans are severely abusing the environment. .524 
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them. -.437 
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. .558 
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial 
nations. 
-.626 
Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature. .370 
The so-called ‘ecological crisis’ facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. -.645 
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. .659 
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. -.441 
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. .622 
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it. -.471 
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological 
catastrophe. 
.720 
Eigenvalue 4.812 
Cronbach’s alpha .844 
Political party support 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of support for different political parties on 
7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support). Only support 
for Labour and National were analysed, to compare results with Kellstedt et al.’s 
‘partisanship’ variable, measured as either Democrat or Republican. The Social 
Attitudes Survey did not include the question on political party support at Time 3, so a 
variable was created that was the mean of each participant’s Time 1 and Time 2 answers 
for the Time 3 regression analysis. 
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Religious service attendance 
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had attended a religious service 
(excluding a wedding or funeral) in the last 7 days.  
Political ideology 
Participants were asked to indicate their political ideology on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). 
Demographic variables 
Participants were asked to indicate their ethnicity, gender, age, education level, and 
income. Ethnicity categories were combined to measure ethnicity nominally, as either 
P?keh? (1) or non-P?keh? (0), to be able to compare results with Kellstedt et al.’s ‘race’ 
variable (measured as either white or non-white). Gender was measured nominally as 
male (1) or female (0). Age was measured in years. Participants indicated their highest 
level of education out of five categories (secondary school incomplete; NCEA, School 
Certificate, or other secondary school qualification; polytechnic qualification or trade 
certificate; undergraduate degree; postgraduate degree). Participants estimated their 
gross personal income for 2007, choosing from nine categories ranging from ‘less than 
$10,000’ to ‘more than $141,000’, in NZ $10,000–$20,000 increments. 
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4.4 Study 1 results 
4.4.1 Summary of main findings 
The aim of Study 1 was to determine whether the knowledge-deficit theory applied to 
concern for climate change, using a measure of perceived knowledge. Multiple 
regression analyses showed that perceived knowledge level was not a significant 
predictor of concern for climate change (though the observed relationship was positive). 
This finding suggests that, for this data, the knowledge-deficit theory does not apply to 
concern for climate change, when using a measure of perceived knowledge. Perceived 
efficacy and environmental values were found to be good positive predictors of concern 
for climate change. 
4.4.2 Regression analyses 
Baseline model of concern for climate change 
The second columns of Tables 13–15 present the results of the baseline models at each 
time-point. 
Main findings 
In the baseline model, the profile of a person with high concern for climate change 
would be a younger female participant with high environmental values who supported 
Labour and had recently attended a religious service. 
The strongest significant predictor of concern was environmental values, with positive 
correlations at all three time-points. However, the strength of the correlation decreased 
at each time-point. Age was a weak but significant negative predictor of concern at 
Times 1 and 2. Other variables that were significant at one of the time-points were 
support for Labour (weak significant positive predictor at Time 1), religious service 
attendance (weak significant positive predictor at Time 2), and gender (being male) 
(slightly stronger significant negative predictor at Time 3).  
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Expanded model of concern for climate change 
The third columns of Tables 13–15 present the results of the expanded models at each 
time-point. 
Main findings 
In the expanded model, the profile of a person with high concern for climate change 
would be a younger participant with high levels of perceived efficacy and high 
environmental values. 
Perceived efficacy was the strongest significant predictor of concern, with positive 
correlations at all three time-points. However, the strength of the correlation decreased 
at each time-point. The environmental values variable was the second strongest positive 
predictor of concern overall, and was stronger than efficacy at Time 3. The strength of 
the environmental values correlation was weaker in the expanded model than it was in 
the baseline model. Age was only very weakly, yet significantly, negatively correlated 
with concern at Time 1. Perceived knowledge was not a significant predictor of concern 
for climate change.  
Overall, the expanded models were better models, as they explained more of the 
participants’ concern for climate change than the baseline models. This is described by 
the statistical concept of explained variance (R2). The Time 1 expanded model of 
concern for climate change had a variance of 45.2 percent, meaning that the variables 
making up the expanded model explained 45.2 percent of the participants’ total amount 
of concern for climate change, while the Time 1 baseline model explained only 
27.7 percent of participants’ total amount of concern. See Table 12 for the variances of 
the different models and time-points.  
Table 12: Explained variance of the two models compared over the three time-points  
 Baseline model: Adj R2 (%) Expanded model: Adj R2 (%) 
Time 1 27.7 45.2 
Time 2 22.9 38.0 
Time 3 18.9 35.1 
Kellstedt et al. 31.8 42.7 
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Table 13: Time 1: Baseline and expanded models of concern for climate change 
Independent 
variable 
Baseline model   Expanded model   
 B Std 
error 
Beta t B Std error Beta t 
Ethnicity 
(P?keh?) 
.029 .096 .018 .305 -.075 .086 -.047 -.867 
Gender (male) -.077 .075 -.064 -1.021 -.003 .069 -.002 -.037 
Education .019 .027 .045 .704 .016 .024 .038 .671 
Income .007 .019 .025 .349 -.001 .017 -.003 -.048 
Age -.007 .002 -.196 -3.111** -.005 .002 -.130 -2.278* 
Religious 
service  
attendance 
.106 .089 .071 1.197 .092 .081 .060 1.140 
Support for 
Labour 
.054 .023 .174 2.365* .035 .022 .110 1.595 
Support for 
National 
.013 .024 .043 .542 .020 .021 .068 .947 
Political 
ideology 
.026 .029 .062 .897 .041 .026 .097 1.558 
Environmental 
values  
.449 .064 .463 7.071*** .329 .060 .336 5.473*** 
Perceived 
knowledge 
level 
    .027 .019 .080 1.428 
Perceived 
efficacy 
    .359 .056 .410 6.437*** 
Trust in media     .005 .021 .016 .234 
Trust in experts     -.003 .024 -.010 -.129 
Confidence in 
science 
    .087 .048 .112 1.824 
Constant .836 .412  2.030* -.110 .381  -.288 
R2 .310    .491    
Adj. R2 .277    .452    
F  9.347 
 
   12.844    
N 269    269    
Note: The dependent variable is concern for climate change (see Table 9). 
*** = p < 0.001 
**   = p < 0.01 
*     = p < 0.05 
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Table 14: Time 2: Baseline and expanded models of concern for climate change 
Independent 
variable 
Baseline model   Expanded model   
 B Std 
error 
Beta t B Std 
error 
Beta t 
Ethnicity (P?keh?) .003 .111 .001 .023 -.072 .101 -.041 -.715 
Gender (male) -.163 .087 -.123 -1.882 -.095 .081 -.072 -1.181 
Education .024 .031 .050 .764 -.014 .029 -.030 -.490 
Income .023 .022 .077 1.058 .018 .020 .059 .885 
Age -.007 .003 -.165 -2.531* -.005 .003 -.112 -1.786 
Religious service  
attendance 
.217 .097 .137 2.234* .125 .091 .078 1.363 
Support for Labour .034 .028 .112 1.188 -.008 .028 -.027 -.294 
Support for 
National 
-.019 .029 -.066 -.644 -.042 .028 -.147 -1.502 
Political ideology .025 .034 .052 .732 .038 .032 .082 1.215 
Environmental 
values  
.400 .076 .370 5.251*** .206 .074 .193 2.799** 
Perceived 
knowledge  
level 
    .013 .021 .038 .635 
Perceived efficacy     .329 .070 .357 4.716*** 
Trust in media     .000 .029 .000 -.004 
Trust in experts     .041 .034 .114 1.220 
Confidence in 
scientists 
    .068 .058 .077 1.177 
Constant 1.175 .531  2.211* .927 .504  1.838 
R2 .264    .424    
Adj. R2 .229    .380    
F  7.430    9.578    
N 269    269    
Note: The dependent variable is concern for climate change (see Table 9). 
*** = p < 0.001 
**   = p < 0.01 
*     = p < 0.05 
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Table 15: Time 3: Baseline and expanded models of concern for climate change 
Independent 
variable 
Baseline model   Expanded 
model 
  
 B Std 
error 
Beta t B Std 
error 
Beta t 
Ethnicity 
(P?keh?) 
.004 .105 .002 .036 -.008 .097 -.005 -.086 
Gender (male) -.198 .083 -.155 -2.382* -.126 .080 -.098 -1.570 
Education .031 .030 .069 1.044 .010 .028 .023 .370 
Income .008 .021 .026 .359 .007 .020 .025 .369 
Age -.002 .003 -.055 -.847 .000 .002 .000 .006 
Religious 
service  
attendance 
.161 .095 .104 1.698 .121 .088 .077 1.375 
Support for 
Labour 
.051 .030 .160 1.709 .009 .029 .028 .316 
Support for 
National 
-.025 .031 -.081 -.800 -.045 .030 -.147 -1.519 
Political 
ideology 
.015 .032 .034 .470 .042 .030 .096 1.434 
Environmental 
values  
.319 .073 .303 4.392*** .221 .068 .209 3.237** 
Perceived 
knowledge  
level 
    .027 .021 .075 1.275 
Perceived 
efficacy 
    .217 .068 .239 3.183** 
Trust media     .021 .030 .064 .705 
Trust experts     .049 .034 .140 1.439 
Confidence in 
scientists 
    .083 .062 .090 1.343 
Constant 1.298 .506  2.565* .489 .516  .947 
R2 .225    .395    
Adj. R2 .189    .351    
F  6.322    8.969    
N 269    269    
Note: The dependent variable is concern for climate change (see Table 9). 
*** = p < 0.001 
**   = p < 0.01 
*     = p < 0.05 
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Perceived efficacy 
Because perceived efficacy was such a strong predictor of concern for climate change, 
Kellstedt et al. ran a final regression to find out why some participants had high levels 
of efficacy (and therefore concern) for climate change, and why others had low levels of 
efficacy (and concern) for climate change. (See Table 10 for the statements making up 
the perceived efficacy variable.) The perceived efficacy model analysed the same full 
list of variables from the expanded model, but used perceived efficacy as the dependent 
variable instead of concern for climate change. Overall, the perceived efficacy model 
accounted for 32.8 percent (Time 1), 44.7 percent (Time 2), and 32.2 percent (Time 3) 
of the explained variance in perceived efficacy (see Table 16). 
Main findings 
In the perceived efficacy model, a profile of a person with high perceived efficacy and 
responsibility for climate change would be a younger, female participant with a high 
level of trust in experts and high environmental values. 
Trust in experts was the strongest significant predictor of perceived efficacy, with 
positive correlations at all three time-points (though the Time 3 correlation was half as 
strong as those at Times 1 and 2). The environmental values variable was the next 
strongest predictor, with positive correlations at Times 2 and 3. Age was a significant 
negative predictor at Time 2 only, and gender (being male) a significant negative 
predictor at Time 3 only. Perceived knowledge level did not significantly predict 
perceived efficacy at any of the time-points. 
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Table 16: Models of perceived efficacy: All three time-points 
Independent variable Time 1    Time 2    Time 3    
 B Std error Beta t B Std error Beta t B Std error Beta t 
Ethnicity (P?keh?) .060 .109 .033 .552 .075 .103 .039 .726 -.037 .099 -.022 -.378 
Gender (male) -.154 .086 -.112 -1.777 -.069 .082 -.048 -.839 -.185 .080 -.145 -2.321* 
Education -.003 .031 -.007 -.110 .041 .030 .079 1.380 .014 .029 .030 .478 
Income .000 .021 .000 -.003 -.002 .021 -.006 -.093 .012 .020 .043 .620 
Age -.005 .003 -.114 -1.814 -.008 .003 -.175 -3.018** -.001 .002 -.023 -.373 
Religious service attendance .057 .102 .033 .557 .155 .093 .090 1.669 .128 .090 .082 1.428 
Support for Labour -.017 .028 -.048 -.621 -.001 .028 -.003 -.029 .007 .029 .023 .254 
Support for National -.041 .027 -.119 -1.511 -.040 .028 -.128 -1.393 -.057 .030 -.186 -1.897 
Political ideology -.012 .033 -.026 -.375 .045 .032 .089 1.408 .035 .030 .080 1.168 
Environmental values .144 .075 .129 1.915 .246 .073 .212 3.353** .247 .069 .233 3.563*** 
Perceived knowledge level .022 .024 .058 .933 .026 .022 .066 1.193 .027 .022 .077 1.273 
Media trust .027 .027 .078 1.006 .055 .029 .144 1.889 .037 .031 .111 1.204 
Trust in experts .125 .030 .352 4.204*** .141 .033 .358 4.237*** .077 .034 .218 2.272* 
Confidence in scientists .063 .061 .071 1.043 .027 .060 .028 .448 .106 .063 .114 1.684 
Constant 1.583 .470  3.370** .693 .499  1.388 .707 .497  1.424 
R2 .371    .484    .365    
Adj. R2 .328    .447    .322    
F  8.483    13.108    8.511    
N 269    269    269    
Note: The dependent variable is perceived efficacy (see Table 10). 
*** = p < 0.001  ** = p < 0.01  * = p < 0.05 
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4.4.3 Changing knowledge and concern levels over time 
As Tables 17 and 18 show, perceived knowledge levels were measured on a scale from 
0 (not at all informed’ to 10 (very well informed) and decreased from 6.09 at Time 1 to 
6.03 at Time 2, and then increased from Time 2 to their highest level of 6.21 at Time 3. 
Concern levels, measured on a scale from 1 (no risk) to 4 (extreme risk), were stable at 
2.53 over the 12-month period. 
Table 17: Perceived knowledge of climate change: June 2008 to June 2009 
 
Table 18: Concern for climate change: June 2008 to June 2009 
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4.5 Study 1 discussion 
4.5.1 Knowledge and concern 
Prediction 1: There will be no significant relationship between perceived knowledge of 
climate change and concern—confirmed  
Study 1 could not confirm the knowledge-deficit theory for concern for climate change. 
The relationship between concern and knowledge found in Study 1 was positive, 
although very weak and non-significant (see Tables 13–15). Kellstedt et al. found that 
more informed participants felt significantly less concern for climate change than 
participants who were not as well informed (Kellstedt et al., 2008). We cannot confirm 
that the knowledge-deficit theory applies to perceived knowledge of climate change and 
concern for climate change. This is similar to Whitmarsh’s (2011) finding that attitudes 
of scepticism for, and uncertainty about, climate change are unrelated to participants’ 
perceived knowledge levels. 
Kellstedt et al.’s baseline accounted for more variance than Study 1’s baseline models, 
while Study 1’s Time 1 expanded model accounted for more variance than Kellstedt et 
al.’s expanded model (and Study 1’s Time 2 and 3 expanded models, slightly less) (see 
Table 12). One reason for these differences in variance could be differences in the 
American and New Zealand publics’ sources of information about climate change. 
Perhaps the American public’s sense of concern is largely explained by demographic 
variables: Kellstedt et al.’s baseline model—containing mostly demographic 
variables—explained twice the variance that Study 1’s baseline models did. It is 
possible that the New Zealand public’s sources of concern could be better explained by 
knowledge and efficacy variables: Kellstedt et al.’s expanded model—including 
knowledge and efficacy variables—only improved on the variance of their baseline 
model by 10 percent, while Study 1’s expanded models improved on the variance of the 
baseline models by 20 to 30 percent. 
Changing knowledge and concern over the survey period 
Tables 17 and 18 showed that concern remained stable at all three time-points, while 
perceived knowledge levels decreased slightly and then increased. Although the scores 
cannot be compared to other studies (Kellstedt did not report the scores, and no other 
studies use these scales) to see how New Zealand concern levels compare, it is 
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interesting to note the trends—that mean concern levels did not change over the year, 
but perceived knowledge levels did. One reason for the slight decrease and then 
increase in perceived knowledge levels could be because of the timing of the three time-
points in relation to international climate change talks and conferences. As Table 19 
shows, the Time 1 survey period took place 6 months after the major Bali United 
Nations climate conference, COP 13 and at the time of other, though less well-
publicised, climate talks. Between the Time 1 and Time 2 survey periods there were no 
major climate conferences, and only one round of talks, which could explain the 
decrease in perceived knowledge. The second half of the Time 2 survey period 
overlapped with the Pozna? conference (COP 14), and this would have been expected to 
influence late survey respondents. The increase in perceived knowledge from Time 2 to 
Time 3 could correspond to the media attention given to Pozna?, and perhaps to media 
attention to the two smaller rounds of talks in Bonn. Another major time-related event 
was the New Zealand general election held directly before the Time 2 survey period. 
This is discussed in Section 6.1.1. 
Table 19: UNFCC talks and conferences compared to survey points 
3–15 December 2007 Bali COP 13 (major, well-publicised conference) 
31 March–4 April 2008 Bangkok UNFCC talks 
2–13 June 2008 Bonn UNFCC talks 
9 June–9 August 2008 Time 1 survey period 
21–27 August 2008 Accra UNFCC talks 
10 November–10 January 2008 Time 2 survey period 
1–12 December 2008 Pozna? COP 14 (major, well-publicised conference) 
29 March–5 April 2009 Bonn UNFCC talks 
2–13 June 2009 Bonn UNFCC talks 
5 June–5 August 2009 Time 3 survey period 
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4.5.2 Perceived efficacy  
Prediction 2: Participants with high perceived efficacy will have high concern for climate 
change—confirmed 
In line with previous research (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, et al., 2008; Heath & Gifford, 
2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008), Study 1 found that perceived efficacy was a strong 
predictor of concern for climate change. It was consistently the strongest predictor of 
concern at all three time-points.  
Perceived efficacy model  
Results for the multiple regression with perceived efficacy as the dependent variable 
varied from Kellstedt et al.’s findings.  
Kellstedt et al. found that participants with high levels of perceived knowledge felt 
lower levels of perceived efficacy. Study 1 found a non-significant positive correlation 
between perceived knowledge level and perceived efficacy. Kellstedt et al. also found 
that participants with high trust in experts and confidence in science had low levels of 
perceived efficacy. Contrastingly, Study 1 found that participants with high trust in 
experts had the highest levels of perceived efficacy. Kellstedt et al. found age to be a 
positive predictor of perceived efficacy, while Study 1 found it to be a negative 
predictor of efficacy though only significant at Time 2.  
Similarly to Kellstedt et al., Study 1 found environmental values to be a significant 
positive predictor of perceived efficacy.  
4.5.3 Environmental values  
Prediction 3: Participants with high environmental values will have high concern for 
climate change—confirmed 
The environmental values variable was a significant positive predictor of concern in all 
models, though stronger in the baseline models then in the expanded models and the 
strength of the correlation decreased at each time-point. This could perhaps be because 
environmental values were only measured at Time 1, and the Time 1 score used for the 
Time 2 and Time 3 analyses. This variable was the strongest predictor of concern in the 
baseline models and the second strongest in the expanded models (after perceived 
efficacy). This is in line with previous research that suggests that environmental values 
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are some of the strongest predictors of concern for climate change (Bord et al., 2000; 
Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, et al., 2008; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Joireman et al., 2010; 
Kellstedt et al., 2008; Nilsson et al., 2004; O’Connor et al., 1999; Whitmarsh, 2011). 
Kellstedt et al. similarly found environmental values to be the biggest predictor of 
concern in their baseline model, and second biggest after efficacy in their expanded 
model. 
4.5.4 Gender, age, and concern 
Prediction 4: Female and younger participants will have high concern for climate 
change—partially confirmed 
Gender was only a significant predictor of concern in the baseline model at Time 3, 
with female participants showing significantly higher concern levels than male 
participants. This trend is supported by previous research finding women display higher 
concern for environmental risks like climate change (Brody et al., 2008; Davidson & 
Freudenburg, 1996; Finucane et al., 2000; Flynn et al., 1994; Leiserowitz, 2006; 
McCright, 2010; Mobley et al., 2010; Stern et al., 1993; Xiao & McCright, 2007). 
Age was a significant negative predictor of concern for Times 1 and 2 in the baseline 
models and in the Time 1 expanded model, with younger participants showing higher 
concern than older participants. This is in line with previous research that suggests that 
values are better predictors of concern than demographic variables like age and gender. 
The environmental values variable was a better predictor of concern than gender and 
age, but perceived efficacy was stronger than both demographic variables and 
environmental values.  
4.5.5 Confidence in science and trust in experts 
Prediction 5: Participants with high confidence in science and trust in experts will have 
high concern for climate change—unconfirmed 
Kellstedt et al. found that participants with high confidence in science had lower 
concern for climate change than those with lower confidence in science. Study 1 found 
no significant correlations between these variables. However, the correlations were all 
positive (bar trust in experts at Time 1), just non-significant.  
Study 1: Perceived knowledge and concern for climate change 
 88 | Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
This could be because Study 1 did not measure actual knowledge levels. The 
information that participants encountered was unlikely to have accurately represented 
the scientific consensus (Antilla, 2010; M. Boykoff, 2008; M. Boykoff & J. Boykoff, 
2004, 2007; Lowe et al., 2006). Conceivably, participants could both highly trust 
scientists yet have low concern for climate change, as the messages they could perceive 
scientists to be giving—via the media—are that there is enough uncertainty and debate 
to justify lower concern. Participants may have perceived experts to be unconcerned, or 
at least undecided, about climate change. 
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5 Study 2: Actual knowledge and concern for climate 
change 
Study 1 suggested that, contrary to the knowledge-deficit theory, participants with high 
knowledge of climate change did not feel greater concern than participants with low 
knowledge. A likely explanation for this finding is that Study 1 measured perceived 
knowledge, which did not accurately reflect participants’ knowledge about climate 
change—instead perhaps reflecting the amount of misinformation present in the media, 
which is the public’s main source of climate change information. Study 2 tests whether 
the knowledge-deficit theory applies to concern for climate change, when participants’ 
actual knowledge levels are tested. 
5.1 Sundblad, Biel, and Gärling (2009) 
To measure climate change knowledge, a Swedish study by Sundblad, Biel, and Gärling 
was replicated and expanded on. Sundblad et al.’s study examined the following areas. 
1. Participants’ knowledge of the state, causes, and consequences of climate change. 
2. Participants’ confidence in their knowledge. 
3. The comparative knowledge levels (and confidence levels) of four groups: the 
general public (N = 621), environmental journalists (N = 72), environmental 
politicians (chairs of environmental committees, N = 145), and climate change 
experts (academics and scientists, N = 65) (Sundblad et al., 2009).  
Sundblad et al. then created adjusted knowledge scores for each group, by adjusting 
participants’ knowledge scores according to their confidence in that knowledge. This 
allowed them to assess how well confidence levels corresponded to actual knowledge, 
providing a more accurate measure of knowledge. 
This study was chosen as it provided the template for a survey measuring actual 
knowledge of climate change. Building on existing research would also enable 
comparison of New Zealanders’ knowledge levels to Swedish knowledge levels using 
the same instruments and analysis. 
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Sundblad et al.’s (2008) main findings were as follows. 
1. Experts had the highest levels of knowledge about climate change, followed by 
journalists, politicians, and the general public. 
2. Experts had the highest levels of confidence in their knowledge about climate 
change, followed by journalists, politicians, and the general public. 
3. After adjusting knowledge by levels of confidence, journalists scored higher than 
experts. 
4. All groups’ knowledge of causes was greater than their knowledge of state and of 
consequences. 
5. Knowledge of health consequences was lower than knowledge of weather 
consequences and of sea level and glacier consequences. 
As well as examining the four groups from the original study, five extra groups were 
included: environmental and non-environmental experts, policy advisers, managers, and 
farmers. These extra groups were analysed separately (see Appendix D) to compare 
results to Sundblad et al.’s study, but are discussed briefly in Section 5.5.1.  
5.2 Study 2 predictions 
The aim of Study 2 is to determine whether the knowledge-deficit theory applies to 
concern for climate change, using a measure of actual knowledge of climate change. To 
address this, the following main prediction will be tested. 
1. Actual knowledge of climate change will predict concern for climate change. 
Previous research has found that actual knowledge levels are good predictors of concern 
for climate change (Bord et al., 2000; Leiserowitz, Smith, et al., 2010; Nolan, 2010; 
Sundblad et al., 2007).  
A number of sub-predictions will also be tested: 
2. Accurate knowledge of climate change will be a better predictor of concern than 
perceived knowledge. 
3. Participants with high perceived efficacy will have high concern for climate change. 
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4. Female and younger participants will have high concern for climate change. 
5. Knowledge of the causes of climate change will predict concern better than 
knowledge of state or consequences. 
6. Climate change experts will have the highest knowledge and confidence in 
knowledge of climate change, followed by journalists, then politicians, then the 
public. 
7. Participants will have higher knowledge of causes than of state or consequences. 
According to Bord et al. (2000), accurate knowledge of causes is the best predictor of 
intentions to engage in climate change mitigating behaviour and to support government 
climate change policies. Sundblad et al. (2007) found that accurate knowledge of causes 
and consequences, particularly health consequences, predicted whether participants 
were concerned about climate change. These studies suggest that knowledge of the 
causes of climate change will predict concern best, followed by knowledge of 
consequences. 
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5.3 Study 2 method 
5.3.1 Participants 
Sample characteristics 
Study 2 was not intended to be a nationally representative sample. Instead, participants 
were required who fitted into distinct groups—scientists, academics, politicians, 
journalists, policy advisers, managers, farmers, and ‘other’. With the exception of 
farmers, these groups were, by definition, more highly educated, in higher-paying jobs, 
and more likely to live in Wellington than the general population (except perhaps 
managers who may be more likely to live in Auckland). One of the groups—‘general 
public’—was intended to broadly represent the general New Zealand population who do 
not work in jobs that relate to the environment or climate change, and was selected via 
snowball sampling. This section compares both the total sample (all participants) and 
the general public group to the 2006 New Zealand census data and to data from Study 1 
participants (the average of the three time points). This is to compare the general public 
group from Study 2 with the Study 1 participants, as these two groups are compared in 
Chapter 6. 
Excluding people who were not born in New Zealand and those who did not complete 
the survey, the total number of participants who completed the survey was 1,129 (see 
Table 20). After creating the groups used by Sundblad et al., the final sample was 452 
(the remaining 677 participants did not fall into the job types used in Sundblad et al.’s 
analysis). 
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Table 20: Study 2 participants’ job type distribution 
Job type Number of participants Percentage of sample 
Other 438 38.8 
Academics 168 14.9 
Scientists 230 20.4 
Politicians (central or local government) 29 2.6 
Public policy advisers 103 9.1 
Journalists or reporters 37 3.3 
Managers 93 8.2 
Farmers 31 2.7 
Total 1129 100.0 
Gender 
Males were slightly over-represented in the total sample, though females were over-
represented in the general public group (Statistics New Zealand, 2006a) (see Table 21). 
The general public group was closer to the 2006 census gender data than the 
participants in Study 1 were. 
Table 21: Study 2 participants’ gender distribution  
Gender All Study 2 
participants (%) 
Study 2 general 
public group (%) 
Study 1 
participants (%) 
(mean of all 
three time-
points) 
2006 census data 
(%) 
Female  46.7 54.5 66.5 51.2 
Male  53.3 45.5 33.5 48.8 
 
Study 2: Actual knowledge and concern for climate change 
 94 | Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
Age 
Table 22 shows that participants ranged in age from 17 to 88 years. The mean age was 
42.8 years, and the median 41 years—higher than the national median age of 35.9 years, 
and lower than the Study 1 median of 55 years. This difference to the national median 
age is probably because Study 2 participants were 17 years or older, while the census 
records data on people of all ages living in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 
2006b). 
Table 22: Study 2 participants’ summary stats for age distribution 
Age  Study 2 participants 
(years) 
Study 2 general public 
group (years) 
Study 1 participants 
(years) (mean of all 
three time-points) 
Mean  42.3 42.8 54.7 
Standard deviation  15.6 16.6 15.9 
Median  41.0 40.0 55 
Range  17–88 17–85 18–89 
Education 
Table 23 shows that participants were much more highly educated than the 
New Zealand population. The general public group was also more highly educated than 
the general population, though not as highly educated as the total sample. The general 
public group was also more highly educated than the Study 1 participants.  
Table 23: Study 2 participants’ education levels  
Education level Study 2 
participants (%) 
Study 2 
general 
public group 
(%) 
Study 1 
participants (%) 
(Time 1 data) 
2006 census data (%) 
Secondary school 
incomplete 
1.2 1.0 19.3 22.4  
(‘No qualification’) 
NCEA, School C, or 
other secondary 
school qualification 
5.8 9.0 24.6 35.5  
(‘Levels 1, 2, & 3 
certificate’ and 
‘overseas secondary 
school qualification’) 
Polytechnic 
qualification or trade 
certificate 
6.7 10.0 12.2 17.6 
(‘Level 4 certificate’ 
and ‘levels 5 & 6 
diploma’) 
Undergraduate 
degree 
31.2 40.5 18.9 10 
Postgraduate degree 55.2 39.4 15.9 4.2 
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Income 
Table 24 shows that participants generally had higher incomes than the New Zealand 
population (Statistics New Zealand, 2006c). The general public group was more similar 
to the 2006 census data than the Study 1 participants were. 
Table 24: Study 2 participants’ income levels  
Income bracket Study 2 
participants (%) 
Study 2 general 
public group (%) 
Study 1 
participants 
(%) (Time 1 
data) 
2006 census data 
(%) 
< 10 000 13.9 19.0 20.6 14.2 
11 000–20 000 9.3 9.7 18.1 19.5 
21 000–40 000 13.7 16.5 20.6 26.5 
41 000–100 000 50.0 47.3 31.3 21.2 
> 101 000 13.0 7.5 9.5 3.3 
Regional distribution 
Table 25 shows that participants from Wellington-Wairarapa and Otago were over-
represented, while participants from Auckland, Canterbury, and Waikato were under-
represented (Statistics New Zealand, 2006b, 2006d). The general public group was 
similarly over-represented in Wellington-Wairarapa and Otago and under-represented in 
Auckland, Canterbury, and Waikato. 
Table 25: Study 2 participants’ regional distribution  
Region Study 2 
participants (%) 
Study 2 general 
public group (%) 
Study 1 
participants 
(%) (Time 1 
data) 
2006 census data 
(%) 
Wellington-
Wairarapa 
48.9 55.7 13.4 11.1 
Auckland 16.0 17.3 23.1 32.4 
Otago 9.2 7.6 7.1 4.8 
Canterbury 9.1 8.3 14.6 13.0 
Waikato 4.6 2.1 7.1 9.5 
Bay of Plenty 2.6 2.4 5.6 6.4 
Manawatu-
Wanganui 
2.4 2.4 6.0 5.5 
Hawke's Bay 1.7 1.0 5.2 3.7 
Taranaki 1.1 1.0 5.6 2.6 
Nelson 0.9 0.3 1.1 1.1 
Southland 0.9 1.4 2.2 2.3 
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Region Study 2 
participants (%) 
Study 2 general 
public group (%) 
Study 1 
participants 
(%) (Time 1 
data) 
2006 census data 
(%) 
Tasman 0.8 0.3 0.7 1.1 
Marlborough 0.6 0.0 2.6 1.1 
Northland 0.5 0.0 3.4 3.7 
West Coast 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.8 
Gisborne 0.2 0.0 1.1 1.1 
Political party support 
Table 26 shows that Study 2 participants strongly supported Labour over National, the 
general public group to an even greater extent. This is very different to the Study 1 
participants, who supported National over Labour. 
Table 26: Support for National and Labour parties 
 All Study 2 participants 
(%) 
Study 2 general public 
group (%) 
Study 1 participants 
(%) (mean of all three 
time-points) 
Support or strongly 
support Labour 
60.3 63.2 41.5 
Support or strongly 
support National 
22.8 20.7 52.0 
Groups  
Climate change experts (N = 97) 
The climate change experts group was created by combining all of the participants who 
selected either the job type ‘academic’ or ‘scientist’ and who also specified that the 
work that they personally did related to climate change ‘very frequently’ or ‘always’. 
To recruit scientists, emails were sent to New Zealand scientific organisations and 
research centres. The Royal Society of New Zealand included a link to the survey in 
their national weekly electronic newsletter and in their Wellington-specific electronic 
newsletter. To recruit academics, emails were sent to relevant departments at all 
New Zealand universities. Notices about the survey were also posted around Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
Politicians (N = 29) 
The politicians group was created by combining all the participants who selected the job 
type ‘politician (central or local government)’. As low numbers of politicians completed 
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the survey, the sample could not be further split to examine environmental politicians as 
Sundblad et al. did. Seventeen politicians specified that the work they did ‘very 
frequently’ or ‘always’ related to the environment. 
To recruit politicians, emails were sent to all New Zealand Members of Parliament and 
to all New Zealand political parties, as well as to administrative staff for circulation. 
Emails were sent to the mayors and councillors at all New Zealand local and regional 
councils, and also to administrative staff. 
Journalists (N = 37) 
The journalists group was created by combining all the participants who selected the job 
type ‘journalist or reporter’. As with the politicians, this was too low a number of 
journalists to further split the sample to examine environmental journalists, although 
10 journalists specified that the work they did ‘very frequently’ or ‘always’ related to 
the environment. 
To recruit journalists, emails were sent to all New Zealand regional newspapers, and 
relevant television and radio stations. Media contacts at the Dominion Post, TV3, and 
Radio New Zealand were asked to forward the invitation email to their colleagues. 
General public (N =289) 
The general public group was created by combining all the participants who selected the 
job type ‘other’. To ensure this group did not mistakenly include environmental 
specialists, it also excluded any participants who said that the work that they personally 
did related to the environment ‘very frequently’ or ‘always’.  
Snowball sampling was used by sending an invitation email—with a description of the 
survey and link to the survey—to friends, family, and colleagues asking them to 
forward the email on to their contacts and so on. A public Facebook page was also 
created and the link was sent around, again using snowball sampling.  
5.3.2 Instruments 
The survey had three parts: Part 1: Climate change knowledge, Part 2: Climate change 
risk assessment, and Part 3: Demographic questions. The climate change risk 
assessment questions posed in Part 2 are not addressed in this thesis, as they are not 
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directly related to this analysis. There were three versions of the survey, which were 
identical except the questions were in different orders. This was to determine whether 
the ordering of the questions affected participants’ answers. 
Types of knowledge 
Climate change knowledge was measured by presenting participants with 22 true 
statements and 22 false statements about climate change—eight statements about the 
state of the climate, 14 statements about the causes of climate change, and 22 statements 
about the consequences of climate change (weather, sea-level rise, health, and 
New Zealand-specific consequences) (see Appendix B).  
The 22 true statements were taken from Sundblad et al.’s survey, which was based on 
the IPCC reports and checked with independent experts. Sundblad et al.’s survey was 
followed as closely as possible, but it was updated with more recent science and 
New Zealand-specific information (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007; Reisinger, 2009). A 
New Zealand climate change expert with the IPCC reviewed the revised statements2. 
The 22 false statements were to detect participants who answered true to all statements, 
and were a combination of common misperceptions about climate change and contrasts 
to the true statements. 
Following Sundblad et al. (2008), seven variables were created that were groups of the 
true statements, intended to represent different types of knowledge of climate change 
(see Appendix C). These variables were: the state of the climate, the causes of climate 
change, and projected consequences of climate change. The consequences variables 
were: weather consequences, sea level and glacier consequences, New Zealand-specific 
consequences, and health consequences. Like Sundblad et al. (2008), the false 
statements were not included in the results analysis because they were not directly 
comparable with the true statements. Knowledge scores were calculated as the mean 
correct answers for each variable. 
Confidence in knowledge 
For each question, participants also had to rate how confident they felt about their 
answer on a 6-point Likert scale, from 1 (very uncertain) to 6 (very certain). Confidence 
                                                          
2 Thanks to Dr Andy Reisinger for kindly reviewing the survey questions. 
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scores were calculated by averaging confidence ratings for answers to the true 
statements. 
Repeated information, identity, and demographic variables from Study 1 
The survey included some of the same questions used in the Social Attitudes Survey. 
This was to be able to re-run multiple regression analysis reported in Study 1 to see 
whether adding an objectively tested knowledge variable produced a different result 
supporting the knowledge-deficit theory.  
The variables repeated from Study 1 were: concern for climate change, perceived 
efficacy, support for Labour and support for National, perceived knowledge level, and 
demographic variables (age, income, education, gender, region).  
5.3.3 Procedure 
Collecting data 
Human ethics approval was granted on 14 September 2010 (approval number 
RM017957). On 5 October 2010, emails were sent inviting recipients to complete an 
online survey about climate change that ran until 1 November 2010. When participants 
typed in the URL to access the survey they were automatically rerouted via a separate 
website and randomly allocated to one of the three survey versions. The instructions on 
each survey asked participants to assess whether 44 statements about climate change 
were true or false, and to indicate how certain they were in each of their answers. The 
invitation email informed participants that they could choose to enter a draw for a $50 
grocery voucher as an incentive for participating in the survey. A reminder email was 
sent on 19 October 2010. 
Analysing data 
Data was analysed using SPSS. Following Sundblad et al., means were calculated, 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed, and Pearson’s 
correlations calculated. Finally, multiple regression analyses were performed. 
Calculating means 
To determine each group’s average level of knowledge and confidence, mean scores 
were calculated for each group for the different knowledge types (state, causes, 
Study 2: Actual knowledge and concern for climate change 
 100 | Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
consequences, and the types of consequences—weather, sea level and glacier, New 
Zealand, health) and each knowledge type’s corresponding mean confidence level. 
Analysis of variance  
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a statistical technique used to calculate whether there 
are significant differences between two or more means, allowing researchers to 
determine whether there are significant relationships between variables. ANOVA 
produces an ‘F ratio’, which represents the variability in scores between the variables 
divided by the variability in scores within the variables. A large F ratio suggests that 
there is more variability between the variables than there is within each variable 
(Pallant, 2010). 
Following Sundblad et al., a repeated measures ANOVA was performed for each 
knowledge type and another for each associated confidence level. Repeated measures 
ANOVA is used when testing a sample under several different conditions. ANOVA 
allows researchers to test for the ‘main effect’ of each independent variable and also any 
potential ‘interaction effects’. An interaction effect is when the effect of one 
independent variable on the dependent variable is affected by the level of another 
independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In the instance of an interaction effect, the main 
effect cannot be relied on to tell the full story.  
Post-hoc statistical tests  
ANOVA will determine whether or not there are significant differences but they will 
not describe what any differences are. Post-hoc tests help to interpret any differences 
identified in the ANOVAs. In line with Sundblad et al., post-hoc Bonferroni corrections 
were applied to any significant effects identified in the ANOVAs. 
A Bonferroni correction is a statistical method that addresses the problem of multiple 
comparisons. When many comparisons are simultaneously tested (as in an ANOVA), an 
overall significance level is found for all comparisons. Bonferroni corrections break the 
comparisons down and provide measures of significance for each comparison. 
Bonferroni corrections are conservative tests that control for the overall Type I error 
rate (the chance of mistakenly thinking that an effect has been found) over multiple 
significance tests. This means that it is more likely that a significant effect will be 
missed than a significant effect will be observed when one does not exist.  
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Pearson’s correlations 
Bivariate Pearson’s correlations were calculated to produce adjusted group mean 
knowledge scores for each type of knowledge with its corresponding mean confidence 
scores. These Pearson’s correlations can be interpreted as adjusted knowledge level 
scores that better reflect accurate knowledge—a high, significant score represents high 
knowledge that was well calibrated with confidence in that knowledge. A non-
significant score means that there was no significant relationship between knowledge 
and confidence in knowledge. A negative score means that confidence was lower for 
correct answers, perhaps implying that participants were guessing. 
Regression analysis 
A similar multiple regression analysis to that used in Study 1 was performed, to 
examine participants’ concern for climate change, and see whether including an 
objectively tested measure of climate change knowledge revealed a different 
relationship between knowledge and concern.  
Study 2 used the concern for climate change dependent variable from Study 1, though it 
did not have exactly the same set of independent variables. The Study 2 survey did not 
include questions on: ethnicity, religious service attendance, political ideology, new 
ecological values, trust in media, trust in experts, or confidence in scientists. It included 
the same measure of self-reported knowledge. To assess objectively tested knowledge 
levels, a new variable was created, which was the mean number of true questions that 
participants correctly answered. 
A second regression analysis included three knowledge variables—knowledge of state, 
knowledge of causes, and knowledge of consequences of climate change. This was to 
test whether knowledge of causes was a more powerful predictor of concern than state 
or consequences (Bord et al., 2000; Sundblad et al., 2007).  
As Study 1 looked at public concern for climate change, the regression analyses were 
only run for the participants in the general public group.  
Study 2: Actual knowledge and concern for climate change 
 102 | Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
5.4 Study 2 results 
5.4.1 Summary of main findings 
The multiple regression analyses showed that, unlike perceived knowledge, actual 
knowledge of climate change significantly positively predicted concern for climate 
change, specifically knowledge of the consequences of climate change, rather than 
knowledge of state or causes. This suggests that the knowledge-deficit theory holds for 
this data. 
Comparing mean knowledge levels showed that journalists had higher knowledge of 
state and causes of climate change, while experts had highest knowledge of 
consequences. The public had the third highest knowledge levels, and politicians had 
the lowest. This order varied for confidence, with experts showing the highest 
confidence in their knowledge, followed by politicians, then journalists, and the public 
with the lowest confidence in their knowledge.  
Adjusting knowledge by levels of confidence, the public had the best match between 
knowledge and confidence, followed by experts. Journalists had no significant 
relationship between their knowledge and their confidence. Politicians also had no 
significant relationship between knowledge and confidence, and had several negative 
relationships, suggesting high confidence in inaccurate answers.  
Overall, participants’ knowledge of the causes of climate change as well as the health 
consequences and sea level and glacier consequences were highest, and their knowledge 
of consequences, specifically knowledge of weather consequences, was lowest. 
5.4.2 Knowledge  
Knowledge of state, causes, and consequences 
Comparing mean knowledge levels of the state, causes, and consequences of climate 
change showed that journalists had the highest knowledge of state and causes, followed 
by climate change experts, then the public, and lastly politicians. Climate change 
experts had the highest knowledge of consequences, followed by journalists, the public, 
and lastly politicians (see Table 28 and Figure 14). 
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Table 27 presents the ANOVA results for knowledge types. Overall, this analysis 
showed that participants had higher knowledge of the causes of climate change than of 
the state of the climate or of the consequences of climate change. Of the four groups, 
climate change experts and journalists had significantly higher overall knowledge of 
climate change than politicians.  
Table 27: Summary of ANOVA results for knowledge type 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 4 (group) x 3 (knowledge type) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with repeated 
measure on knowledge type 
The groups were: climate change experts, 
politicians, journalists, and the public. 
The knowledge types were: state, causes, and 
consequences of climate change. 
Main effect of 
knowledge type 
F(1.85, 812.75)  = 48.77, p<.0005, 
Greenhouse-Geisser ? = .92 
Knowledge levels significantly varied by 
knowledge type. 
Main effect of 
group (job type) 
F(3, 440) = 2.93, p < .05 Knowledge levels significantly varied by 
group. 
Interaction effects None The lack of significant interactions between 
knowledge type and group; knowledge type 
and survey version; or knowledge type, 
group, and survey version means that the 
relationship between knowledge level and 
knowledge type was the same for each group 
and each survey version. 
Bonferroni on 
knowledge type 
Pairwise comparisons between state and 
causes were significantly different 
(p < .0005), as were those between causes 
and consequences (p < .0005), but not 
between state and consequences (p = .42). 
Participants had similar levels of knowledge 
of state and consequences, but different 
levels of knowledge of causes. Figure 14 
shows that all the groups’ knowledge of 
causes was much higher than knowledge of 
state or consequences. 
Bonferroni on 
group 
Politicians had significantly less accurate 
knowledge than climate change experts 
(p < .05) and journalists (p < .05). 
See Figure 14. 
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Table 28: Mean levels of climate change knowledge 
Group State Causes Consequences 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Climate 
change 
experts  
(N = 97) 
0.75 0.26 0.84 0.19 0.75 0.19 
Politicians 
(N = 29) 
0.64 0.27 0.79 0.19 0.60 0.27 
Journalists 
(N = 37) 
0.78 0.22 0.88 0.17 0.74 0.17 
Public 
(N = 289) 
0.71 0.26 0.84 0.18 0.68 0.20 
(The highest mean scores are in bold.) 
Figure 14: Mean levels of climate change knowledge  
 
Knowledge of consequences 
Comparing mean knowledge levels of the different climate change consequences 
showed that, overall, experts had the highest knowledge levels followed by journalists, 
then the public, and lastly politicians (see Table 30 and Figure 15).  
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Table 29 presents the ANOVA results for consequence types. Overall, this analysis 
showed that participants had significantly higher knowledge of the New Zealand-
specific and health consequences of climate change than of the weather consequences or 
sea level and glacier consequences. Of the four groups, climate change experts and 
journalists had significantly higher overall knowledge of climate change consequences 
than politicians.  
Table 29: Summary of ANOVA results for consequence types 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 4 (group) x 4 (consequence type) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with repeated measure 
on consequence type 
The groups were: climate change experts, 
politicians, journalists, and the public. 
The consequence types were: weather, sea 
level and glacier, New Zealand, and health. 
Main effect of 
consequence type 
F(2.48, 1090.77) = 40.55, p < .0005, Green
house-Geisser ? = .83 
Knowledge levels significantly varied by 
consequence type.  
Main effect of group 
(job type) 
F(3, 440) = 3.51, p < .05 Knowledge levels significantly varied by 
group. 
Interaction effects None  
Bonferroni on 
consequence type 
All pairwise comparisons were 
significantly different (p < .0005), except 
for those between New Zealand 
consequences and health consequences 
(p > .05). 
Figure 15 shows that knowledge of weather 
consequences was lowest, followed by sea 
level and glacier consequences. Knowledge of 
New Zealand and health consequences was 
highest. 
Bonferroni on group Climate change experts had significantly 
more accurate knowledge of consequence 
types than politicians (p < .01), and that 
politicians had significantly lower 
knowledge of consequence types than 
journalists (p < .05). 
See Figure 15. 
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Table 30: Mean levels of knowledge of climate change consequences 
Group Weather Sea level / glacier NZ Health 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Experts 
(N = 97) 
0.62 0.31 0.79 0.21 0.85 0.32 0.87 0.26 
Politicians 
(N = 29) 
0.51 0.36 0.64 0.29 0.69 0.41 0.67 0.38 
Journalists 
(N = 37) 
0.65 0.31 0.77 0.18 0.85 0.29 0.85 0.29 
Public 
(N = 289) 
0.61 0.29 0.70 0.21 0.78 0.35 0.80 0.30 
(The highest mean scores are in bold.) 
Figure 15: Mean levels of knowledge of climate change consequences 
 
5.4.3 Confidence in knowledge  
Confidence in knowledge of state, causes, and consequences  
Comparing participants’ mean confidence levels showed that experts were the most 
confident in their knowledge of state, causes, and consequences of climate change, 
followed by politicians, then journalists, then the public (See Table 32 and Figure 16).  
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Table 31 shows the ANOVA results for confidence in knowledge type. Overall, this 
analysis showed that participants had significantly higher confidence in their knowledge 
of the causes of climate change than in their confidence in their knowledge of state or 
consequences. This differed only for politicians, who had significant similarly high 
confidence in their knowledge of both causes and consequences. Of the four groups, 
climate change experts had significantly higher overall confidence in their knowledge of 
climate change than both journalists and the public, but not politicians.  
Table 31: Summary of ANOVA results for confidence in knowledge type 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 4 (group) x 3 (knowledge type) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with repeated measure 
on knowledge type. 
The four groups were climate change experts, 
politicians, journalists, and the public. 
The three knowledge types were the state, 
causes, and consequences of climate change. 
Main effect of 
knowledge type 
F(1.85, 811.83)  = 49.64, p<.0005, 
Greenhouse-Geisser ? = .92 
Confidence levels significantly varied by 
knowledge type. 
Main effect of group 
(job type) 
F(3, 440) = 23.64, p < .0005 Confidence levels significantly varied by 
group. 
Interaction effects F(5.54, 811.83) = 2.66, p < .05, 
Greenhouse-Geisser ? = .92 
The difference across confidence in knowledge 
type significantly varied by group.  
The difference was that politicians’ confidence 
followed a different pattern to the other 
groups. Experts had similarly high levels of 
confidence in consequences as they did in 
causes, while all other groups had relatively 
similar levels of knowledge of state and 
consequences (see Figure 16). 
Bonferroni on 
knowledge type 
All pairwise comparisons were significant 
(p < .0005), except between confidence in 
knowledge of state and confidence in 
knowledge of consequences (p = .09). 
Participants were more confident in their 
knowledge of causes than in their knowledge 
of state or consequences. 
Bonferroni on group Climate change experts had significantly 
higher confidence in their knowledge of 
state, causes, and consequences than 
journalists (p < .0005) and the public (p 
< .0005). 
See Figure 16. 
Table 32: Mean levels of confidence in climate change knowledge 
Group Confidence in state Confidence in causes Confidence in consequences 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Experts 
(N = 97) 
4.74 0.65 5.20 0.56 4.73 0.54 
Politicians 
(N = 29) 
4.38 0.89 4.63 0.70 4.58 0.71 
Journalists 
(N = 37) 
4.19 0.85 4.57 0.94 4.22 0.84 
Public 
(N = 289) 
3.99 0.91 4.45 0.79 4.11 0.79 
(The highest mean scores are in bold.) 
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Figure 16: Mean levels of confidence in climate change knowledge 
 
Confidence in knowledge of different consequences 
Comparing participants’ mean levels of confidence in their knowledge of consequences 
showed similarly that experts had the highest confidence levels, followed by politicians, 
then by journalists, and lastly the public (see Table 34 and Figure 17).  
Table 33 summarises the ANOVA findings. Overall, this analysis showed that 
participants had significantly higher confidence in their knowledge of health and 
New Zealand-specific consequences of climate change than of weather consequences or 
of sea level and glacier consequences. Of the four groups, climate change experts had 
significantly higher overall confidence in their knowledge of climate change 
consequences than journalists and the public, and politicians had significantly higher 
confidence than the public.  
Table 33: Summary of ANOVA results for confidence in consequence type 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 4 (group) x 4 (consequence type) 
repeated measures ANOVA, with 
repeated measure on consequence 
type 
The groups were: climate change 
experts, politicians, journalists, and 
the public.  
The consequence types were: 
weather, sea level and glacier, New 
Zealand, and health. 
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Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Main effect of consequence type F(3, 1320) = 46.49, p<.0005 Confidence levels significantly 
varied by consequence type. 
Main effect of group (job type) F(3, 440) = 14.31, p < .0005 Confidence levels significantly 
varied by group. 
Interaction effects F(9, 1320) = 2.13, p<.05 As with confidence in knowledge 
type, the difference across 
confidence in knowledge of 
consequence type significantly 
varied by group.  
The difference was that experts’ 
knowledge followed a different 
pattern to the other groups (see 
Figure 17). Experts had a much 
higher knowledge of sea level and 
glacier consequences than the other 
groups, and a (comparatively) much 
lower knowledge of health 
consequences. 
Bonferroni on consequence type All pairwise comparisons were 
significantly different (p < .0005), 
except for those between sea level 
and glacier consequences and 
New Zealand consequences 
(p = .48). 
Participants had significantly higher 
knowledge of health and 
New Zealand consequences than of 
weather or sea level and glacier 
consequences (see Figure 17. 
Bonferroni on group Climate change experts had 
significantly higher confidence in 
their knowledge of the types of 
consequences of climate change than 
journalists (p < .05) and the public 
(p < .0005). Politicians had 
significantly higher confidence in 
their knowledge of the types of 
consequences of climate change than 
the public (p < .05). 
See Figure 17. 
 
Study 2: Actual knowledge and concern for climate change 
 110 | Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
Table 34: Mean levels of confidence in knowledge of climate change consequences  
Group Weather Sea level and glacier New Zealand Health 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Experts 
(N = 97) 
4.38 0.88 4.88 0.65 4.69 0.84 5.12 0.77 
Politicians 
(N = 29) 
4.29 1.06 4.57 0.63 4.90 0.79 4.95 0.86 
Journalists 
(N = 37) 
3.94 0.95 4.28 0.90 4.45 1.13 4.66 0.98 
Public 
(N = 289) 
3.82 0.94 4.13 0.90 4.25 1.08 4.67 0.94 
(The highest mean scores are in bold.) 
Figure 17: Mean levels of confidence in knowledge of climate change consequences 
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Relationship between knowledge and confidence  
Overall, the general public had the best match between knowledge and confidence, 
causes was the best-matched knowledge type, and knowledge of health consequences 
the best-matched consequence type. 
As Table 35 shows, the match between knowledge and confidence was best for the 
public, followed by climate change experts, then journalists, and lastly politicians. Of 
the three main knowledge types (state, causes, consequences), climate change experts 
and the public had the best match for causes (these were the only significant 
correlations for knowledge type). Of the four consequence types, climate change experts 
had the best match for sea level and glacier consequences, while the public had the best 
match for health consequences, followed by New Zealand consequences (these were the 
only three significant correlations for consequence type). Politicians and journalists had 
no significant correlations at all. 
Table 35: Relationships between knowledge and confidence in knowledge (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients) 
 Experts Politicians Journalists Public 
State .11 .12 .05 .11 
Causes .22* -.02 .13 .21** 
Consequences -.03 -.11 .03 .08 
— Weather -.10 .05 -.00 .03 
— Sea level and glacier .24* -.09 .14 .07 
— New Zealand .01 .06 .26 .19** 
— Health .16 .16 .29 .25** 
(Significant scores are in bold. Asterisks indicate the degree of significance.) 
** = p < 0.01 
*  = p < 0.05 
This analysis showed that the public and climate change experts had a better balance 
between their actual knowledge of climate change and how confident they were in their 
knowledge than journalists or politicians. Overall, participants had a more accurate and 
well balanced knowledge of the causes of climate change than for any of the other 
knowledge and consequence types. 
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5.4.4 Regression analyses 
Knowledge and concern 
Testing concern with an overall measure of accurate knowledge 
Table 36 shows that accurate knowledge of climate change was a significant positive 
predictor of concern for climate change. Perceived efficacy was also positively 
correlated with concern, and was the strongest predictor in the model. Gender (male) 
and support for Labour were both small but significant negative predictors of concern. 
As in Study 1, perceived information level was not a significant predictor of concern for 
climate change. The variance explained by the model was 37.9 percent. 
A profile of a participating member of the public with high concern for climate change 
would be a female participant with low support for Labour, high levels of perceived 
efficacy and responsibility, and high accurate knowledge of climate change. 
Testing concern with three separate measures of knowledge: State, causes, 
consequences 
For the second multiple regression, the accurate knowledge of climate change variable 
was split into three separate variables measuring accurate knowledge of the state, 
causes, and consequences of climate change. Table 37 shows that knowledge of 
consequences was the only type of knowledge that significantly predicted concern for 
climate change, with a highly significant positive correlation. As in the previous model, 
gender (being male) and support for Labour were significantly negatively correlated 
with concern (though with slightly weaker correlations), and perceived efficacy was a 
significant positive predictor (with a slightly stronger correlation). Perceived efficacy 
remained the strongest predictor of concern, followed by knowledge of consequences. 
This model accounted for slightly more variance than with the single accurate 
knowledge variable reported in Table 36 (38.1 percent compared to 37.9 percent). 
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Perceived efficacy regression 
Because perceived efficacy was such a powerful predictor of concern, the perceived 
efficacy regression from Study 1 (see Table 16) was re-run. The regressions cannot be 
precisely compared, as several of the Study 1 variables were not included in Study 2. 
The missing variables are ethnicity, religious-service attendance, political ideology, 
environmental values, media trust, trust in experts, and confidence in science. Only 
environmental values and trust in experts were consistent significant predictors of 
concern in Study 1. The single measure of actual knowledge was included in this 
regression also. Table 38 shows that actual knowledge was a highly significant, 
relatively strong positive predictor of perceived efficacy. Support for Labour was also 
highly significant, and was a positive predictor of perceived efficacy. 
Table 36: Public concern for climate change with one measure of knowledge 
Independent variables B Standard error Beta (?) t 
Gender (male) -0.238 0.062 -0.211 -3.815*** 
Education -0.004 0.030 -0.008 -0.145 
Income 0.010 0.015 0.035 0.684 
Age 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.027 
Support Labour -0.042 0.020 -0.124 -2.080* 
Support National -0.034 0.018 -0.107 -1.876 
Perceived knowledge level 0.020 0.014 0.086 1.501 
Perceived efficacy 0.363 0.060 0.391 6.065*** 
Accurate knowledge level 0.915 0.201 0.273 4.549*** 
Constant 1.347 0.265  5.081*** 
R2 .401    
Adj. R2 .379    
F 18.20    
N 289    
Note: The dependent variable is concern for climate change (see Table 9). 
*** = p < 0.001 **  = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
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Table 37: Public concern for climate change with three measures of knowledge  
Independent variables B Standard error Beta t 
Gender (male) -.229 .063 -.203 -3.647*** 
Education .001 .031 .001 .019 
Income .008 .015 .028 .546 
Age .000 .002 -.007 -.120 
Support Labour -.041 .020 -.120 -2.008* 
Support National -.028 .018 -.089 -1.544 
Perceived knowledge level .019 .014 .079 1.379 
Perceived efficacy .375 .061 .405 6.197*** 
Knowledge of state .070 .125 .032 .554 
Knowledge of causes .045 .212 .014 .210 
Knowledge of consequences .739 .185 .255 3.988*** 
Constant 1.357 .266   5.110*** 
R2 .408    
Adj. R2 .381    
F 15.212    
N 289    
Note: The depended variable is concern for climate change (see Table 9). 
*** = p < 0.001 **  = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
Table 38: Perceived efficacy 
Independent variable B Std error Beta t 
Gender (male) -.099 .066 -.081 -1.492 
Education -.015 .032 -.024 -.477 
Income .028 .016 .087 1.708 
Age -.002 .002 -.051 -.948 
Support for Labour .100 .021 .274 4.842*** 
Support for National -.035 .019 -.104 -1.854 
Perceived knowledge 
level 
.005 .014 .019 .327 
Actual knowledge level 1.649 .187 .456 8.830*** 
Constant 1.643 .262  6.260*** 
R2 .411    
Adj. R2 .392    
F  21.492    
N 289    
Note: The dependent variable is perceived efficacy (see Table 10). 
*** = p < 0.001 **  = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
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5.5 Study 2 discussion 
5.5.1 Knowledge findings 
Knowledge 
Contrary to expectations, journalists had the highest knowledge of state and causes, 
although experts had the highest knowledge of consequences. Politicians had the lowest 
levels of all types of knowledge and consequence.  
A reason for journalists scoring surprisingly higher than climate change experts on state 
and causes of climate change could be because of the wording of the survey. A number 
of scientists emailed afterwards to say that they felt uncomfortable being asked to 
express scientific predictions with simple true or false answers, as uncertainty is 
inherent in science. It is possible that scientists answered conservatively because of this. 
Another possible reason could be that the survey did not explicitly differentiate between 
anthropogenic climate change and historic natural climate change. Scientists again 
emailed criticising this, and it is possible that their answers reflected this concern. 
However, more relevant for the bigger picture is the balance between knowledge and 
confidence, discussed below. 
It is interesting that politicians consistently had the lowest knowledge levels, while the 
public had higher levels of knowledge more similar to journalists than to politicians. 
This could be partly because New Zealand local government contains a disproportionate 
number of farmers, and farmers have very low knowledge of climate change (see 
Appendix D).  
These findings differ from Sundblad et al.’s findings as they found that experts had the 
highest levels of knowledge for all knowledge and consequence types, followed by 
journalists, then politicians, and then the public. It is important to remember that 
Sundblad et al.’s politicians were all environmental politicians—members of 
environmental committees, and their journalists also environmental journalists, while 
Study 2 did not have large enough samples to replicate this. This may explain why 
Swedish politicians had higher knowledge levels than New Zealand politicians. 
Sundblad et al. do not mention feedback from Swedish participants similar to the 
feedback received on Study 2, such as that from experts critical of the survey wording 
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(wording was taken directly from Sundblad’s translation of their own survey) as well as 
feedback from climate sceptics (discussed later). This points to interesting differences 
between Swedish and New Zealand participants, which it would be interesting to 
explore further. Are New Zealanders generally more sceptical about climate change? It 
could also point to language and translation differences, as the survey was based on an 
English translation of the original Swedish survey. Some meaning or intent could have 
been lost in translation, although it is important to highlight again that all statements 
were checked by an expert who worked for the IPCC. 
Prediction 7: Participants will have higher knowledge of causes than of state or 
consequences—confirmed 
As predicted, participants had a higher knowledge of causes than of state or 
consequences. Across all groups, knowledge of causes was highest, followed by 
knowledge of state, and knowledge of consequences was lowest (except for climate 
change experts who had equal knowledge of state and consequences). This is similar to 
Sundblad et al.’s findings. Swedish participants also had highest knowledge of causes, 
followed by state and consequences.  
Sundblad et al. note that although the state of the climate is the more easily verifiable 
knowledge type (relying on scientific observations), it is more difficult to convey to the 
public as it is expressed as numbers (such as concentrations of greenhouse gases, 
measurements of sea level and temperature, and emissions of carbon dioxide). 
Knowledge of causes is higher because it is probably more easily represented as 
narratives and also, consequentially, as news stories. Knowledge of consequences is 
knowledge of what the future will be like. It is inherently uncertain and based upon 
models and predictions, which are constantly being refined and revised. Understandably 
knowledge of consequences was lowest. 
Of the consequence types, participants’ knowledge of health consequences was highest, 
then New Zealand consequences, followed by sea level and glacier consequences, and 
knowledge of weather consequences was lowest. Interestingly, Sundblad et al. found 
health knowledge was the lowest for Swedish participants. However, as discussed 
below, the questions relating to health were not directly comparable. Scientists do not 
predict as devastating consequences of climate change for New Zealand in the short 
term as for most other countries. The IPCC only includes two projected consequences 
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for New Zealand, increased drought and fire in certain regions and increased water 
security problems by 2030 (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). This could mean that 
New Zealanders do not feel they need to be particularly informed about the 
consequences of climate change, as they perceive themselves to be relatively immune to 
them.  
Participants had lowest knowledge of weather consequences and sea level and glacier 
consequences. This could partly be due to the fact that, as Sundblad et al. noted for 
state-related information, these consequences are similarly expressed numerically, in 
terms of meters of sea level rise and degrees of temperature increases, meaning they are 
harder to understand and remember, and appear to constantly be changing. Many of the 
statements relating to these consequence types also referred to northern hemisphere 
weather patterns, or to consequences for the Arctic rather than Antarctica, meaning they 
were less relevant to New Zealand participants and probably contributed to low scores 
on knowledge of consequences. 
Confidence 
Similarly to knowledge levels, confidence was higher for knowledge of causes, 
although confidence in consequences was higher than confidence in state. Sundblad et 
al. found that confidence levels varied between groups similarly to knowledge levels, 
with experts having highest levels of confidence (and knowledge), followed by 
journalists, then politicians, then the public. This was not the case for the New Zealand 
groups. New Zealand experts had the highest levels of confidence for all knowledge and 
consequence types, followed by politicians, then journalists, and the public had the 
lowest confidence levels.  
It is particularly interesting that politicians had such high levels of confidence in their 
low knowledge of climate change, and probably reflects a tendency for politicians to 
generally overestimate their own knowledge (perhaps a necessary prerequisite for a 
career in politics).  
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Knowledge adjusted by confidence 
Prediction 6: Climate change experts will have the highest knowledge and confidence 
in knowledge of climate change, followed by journalists, then politicians, then the 
public—unconfirmed 
Overall, participants (at the group level) did not have a significant match between 
knowledge and confidence, although the public and experts were better matched than 
journalists and politicians. Journalists had high actual knowledge but it was matched 
with low confidence, suggesting perhaps some good guesswork. Politicians were the 
opposite, with low knowledge yet high confidence, suggesting a general 
over-confidence in their knowledge. Sundblad et al. found, contrastingly, that 
journalists and experts had a better match between confidence and knowledge than 
politicians and the public, with journalists surprisingly better matched than experts. One 
reason for this could be because the group sizes of journalists and politicians were much 
lower than the group sizes for the public and for experts (see Table 20), as well as the 
fact that Sundblad et al. surveyed environmental journalists and environmental 
politicians. 
The general public and experts had the best match between knowledge and confidence, 
meaning they were more realistic in terms of their level of knowledge and confidence in 
their knowledge (Table 35).  
Of the knowledge types, causes had the best match between knowledge and confidence, 
but it was still not well matched. There was no significant relationship between 
knowledge and confidence for state or consequences, suggesting a high degree of 
confusion among participants, and perhaps a lot of guesswork when answering these 
questions. 
Even the significant correlations for the public and for experts are still quite small (the 
highest is .25** for the public’s knowledge of health consequences). The overall lack of 
calibration between knowledge and confidence in knowledge is consistent with research 
that has found that the public’s main source of climate change information, the media, 
misrepresents the scientific consensus and increases public (and apparently journalists’ 
and politicians’) uncertainty about climate change (Antilla, 2010; Boykoff, 2008; 2009; 
Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Cox, 2010; Lowe et al., 2006; Wilson, 2000).   
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Analysis of other groups 
Although Appendix D’s analysis of other groups (environmental experts, non-
environmental experts, policy advisers, managers, and farmers) cannot be compared to 
Sundblad et al.’s findings, it is interesting to briefly address these findings and compare 
the results to the main Study 2 analysis. 
This analysis found that policy advisors had the highest levels of knowledge for all the 
knowledge and consequence types, followed by environmental experts, then non-
environmental experts, then managers, and finally—and distantly—by farmers. 
Confidence levels did not follow this same pattern and varied particularly among 
consequence types, but, overall, environmental experts were by far the most confident 
in their knowledge, followed by non-environmental experts, then managers and policy 
advisers, and finally farmers.  
When the knowledge scores were adjusted by confidence levels, policy advisers had the 
best match, followed by environmental experts, then managers, then non-environmental 
experts, and finally farmers. 
Comparing all the groups, Table 39 shows that policy advisers had the highest 
knowledge of causes and consequences, while journalists had the highest knowledge of 
state. The public outperformed managers, politicians, and farmers.  
Overall, the groups in this second analysis had much better matches between their 
knowledge and confidence than the main groups discussed in Study 2. Policy advisers 
had by far the best match between knowledge and confidence out of all the groups 
examined in this thesis. They displayed positive and relatively strong correlations for all 
the knowledge and consequence types bar weather consequences.  
An explanation for policy advisers and journalists outperforming climate change experts 
and environmental experts could be that policy advisers were highly knowledgeable 
about climate change, but were also more comfortable with the true / false statements 
and the certainty scales than experts were (discussed later). 
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Figure 18: All groups’ knowledge of climate change 
 
5.5.2 Regression findings 
Knowledge and concern 
Prediction 1: Actual knowledge of climate change will predict concern for climate 
change—confirmed 
Prediction 5: Actual knowledge of climate change will be a better predictor of concern 
than perceived knowledge—confirmed 
As in Study 1, perceived knowledge level did not significantly predict concern for 
climate change. However, the measure of actual knowledge did significantly predict 
concern. Actual knowledge was a significant positive predictor, and the second best 
predictor of concern after perceived efficacy. This suggests that the knowledge-deficit 
theory applies to actual knowledge of climate change, but not to perceived knowledge. 
This is discussed more fully in Chapter 6, the general discussion section. 
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Prediction 5: Knowledge of the causes of climate change will predict concern better 
than knowledge of state or consequences—unconfirmed 
Contrary to expectations, knowledge of the consequences of climate change was the 
only significant predictor of concern. This is contrary to what was predicted based on 
the findings of Bord et al. (2000), that accurate knowledge of causes is the best 
predictor of behavioural intentions to act and vote to mitigate climate change. On closer 
inspection this seems reasonable, as the measure of concern (taken from Kellstedt et al.) 
was actually a measure of belief in the impact of negative consequences of climate 
change. This finding confirms research by Sundblad et al. (2007), which found that 
knowledge of consequences, particularly health consequences, predicted concern for 
climate change. 
Perceived efficacy 
Prediction 3: Participants with high perceived efficacy will have high concern for climate 
change—confirmed 
As in Study 1, perceived efficacy was the best predictor of concern for climate change. 
It was highly significantly positively associated with concern. This reinforces findings 
from Study 1 and from previous research suggesting that perceived efficacy is one of 
the strongest predictors of concern for climate change (Brody, Zahran, Grover, et al., 
2008; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008).  
Perceived efficacy regression 
Because the Study 2 perceived efficacy regression excluded the main significant 
variables from Study 1 (environmental values and trust in experts), it is difficult to 
compare the two models and draw firm conclusions, though broad comparisons can be 
made. Perceived knowledge level was not a significant predictor of perceived efficacy 
in either model, while actual knowledge level was a highly significant and relatively 
strong positive predictor of perceived efficacy in the Study 2 model. Support for Labour 
was also a highly significant predictor in Study 2. None of the demographic variables 
were significant in the Study 2 model.  
Interestingly, when the perceived efficacy regression was run for the total Study 2 
sample (see Appendix E), not just the non-environmental public group used for all the 
Study 2 regressions, gender (male) was found to be a significant negative predictor of 
perceived efficacy (? = -.14***), as was support for Labour (? = .21***) and (National 
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(? = -.096***). This suggests that among the participants who were scientists, 
academics, politicians, journalists, and members of the public whose work related to the 
environment, there were significant differences by gender and by political party 
support. It appears that among participants who work in environmental fields, women 
and participants with high support for Labour and low support for National have higher 
levels of perceived efficacy.  
Gender and political party support 
Prediction 4: Female and younger participants will have higher concern for climate 
change than male and older participants—partially confirmed 
Gender was highly significantly negatively correlated with concern, meaning that male 
participants showed significantly less concern for climate change than female 
participants. Age was not significantly related to concern for these participants. The 
limited effect of demographic variables compared to information and identity variables 
is consistent with findings from previous research (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 
2011).  
Support for Labour was surprisingly negatively correlated with concern, suggesting 
participants with high support for Labour had lower levels of concern for climate 
change. This is a similar finding to Kellstedt et al., who found that, in their baseline 
model, being Republican was significantly correlated with high concern for climate 
change, a finding inconsistent with the literature on this subject (Heath & Gifford, 2006; 
Leiserowitz, 2005; Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, et al., 2010; Malka et al., 2009; Mobley 
et al., 2010; Whitmarsh, 2011; Xiao & McCright, 2007). Kellstedt et al. attributed their 
finding to the influence of the new ecological paradigm (NEP). However, it is possible 
that the present results may reflect Green party voters and other minor party voters 
having strong climate change concern. Support for National was also negatively 
correlated with concern, though it was nonsignificant. 
Study 2 did not include the NEP, suggesting that perhaps this finding was perhaps due 
to the exclusion of the NEP or to the inclusion of the measure of actual knowledge. This 
finding for Labour is the opposite of that found for Study 1, where participants with 
high support for Labour had significantly higher concern for climate change at Time 1.  
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5.5.3 Limitations 
Group sizes 
The size of the journalist and politician groups were quite small, with only 
29 politicians and 37 journalists. This means that the results relating to these groups are 
less reliable than the results relating to climate change experts and to the public. It is an 
interesting finding in itself that journalists, politicians, and farmers were the most 
reluctant to complete the survey. 
Several of the variables measuring different types of climate change knowledge also 
had low numbers of statements (see Appendix C). In particular, knowledge of 
New Zealand consequences and knowledge of health consequences both comprised 
only two statements. This is because Sundblad et al. had six health statements, including 
Swedish-specific health consequences. Because there are fewer health consequences 
projected for New Zealand, Sundblad et al.’s health questions were split into two 
groups: New Zealand-specific statements (two statements), and general health 
statements (two statements). Consequentially, results relating to these knowledge types 
may be less reliable than results relating to knowledge types composed of larger groups 
of statements. 
No nationally representative sample 
As Study 2 replicated an overseas study, it did not aim for a nationally representative 
sample of New Zealanders, rather representatives of certain groups. While this was 
suited to the specific task of comparing knowledge levels of different groups, it means 
the findings cannot be extrapolated to the general New Zealand population, nor 
perfectly compared to Study 1 results.  
The sampling method was snowball and self-selection as this was the best method 
possible given the resourcing and nature of the study. Hence it is not as representative 
as a random sample would be. 
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6 General discussion 
6.1 Main findings 
6.1.1 Knowledge and concern 
Study 1 and Study 2 both found that perceived knowledge of climate change did not 
significantly predict concern for climate change (although knowledge and concern were 
positively related). Study 2 found that actual knowledge of climate change did predict 
concern for climate change. Together, Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that the knowledge-
deficit theory applies to concern for climate change, but only when using a measure of 
actual knowledge. In other words, this research suggests that people with high levels of 
actual knowledge of climate change will be more concerned about climate change than 
those with lower knowledge levels, and that there is no relationship between perceived 
knowledge and concern for climate change. 
Perceived knowledge 
The most likely reason for Study 1’s and Kellstedt et al.’s divergence from the 
knowledge-deficit theory appears to be that they used measures of perceived 
knowledge, not actual knowledge. Study 2 supports this explanation. 
As Study 1 relied on perceived knowledge of climate change, it is impossible to know 
whether participants’ perceived knowledge was accurate or not. Not all of the 
information available on climate change accurately represents the scientific consensus, 
and some websites, books, and movies actively attempt to do the opposite and aim to 
discredit scientists and spread scepticism. It is relatively easy for someone sceptical of 
climate change to exist in a bubble of scepticism and only encounter and focus on 
information written by other sceptics. Testing the knowledge-deficit theory with a 
measure of perceived knowledge could reveal high perceived knowledge and low 
concern (as Kellstedt et al. found). This does not necessarily mean the 
knowledge-deficit theory does not apply, but could mean that it is working perfectly 
well according to the information that people have encountered. This is why it is 
important to examine actual knowledge of climate change as well as perceived 
knowledge. 
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The media is the main source of public information on climate change (Bell, 1994; 
Leiserowitz, Smith, et al., 2010; Whitmarsh, 2009). American research has shown how 
journalistic norms, particularly the need to present a ‘balanced’ story, create a greatly 
exaggerated perception of scientific debate on climate change (M. Boykoff & J. 
Boykoff, 2004, 2007; Lowe et al., 2006). Other research has shown that journalists 
themselves, even environmental journalists, have low knowledge of climate change, and 
rely on other media sources rather than scientists or scientific publications (Antilla, 
2005; Trumbo, 1996; Wilson, 2000). However, Sundblad et al. (2009) found that 
Swedish journalists had a good match between knowledge and confidence in knowledge 
of climate change (a better match than climate experts in fact). Contrastingly, my 
research found that, although New Zealand journalists scored highly in a climate change 
knowledge test, they had low confidence in their knowledge, suggesting perhaps good 
guesswork but general confusion about climate change, or perhaps undue modesty in 
their fairly high level of knowledge. 
Taking the problems with media reporting on climate change into account, it is possible 
that participants could have believed themselves to have high knowledge of climate 
change but to also have believed that scientists are still making up their minds about 
whether climate change is a real risk. This could have led participants to be confused 
about the risks of climate change and could help to explain why research examining the 
relationship between perceived knowledge of climate change and concern produces 
such inconclusive and contradictory results. This also supports the proposition that the 
knowledge-deficit theory does not (or perhaps cannot) apply when the knowledge is 
really people’s perceptions of their own knowledge, or confidence in their knowledge, 
not objectively tested knowledge. 
Changing levels of perceived knowledge and concern over time 
Other longitudinal research has identified a trend in decreasing concern for climate 
change (HSBC Climate Partnership, 2010; Jones, 2011a; Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, et 
al., 2010; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Nielsen, 2009a; Pew Research Center, 2009; 
Radio New Zealand, 2010; ShapeNZ, 2010; The World Bank, 2009).  
It is difficult to compare Study 1 and 2 levels of concern and perceived knowledge, as 
the studies involved completely different participants, with different socio-demographic 
characteristics. Overall, Study 1 over-represented females and Study 2 over-represented 
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males (compared to the 2006 census data). Study 1 participants had a higher median 
age, while Study 2 had a lower median age. Participants from both studies were much 
more highly educated (particularly in Study 2), had higher incomes (particularly 
Study 2), and were over-represented by participants from the Wellington-Wairarapa 
region than the 2006 census respondents.  
Bearing this in mind, Table 39 shows that concern levels were stable from June 2008 to 
June 2009 for Study 1 participants, though perceived knowledge levels fluctuated. Both 
perceived knowledge levels and concern levels were lower in October 2010 for Study 2 
non-environmental public participants than for Study 1 participants at any of the three 
time-points. Although these findings cannot be generalised to the New Zealand 
population, the slightly decreased concern levels from Study 1 to Study 2 do correspond 
with observed trends in other research. Perceived knowledge levels would be expected 
to fluctuate in response to media coverage of, and political attention to, climate change 
(see Table 19). 
Examining the political context in New Zealand over this time period also allows 
interesting speculation on potential causes of changing concern and perceived 
knowledge levels. At Time 1 of Study 1 (June 2008), the New Zealand Labour 
government was still in power. The Labour government (centre-left on the political 
spectrum) had prioritised climate change. Five months later, at Time 2 of Study 1 
(November 2008), New Zealand had just had a general election and the government 
changed to a National-led government (centre-right on the political spectrum). The 
National government formed a coalition with the ACT Party (far right on the political 
spectrum), which is openly sceptical about climate change, and is determined to abolish 
the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and withdraw New Zealand from 
the Kyoto Protocol. Since coming to power, the National-led government has reduced 
the priority given to climate change, is reviewing the New Zealand ETS, and has 
weakened New Zealand’s emissions targets.  
This change in government and decreased political priority of climate change could 
have contributed to the decreasing concern between Study 1 and Study 2, in spite of the 
increasing scientific consensus on climate change. Another event that could have 
contributed to this is ‘Climategate’, which occurred in November 2009, between 
Study 1 and Study 2. 
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Table 39: Study 1 and Study 2: Changing levels of perceived knowledge and concern 
 Study 1: Time 1 
June 2008 
Study 1: Time 2 
November 2008 
Study 1: Time 3 
June 2009 
Study 2 
October 2010 
Perceived 
knowledge level 
6.09 6.03 6.21 5.90 
Concern level 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.51 
Actual knowledge 
Study 2 found that accurate knowledge of climate change, particularly of the 
consequences of climate change, was the second strongest positive predictor of concern 
after perceived efficacy. The higher participants’ accurate knowledge of climate change, 
the higher their concern levels. This supports the knowledge-deficit theory and 
reinforces similar findings in previous studies assessing the relationship between actual 
knowledge of climate change and climate change attitudes and beliefs (Bord et al., 
2000; Leiserowitz, N. Smith, et al., 2010; Nolan, 2010; Sundblad et al., 2007).  
The scientific consensus on climate change suggests that the public should have high 
levels of concern for climate change. Study 1 found that perceived knowledge levels did 
not accurately predict concern and probably reflected the high level of confusion and 
uncertainty confounding public understanding of climate change. Misleading media 
reporting leads to confused perceptions of the scientific consensus. Actual knowledge of 
climate change represents an understanding of the scientific consensus on climate 
change. As predicted, and in line with the knowledge-deficit theory and the scientific 
consensus on climate change, Study 2 found that high accurate knowledge led to high 
concern. 
6.1.2 Perceived efficacy 
Perceived efficacy was consistently the strongest predictor of concern for climate 
change at all three time-points in Study 1 and for Study 2. Participants who had stronger 
perceptions that their actions could make a difference (and influence others to make a 
difference), and who also had stronger beliefs that climate change is due to human 
activity, had significantly higher concern for climate change. Perceived efficacy and 
environmental values were the only consistently significant predictors of concern at all 
survey points. Although environmental values were not measured in Study 2, based on 
Study 1 results, it is reasonable to assume that it would also have been a significant 
positive predictor of concern in Study 2. 
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Study 1 and 2 perceived efficacy findings reinforce previous research suggesting that 
perceived efficacy is one of the strongest predictors of concern for climate change 
(Brody, Zahran, Grover, et al., 2008; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008). 
Believing in anthropogenic climate change, and believing that one’s actions can actually 
make a difference, appear to be some of the most important predictors of concern.  
Promoting perceived efficacy  
This research reinforces the findings in the literature, and suggests that policies aiming 
to increase public concern for climate change should strongly focus on increasing public 
perceptions of efficacy and on ensuring that the scientific consensus on climate change 
is filtering through to the public. Further research could examine ways of increasing 
public perceptions of efficacy and on how the New Zealand media communicates 
climate change. 
The perceived efficacy models from Study 1 (without the accurate knowledge variable) 
found that high trust in experts was the strongest predictor of perceived efficacy, 
followed by environmental values. Age and gender (male) were negative predictors of 
perceived efficacy. The Study 2 model (without the trust or environmental values 
variables) found that accurate knowledge was the strongest predictor of perceived 
efficacy—this was the largest coefficient in any of the perceived efficacy models—
followed by support for Labour.  
The perceived efficacy models suggest that increasing public knowledge of climate 
change, increasing public trust in climate change experts, and activating environmental 
values would lead to higher public perceptions of efficacy, in turn leading to higher 
concern for climate change. Further research should focus on the most effective ways of 
doing this.  
Identity variables like environmental values and political ideology and party support 
had significant effects on participants’ concern for climate change and perceived 
efficacy. These identity variables tapped into participants’ cultural worldviews and 
underlying values, which have been found to be some of the strongest predictors of 
beliefs in, and perceptions of, climate change (Crompton, 2010; Kahan et al., 2010; 
Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; Whitmarsh, 2011). Kahan et al. (2010) found that they could 
overcome the effect of cultural worldviews and values on participants’ interpretation of 
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the scientific consensus of climate change by presenting information that participants 
were culturally primed to oppose via experts that they are culturally primed to trust. 
Research like this in a New Zealand context is needed.  
Policies aiming to increase public concern and perceived efficacy should be informed 
by research like Kahan et al.’s, and take into account the range of different values and 
worldviews that affect how people differently interpret and respond to information, 
particularly about a topic as polarising and value-laden as climate change. 
6.1.3 Demographic variables 
Gender and age 
Gender (being male) was significantly negatively associated with concern for climate 
change in the baseline model at Time 3 of Study 1, and in Study 2. Age was also 
significantly negatively associated with concern in the baseline models of Time 1 and 
Time 2 of Study 1 and in the expanded model at Time 1 of Study 1, but not in Study 2. 
The only other demographic variable tested that significantly predicted concern for 
climate change was religious service attendance, which was a positive predictor of 
concern in the baseline model at Time 2 of Study 1. The fact that it was non-significant 
at all other time-points and models suggests that its effect is explained by other 
variables. This thesis has not examined research on religious service attendance on 
concern for climate change, but a possible reason for higher concern could be if church 
leaders were expressing concern to their congregations. If so, this would be a good 
example of people accepting messages from trusted information sources. Further 
research could examine this. 
Findings on age and gender from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that, although female and 
younger participants generally showed higher concern for climate change than male and 
older participants, these variables have varying effects, and can be cancelled out after 
introducing more powerful explanatory variables such as perceived efficacy, 
environmental values, and measures of actual knowledge. This ties in with previous 
research finding that identity and efficacy variables can reduce the explanatory power of 
demographic variables (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 2011).  
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6.1.4 Political party support 
Political party support had varying effects on concern for climate change. In Study 1, 
support for Labour was positively correlated with concern in the baseline model of 
Time 1 only. In Study 2, support for Labour was, surprisingly, negatively correlated 
with concern. These limited and contradictory findings suggest that political party 
support was not a good predictor of concern for climate change for New Zealand 
participants in these surveys. Although previous research has found identity variables 
such as political ideology and political party support to be strong predictors of concern 
(Heath & Gifford, 2006; Leiserowitz, 2005; Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, et al., 2010; 
Leiserowitz, N. Smith, et al., 2010; Whitmarsh, 2011), this does not appear to be the 
case for these New Zealand participants. This could perhaps be due to the effect of the 
strong predictive ability of the perceived efficacy, environmental values, and actual 
knowledge variables, which explained the effect of political party support or political 
ideology. Another reason could be that New Zealanders are perhaps less partisan than 
Americans, who were participants in most previous studies on this topic. The inclusion 
of other New Zealand political parties in the analysis, such as the Green Party, could 
also have produced more significant results.  
6.2 Qualifications and limitations  
6.2.1 Concern variable 
Malka et al. (2009) criticised Kellstedt et al. for not asking broad questions to measure 
concern. Malka et al. noted that by asking about the ‘perceived effects of GW [global 
warming], researchers have apparently presumed that concern is based upon perceptions 
of events: people who believe GW will have more undesirable consequences are 
presumably more likely to be concerned about it’ (p. 634). This suggests perhaps a 
cyclic relationship between concern and negative consequences of climate change, as 
they appear to measure the same thing. Study 1 and Study 2 kept Kellstedt et al.’s 
concern variable to allow the results to be compared. 
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6.2.2 Perceived efficacy variable 
Kellstedt et al.’s perceived efficacy variable mingles the separate concepts of perceived 
responsibility (accepting that human behaviour causes climate change) and perceived 
efficacy (perceived ability to influence group outcomes and influence other people).  
When Kellstedt et al. discussed the contribution of the perceived efficacy variable to 
their model, they often referred to it simply as ‘responsibility’, which is misleading. For 
example, they state that high perceived knowledge was correlated with low 
responsibility for climate change—when it is impossible to know from their research 
whether it is perceived efficacy or responsibility that produces this effect). Study 1 and 
Study 2 used the combined variable to allow comparison with Kellstedt et al.’s results.  
Separating these concepts into two variables and re-running the analyses (see Appendix 
E) revealed that perceived efficacy and responsibility were both highly significant 
predictors of concern for both Study 1 and Study 2, although responsibility was stronger 
than perceived efficacy.  
6.2.3 Missing variables from Study 1 regression analysis 
The Study 2 survey did not include questions on: ethnicity, religious service attendance, 
political ideology, environmental values, trust in media, trust in experts, or confidence 
in scientists. None of these variables, except environmental values, were significantly 
associated with concern in Study 1, so it seemed reasonable to exclude them and 
simplify Study 2. Due to an error in the Study 1 data analysis, at the time of designing 
the Study 2 survey it appeared that environmental values were not significant predictors 
of concern in the expanded model, causing the variable to be excluded from Study 2. It 
was too late to add the variable once the error had been corrected. 
Malka et al. (2009) proposed that a possible reason for Kellstedt et al. finding a negative 
correlation between perceived knowledge and concern for climate change could be 
precisely because they included the new ecological paradigm (NEP) in their analysis. 
They proposed that, although the NEP is meant to represent general environmental 
attitudes, some of the specific statements (particularly ‘If things continue on their 
present course, we will experience a major ecological catastrophe’ and ‘When humans 
interfere with nature, it produces disastrous consequences’) appeared to ‘tap the 
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dependent variable they predicted: perception of undesirable environmental 
consequences of human activity’ (p. 644). This led Malka et al. to conclude that it was 
not sensible to use the NEP as a predictor of climate change risk perceptions. Study 2’s 
exclusion of the NEP could mean this potential problem was avoided for Study 2. 
6.2.4 Qualitative feedback 
One of the most interesting aspects of this research has been the quantity (and tone) of 
unsought feedback received about the Study 2 survey. It is not the purpose of this thesis 
to analyse these comments, but they reveal the strong reactions that climate change 
often provokes. Many of the comments reveal deep suspicion about climate change and 
distrust of the IPCC, indicating that people have a strong attachment to their knowledge 
claims about climate change. These participants may have found the survey threatening 
to their worldviews, leading them to discount the information presented by the IPCC as 
unreliable and discredited. A selection of example comments is included as Appendix F.  
The main criticisms that participants had of the survey content and methodology are 
summarised below. 
Lack of distinction between anthropogenic and historical climate change 
A number of Study 2 participants emailed after taking the survey to complain that the 
survey did not make an explicit distinction between the anthropogenic climate change 
of the last 100 years and the historic ongoing natural climate change. The survey 
described climate change in this way to be consistent with Sundblad et al.’s survey and 
IPCC findings and because it was not believed to be confusing or misleading. None of 
the climate change experts who reviewed the survey mentioned this as a potential 
problem. 
Advice was sought from Victoria University climate change experts as to whether these 
were justified criticisms.  
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This quote best expresses the feedback received:  
Most of these answers are precious. It is clear from the context what you are 
talking about, even if some of the complainants might be technically correct. 
E.g. “Climate change is mainly caused by increased concentrations of 
greenhouse gases” clearly refers to recent climate change, since there has been 
limited climate change other than anthropogenic change for the last 1000 years. 
Technically, it might have been better to say ‘Climate change over the last century 
has been mainly caused by increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases’ to head 
off this nitpicking but I don’t think this is a significant criticism. 
The survey was also quite long for an online survey (taking participants 15–30 minutes 
to complete) and would have been much longer, far less readable, and therefore likely to 
have a lower completion rate if it had precisely defined climate change every time it 
was referred to. Striking a balance between simplicity and technical accuracy is another 
of the many challenges of climate change research.  
Regardless of this, some participants were confused and this would have affected how 
they answered the survey.  
True / false questions and confidence scales 
A few participants were concerned about the confidence scales. The main concern was 
that some found it unclear as to whether they were expressing certainty in their own 
knowledge, or in the scientific consensus. Some participants felt that the survey asked 
them to express too much confidence in projected future consequences, and they were 
uncomfortable determining scientific statements as either ‘true’ or ‘false’, as science 
requires systemic doubt. Although these are legitimate criticisms, the survey necessarily 
followed Sundblad et al.’s survey to allow comparison, and their survey was structured 
in this way.  
Researchers designing future surveys should consider ways to avoid these potential 
pitfalls and make it explicit whether they are seeking confidence in participants’ own 
knowledge, or confidence in their perceptions of the scientific consensus. 
6.2.5 Selection biases 
Although Study 1 used a mail survey, data from Study 2 relied on data from an online 
survey. Such surveys automatically exclude anyone without access to the internet or a 
computer, biasing participants towards being better educated and with higher incomes. 
General discussion 
 134 | Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory 
People with higher concern about the environment are more likely to participate in a 
voluntary survey about the environment, biasing participants to being more 
environmentally conscious. Climate change is a particularly polarising environmental 
problem, and polarising problems can lead to extreme responses. Extreme concern for 
climate change or extreme scepticism can be seen to reflect this polar effect. Extreme 
scepticism was reflected in the amount and degree of critical unsought feedback 
received about the Study 2 survey, suggesting that non-environmentally conscious 
respondents also took part in this study. 
Strict criteria were applied to the participants making up the Study 2 public group (used 
for the regression analysis on knowledge and concern) to try and minimise any 
environmental selection bias. This group excluded participants who worked in jobs 
relating to environment and climate change issues. 
6.3 Further research and policy recommendations 
Research into promoting concern for climate change should focus on identifying 
motivators and barriers to:  
? increasing public perceptions of the scientific consensus 
? identifying and countering the effects of worldviews  
? activating environmental values   
? increasing public perceptions of perceived efficacy and human responsibility.  
Further research assessing the effect of actual knowledge on concern should include a 
measure of environmental values, as Study 2 did not examine this. It would be useful to 
know whether accurate knowledge is a better predictor of concern than environmental 
values. Study 1 suggests not, but research is needed to confirm this. To avoid potential 
problems with the NEP identified by Malka et al., a different measure of environmental 
values could be used. 
This research has shown the importance of clear, explicit, and consistent terminology in 
climate change communication. This is also necessary in policy and media reporting, 
which need to focus on getting the right balance between simplicity and technical 
accuracy while minimising public confusion and reactance. 
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As described in Chapter 1, attitudes like concern for climate change lead to behavioural 
intentions and to actual behaviour. Therefore, focusing on increasing public concern for 
climate change is likely to lead to intentions to perform climate-friendly behaviour, 
which is likely in turn to lead to these behaviours being performed. As well as 
increasing concern, future research and policy should focus on identifying and 
increasing the many different internal and external forces that enable desired 
behaviours, and on identifying and reducing those forces that disable or inhibit desired 
behaviours. 
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7 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to determine whether the knowledge-deficit theory applied to 
concern for climate change. The knowledge-deficit theory implies that high knowledge 
of climate change should correspond to high concern for climate change.  
This research has shown that participants with high perceived knowledge of climate 
change did not have correspondingly high levels of concern, but those with high actual 
knowledge did. These findings provide support for the knowledge-deficit theory with a 
measure of actual knowledge, and suggest that parties aiming to increase public concern 
for climate change should focus on making sure that the public comprehends the 
scientific consensus on climate change. Further analysis found that actual knowledge of 
the consequences of climate change significantly predicted concern, but that actual 
knowledge of the state of the climate or the causes of climate change did not. 
Although actual knowledge of climate change was a significant positive predictor of 
concern, it was not the best predictor of concern identified in this research. Perceived 
efficacy (comprising the concepts of efficacy and human responsibility) was a stronger 
predictor of concern than actual knowledge, and Study 1 suggests that environmental 
values would have remained a strong predictor of concern, had it been included in 
Study 2.  
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there is already a great deal of climate change 
information available to the public but, in spite of this, public concern levels have been 
declining in recent years. The media have been shown to misrepresent the scientific 
consensus, causing the public to underestimate the human causes of climate change, 
perhaps contributing to declining concern levels. This thesis has found that 
understanding that human activities cause climate change is one of the most important 
predictors of concern, as is an understanding of the consequences of climate change. 
Given the importance of public understanding in motivating public concern, 
information campaigns should not be abandoned, but they should be smarter. 
Climate change communications should provide information that accurately represents 
the scientific consensus and explains that climate change is due to human activities and 
describes the consequences of climate change. Because perceived efficacy is also such a 
strong predictor of concern, climate change communications should emphasise the 
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different ways that people can act and the effectiveness of taking such actions. This 
thesis also supported research finding that trust in experts and people’s underlying 
values and worldviews are important for predicting concern and perceived efficacy. 
Climate change communications should provide information tailored to different sets of 
values and worldviews, coming from trusted information sources.  
This thesis and previous research described in Chapters 1 and 2 suggest that policies 
and communications taking these findings into account will be more effective at 
increasing public concern for climate change. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Study 1: New Zealand Social Attitudes Survey 
 
In general, when it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as… 
Extremely      Liberal         Slightly      Moderate        Slightly        Conservative   Extremely 
liberal                              liberal                             conservative                    conservative 
1                       2                   3                4                    5                    6                   7 
PART 2. General questions about environmental issues 
Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the 
environment. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements. 
1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Unsure 
4 
Agree 
5 
Strongly agree 
 
We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can 
support.  
1  2  3  4  5 
Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their 
needs.  
1  2  3  4  5 
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous 
consequences. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Human ingenuity will insure that we do not make the earth unlivable.  1  2  3  4  5 
Humans are severely abusing the environment.  1  2  3  4  5 
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to 
develop them.  
1  2  3  4  5 
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 1  2  3  4  5 
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of 
modern industrial nations.  
1  2  3  4  5 
Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of 
nature. 
1  2  3  4  5 
The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly 
exaggerated.  
1  2  3  4  5 
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. 1  2  3  4  5 
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature.  1  2  3  4  5 
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 1  2  3  4  5 
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be 
able to control it.  
1  2  3  4  5 
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If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a 
major ecological catastrophe. 
1  2  3  4  5 
PART 3. Questions about global warming and climate change 
How well-informed do you consider yourself to be on global warming and climate change? 
    Not at all                                           Somewhat                                          Very well        
    informed                                             informed                                           informed 
     0         1         2           3          4           5          6         7           8            9          10 
How clearly do you think scientists understand global warming and climate change? 
                                               Very unclear                         Very clear 
                                              understanding                    understanding 
1            2            3            4 
What is the risk of global warming and climate change exerting a significant impact on… 
                                                                                   No risk  1      2      3      4  Extreme 
risk 
Public health in your town or city?             1      2      3      4 
Economic development in your town or city?             1      2      3      4 
The environment in your town or city?             1      2      3      4    
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Agree 
4 
Strongly agree 
Global warming and climate change will have a noticeably negative 
impact on my health in the next 25 years. 
1   2   3   4 
Global warming and climate change will have a noticeably negative 
impact on my economic and financial situation in the next 25 years. 
1   2   3   4 
Global warming and climate change will have a noticeably negative 
impact on the environment in which my family and I live. 
1   2   3   4 
I believe my actions have an influence on global warming and climate 
change. 
1   2   3   4 
My actions to reduce the effects of global warming and climate 
change in my community will encourage others to reduce the effects 
of global warming through their own actions. 
1   2   3   4 
Human beings are responsible for global warming and climate change. 1   2   3   4 
Please indicate the trustworthiness of information on global warming and climate change 
provided by the following media and groups. 
   Not trustworthy at all                                                                Very trustworthy 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
Newspapers 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Television news 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Radio 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Internet 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
University academics 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Scientists 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
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Government agencies 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Nonprofit organisations 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Environmental interest groups 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Other interest groups 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
PART 6. Background questions (Please remember that your responses 
are confidential) 
 
1. How old are 
you? 
 
_________ 
years.         
2. What is your 
gender?  
   ? Female        ? 
Male        
3. Are you member of any environmental 
organisation (e.g., Greenpeace)?      
            ? Yes        ? No       
4. Which of these best describe your highest educational qualification? 
? Secondary School Incomplete     
? NCEA, School Certificate, or other secondary school qualification        
? Polytechnic qualification or Trade Certificate                            
     ? Undergraduate Degree             ? Postgraduate Degree      ? Masters        ? Doctorate 
5. Which country were you born in? 
______________________________________________ 
6. Which ethnic group(s) do you belong to? (Tick as many as apply. If you identify with 
multiple groups, then please circle the group that you feel you most strongly belong to)  
? New Zealand European (Pakeha)  ? M?ori 
? Pacific Nations    ? Asian  
          ? Indian    ? Other (please specify): 
______________________ 
7. In which of the following areas do you live?  
  ? Northland ? Gisborne   ? Wellington-Wairarapa ? West Coast 
  ? Auckland    ? Hawke's Bay  ? Tasman   ? 
Canterbury  
  ? Waikato    ? Taranaki   ? Nelson   ? 
Otago 
  ? Bay of Plenty   ? Manawatu-Wanganui ? Marlborough  ? Southland 
8. Which of the following best describes where you grew up? I grew up in a…  
  ? Rural area (under 1,000 population)  ? A medium-sized town (10,000-
29,999 population) 
  ? A small town (1,000-9,999 population)  ? A large town or city (30,000+ 
population)  
9. Do you have any children?      ? Yes        ? No       
 9.1. If YES, how many? ______ What is the age of your youngest child? _____(years) 
_____(months) 
10. Which religious or philosophical orientation do you most identify with? (tick only one) 
           ? Agnostic ? Atheistic  ? Buddhist  ? Christian 
           ? Hindu ? Jewish  ? Muslim  ? Other: 
________________________ 
           ? I do not identify with any specific religious or philosophical orientation 
11. Have you attended a religious service in the last 7 days (not including funeral, wedding)?  
          ? Yes        ? No       
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12. Please estimate your own personal earnings from paid employment (before tax) for the 
year 2007. 
               ? under       $10,000         ? $41,000   -   $60,000       ? $101,000 - $120,000 
               ? $11,000 - $20,000         ? $61,000   -   $80,000         ? $121,000 - $140,000 
               ? $21,000 - $40,000         ? $81,000  -  $100,000       ? More than - $141,000 
13. Please indicate how strongly you support/oppose each of the following political parties in 
the upcoming New Zealand election. 
 
                Strongly                                          Strongly 
                   oppose                                            support 
1       2       3       4       5       6        7  
 
The Green Party 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
The Labour Party 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
The M?ori Party        1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
The National Party    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
The NZ First Party 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Other (specify):________________ 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
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Appendix B: Study 2: Climate change knowledge survey 
Statements about climate change 
 
True False Very 
uncertain 
Fairly 
uncertain 
More 
uncertain 
than 
certain 
More 
certain 
than 
uncertain 
Fairly 
certain 
Very 
certain 
Sea levels have risen by a global average of 17cm over 
the last 100 years.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Climate change is mainly caused by increased 
concentrations of greenhouse gases. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The average global temperature has increased about 
0.7ºC over the last 100 years.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Globally, negative health impacts caused by climate 
change will be more severe for poor, marginalised 
people.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Changes to Earth's albedo contribute to climate change. 
(Albedo is the solar energy Earth reflects back into 
space.) 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
If the Greenland ice sheet melted completely, sea levels 
would rise by 12–13 metres.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Climate change will intensify water security problems 
in parts of New Zealand by 2030.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Atmospheric methane concentrations have increased by 
more than 200% since the pre-industrial period.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The 1990s and 2000s were no warmer than other 
decades over the last 100 years.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Increasing greenhouse gases increases ultra violet (UV) 
radiation, creating a greater risk of skin cancer.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Statements about climate change 
 
True False Very 
uncertain 
Fairly 
uncertain 
More 
uncertain 
than 
certain 
More 
certain 
than 
uncertain 
Fairly 
certain 
Very 
certain 
The increase in greenhouse gases is mainly caused by 
intensified agricultural practices.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Over the next 100 years sea levels will rise by less than 
we can measure.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Many extreme weather events (precipitation, floods, 
tropical cyclones, heat waves, droughts, etc) have 
increased in frequency and intensity over the last 100 
years.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have 
increased by more than 30% since the pre-industrial 
period.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Heavy precipitation events (rain and snow fall) have 
increased over most land areas since the 1950s.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
If the Arctic sea ice melted completely, sea levels 
would rise by about 3 metres.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Climate change is mainly caused by the ozone hole.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Sea levels have risen by a global average of 87cm over 
the last 100 years.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Global precipitation (rain and snow fall) will decrease 
over the next 100 years in most subtropical regions.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The increase in greenhouse gases is mainly caused by 
increased volcanic eruptions. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
It is not possible to determine whether the last 100 
years had a different temperature to the last 1000 years. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Statements about climate change 
 
True False Very 
uncertain 
Fairly 
uncertain 
More 
uncertain 
than 
certain 
More 
certain 
than 
uncertain 
Fairly 
certain 
Very 
certain 
If the Greenland ice sheet melted completely, sea levels 
would rise by 6–7 metres.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Climate change is mainly caused by natural variations 
in solar radiation. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Melting snow and glaciers cause sea levels to rise.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Global precipitation (rain and snow fall) will increase 
over the next 100 years in high latitudes.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The increase in greenhouse gases is mainly caused by 
human activities.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The warmest two decades over the last 100 years were 
the 1990s and 2000s. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Melting sea ice and floating ice shelves breaking up 
cause sea levels to rise.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have 
increased by between 20% and 30% since the pre-
industrial period.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Global sea levels have not risen over the last 100 years. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Over the next 50 years, incidents of malaria, dengue 
fever, and other infectious diseases will increase and 
spread globally due to climate change. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Deforestation contributes to climate change.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The average global temperature has increased about 
3.1ºC over the last 100 years.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Statements about climate change 
 
True False Very 
uncertain 
Fairly 
uncertain 
More 
uncertain 
than 
certain 
More 
certain 
than 
uncertain 
Fairly 
certain 
Very 
certain 
Over the next 100 years sea levels will rise by at least 
2–3 metres.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Carbon dioxide is mainly emitted through fossil fuel 
combustion. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Climate change will cause increased drought and fire in 
parts of New Zealand by 2030.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The ice mass of the Arctic is expected to increase over 
the next 100 years.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Carbon dioxide is responsible for about 45% of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The change in average global temperatures over the last 
100 years is the largest change over the last 1000 years. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Over the next 100 years sea levels will rise by 0.5–1.5 
metres.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Methane is mainly emitted through fossil fuel 
combustion.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
It is not yet possible to determine whether extreme 
weather events (precipitation, floods, tropical cyclones, 
heat waves, droughts, etc) have increased in frequency 
and intensity over the last 100 years.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
The average global temperature has been more or less 
stable over the last 100 years. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Increasing the temperature of seawater causes sea 
levels to rise.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Statements about climate change 
 
True False Very 
uncertain 
Fairly 
uncertain 
More 
uncertain 
than 
certain 
More 
certain 
than 
uncertain 
Fairly 
certain 
Very 
certain 
Climate change is mainly caused by increased 
concentrations of greenhouse gases. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Appendix C: Study 2: Statements making up knowledge variables 
Knowledge of the state of the climate  
1 The average global temperature has increased about 0.7ºC over the last 100 years. 
2 The two warmest decades over the last 100 years were the 1990s and 2000s. 
3 The change in average global temperatures over the last 100 years is the largest change over the 
last 1000 years. 
4 Heavy precipitation (rain and snowfall) events have increased over most land areas since the 
1950s. 
Knowledge of the causes of climate change 
1 Climate change is mainly caused by increased concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
2 Deforestation contributes to climate change. 
3 Changes to Earth's albedo contribute to climate change. (Albedo is the solar energy Earth 
reflects back into space.) 
4 Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by more than 30% since the pre-
industrial period. 
5 Atmospheric methane concentrations have increased by more than 200% since the pre-industrial 
period. 
6 Carbon dioxide is mainly emitted through fossil fuel combustion. 
7 The increase in greenhouse gases is mainly caused by human activities. 
Knowledge of the consequences of climate change 
1 Many extreme weather events (precipitation, floods, tropical cyclones, heat waves, droughts, 
etc) have increased in frequency and intensity over the last 100 years. 
2 Global precipitation (rain and snowfall) will increase over the next 100 years in high latitudes. 
3 Global precipitation (rain and snowfall) will decrease over the next 100 years in most 
subtropical regions. 
4 Sea levels have risen by a global average of 17 cm over the last 100 years. 
5 Melting snow and glaciers cause sea levels to rise. 
6 Increasing the temperature of seawater causes sea levels to rise. 
7 Over the next 100 years sea levels will rise by 0.5 – 1.5 metres. 
8 If the Greenland ice sheet melted completely, sea levels would rise by about 6 – 7 metres. 
9 Climate change will intensify water security problems in parts of New Zealand by 2030. 
10 Climate change will cause increased drought and fire in parts of New Zealand by 2030. 
11 Over the next 50 years, incidents of malaria, dengue fever, and other infectious diseases will 
increase and spread globally due to climate change. 
12 Globally, the negative health effects of climate change will be more severe for poor, 
marginalised people. 
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Knowledge of specific weather consequences of climate change 
1 Many extreme weather events (precipitation, floods, tropical cyclones, heat waves, droughts, 
etc) have increased in frequency and intensity over the last 100 years. 
2 Global precipitation (rain and snowfall) will increase over the next 100 years in high latitudes. 
3 Global precipitation (rain and snowfall) will decrease over the next 100 years in most 
subtropical regions. 
Knowledge of specific sea level and glacier consequences of climate change 
1 Sea levels have risen by a global average of 17 cm over the last 100 years. 
2 Melting snow and glaciers cause sea levels to rise. 
3 Increasing the temperature of seawater causes sea levels to rise. 
4 Over the next 100 years sea levels will rise by 0.5 – 1.5 metres. 
5 If the Greenland ice sheet melted completely, sea levels would rise by about 6 – 7 metres. 
Knowledge of specific New Zealand consequences of climate change 
1 Climate change will intensify water security problems in parts of New Zealand by 2030. 
2 Climate change will cause increased drought and fire in parts of New Zealand by 2030. 
Knowledge of specific health consequences of climate change 
1 Over the next 50 years, incidents of malaria, dengue fever, and other infectious diseases will 
increase and spread globally due to climate change. 
2 Globally, the negative health effects of climate change will be more severe for poor, 
marginalised people. 
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Appendix D: Study 2 results for expanded groups 
As part of Study 2, the same analysis was run for a different set of groups: 
environmental experts, non-environmental experts, policy advisers, managers, and 
farmers. As discussed in Chapter 2, Hatfield-Dodds and Jollands found that 
New Zealand farm owners and managers displayed the highest levels of perceived 
knowledge of climate change as well as the lowest levels of support for climate change 
policies. Farmers and managers were added to the Study 2 analysis to replicate this 
research. Examining the climate change knowledge of farmers is particularly interesting 
in New Zealand, as 50 percent of our greenhouse gas emissions come from agriculture. 
Participants 
Environmental experts (N = 190) 
The environmental experts group was created by combining all the participants who 
selected either the job type ‘academic’ or ‘scientist’ and who also specified that the 
work they personally did related to the environment ‘very frequently’ or ‘always’.  
Non-environmental experts (N = 208) 
The non-environmental experts group was a combination of all the participants who 
selected either the job type ‘academic’ or ‘scientist’ and excluded those who also 
specified that the work they personally did related to the environment ‘very frequently’ 
or ‘always’. 
Policy advisers (N = 103) 
Policy advisers were those participants who selected the job type ‘public policy 
adviser’. Of these, 49 were environmental policy advisers. To recruit policy advisers, 
emails were sent to relevant government organisations. A contact at Ministry for the 
Environment placed a description of, and link to, the survey on the Ministry for the 
Environment’s intranet. 
Managers (N = 93) 
The managers group was created by combining all the participants who selected the job 
type ‘manager’. Of these, 26 were environmental managers. Managers were recruited 
using the rolling snowball technique, asking other participants to forward the survey to 
any managers they knew who they thought might like to participate. 
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Farmers (N = 31) 
The farmers group was created by combining all the participants who selected the job 
type ‘farmer’. To recruit farmers, emails were sent to farming organisations, such as 
Federated Farmers, Dairy NZ, Rural Women, and the Farm Environment Awards 
network. Federated Farmers included a description of, and link to, the survey in their 
weekly electronic newsletter for member farmers, but response rates from farmers were 
low. 
Knowledge results 
Knowledge of state, causes, and consequences 
This analysis found that policy advisers had the highest levels of knowledge of climate 
change, followed by environmental experts, non-environmental experts, managers, and 
lastly farmers (see Table 42 and Figure 19). 
Table 41 summarises the ANOVA results. Overall, this analysis showed that these 
participants had significantly higher levels of knowledge of causes than of state or of 
consequences. Of the five groups, policy advisers had significantly more accurate 
knowledge than managers, and farmers had significantly less accurate knowledge than 
environmental and non-environmental experts and managers. 
Table 40: Summary of ANOVA results for knowledge type 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 5 (group) x 3 (knowledge type) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with repeated 
measure on knowledge type 
The groups were: environmental and 
non-environmental experts, policy 
advisers, managers, and farmers. 
The knowledge types were: state, 
causes, and consequences. 
Main effect of 
knowledge type 
F(1.83, 1117.84) = 105.79, p < .0005, 
Greenhouse-Geisser ? = .92 
Knowledge levels significantly varied 
by knowledge type. 
Main effect of 
group (job type) 
F(4, 610) = 8.77, p  < .0005 Knowledge levels significantly varied 
by group. 
Interaction effects F(3.67, 1117.84) = 5.175, p  
< .01, Greenhouse-Geisser ? = .92 
The interaction was between knowledge 
type and survey version, meaning that 
the relationship between knowledge 
level and knowledge type was different 
for the different survey versions. 
Bonferroni on 
knowledge type 
Pairwise comparisons between state and 
causes were significantly different 
(p < .0005), as were those between causes 
and consequences (p < .0005), but not 
those between state and consequences 
(p = .08). 
Participants had higher knowledge of 
causes than of state or consequences 
(see Figure 19). 
 Climate change and the knowledge-deficit theory | 161 
Bonferroni on 
group 
Farmers had significantly less accurate 
knowledge than environmental experts 
(p < .0005), non-environmental experts 
(p  < .0005), and managers (p  < .05). 
Policy advisers had significantly more 
accurate knowledge than managers (p  
< .05). 
See Figure 19. 
Bonferroni on 
survey version 
Pairwise comparisons between version 1 
and version 3 were marginally significant 
(p = .06), but not between version 1 and 
version 2 (p = .63) or version 2 and 
version 3 (p = .78).  
Figure 20 shows that survey version 1 
was different to versions 2 and 3. 
Participants answering version 1 scored 
higher on the state questions and lower 
on the consequence questions than 
those participants answering versions 2 
and 3. 
Table 41: Mean knowledge levels 
Group State Causes Consequences 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Environmental 
experts 
(N = 190) 
0.73 0.25 0.87 0.16 0.74 0.18 
Non-env. experts 
(N = 208) 
0.71 0.26 0.84 0.19 0.68 0.21 
Policy advisers 
(N = 103) 
0.76 0.26 0.89 0.15 0.76 0.16 
Managers 
(N = 103) 
0.68 0.28 0.81 0.24 0.66 0.21 
Farmers 
(N = 31) 
0.56 0.28 0.70 0.25 0.51 0.30 
(The highest mean scores are in bold.) 
Figure 19: Mean knowledge levels by group 
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Figure 20: Mean knowledge levels by survey version 
 
Knowledge of different consequences 
This analysis found that, again, policy advisers had the highest knowledge, followed by 
environmental experts, non-environmental experts, managers, and then farmers were 
again quite far behind (see Table 44 and Figure 21). 
Table 43 presents the ANOVA findings. Overall, participants had lower levels of 
knowledge of weather consequences and of sea level and glacier consequences, and 
higher levels of knowledge of New Zealand consequences and of health consequences. 
Of the five groups, policy advisers had significantly more accurate knowledge than non-
environmental experts and managers. Farmers had significantly less accurate knowledge 
than all the other groups. 
Table 42: Summary of ANOVA results for consequence type 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 5 (group) x 4 (consequence type) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with repeated 
measure on consequence type 
The groups were: environmental and 
non-environmental experts, policy 
advisers, managers, and farmers. 
The consequence types were: weather, 
sea level and glacier, New Zealand, and 
health. 
Main effect of 
consequence type 
F(2.43, 1485.02) = 78.27, p < .0005, Gree
nhouse-Geisser ? = .81 
Knowledge levels varied by 
consequence type. 
Main effect of 
group (job type) 
F(4, 610) = 12.20, p<.0005 Knowledge levels varied by group. 
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Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Interaction effects None  
Bonferroni on 
consequence type 
Pairwise comparisons for weather and sea 
level / glacier were significant (p<.0005), 
for weather and New Zealand were 
significant (p<.0005), for weather and 
health were significant (p<.0005), for sea 
level / glacier and New Zealand were 
significant (p<.01), for sea level / glacier 
and health were significant (p<.0005); but 
for New Zealand and health were non-
significant (p=.45). 
Overall, participants had significantly 
higher knowledge of New Zealand 
consequences and of health 
consequences than of weather or sea 
level and glacier consequences. See 
Figure 21. 
Bonferroni on 
group 
Farmers had significantly less accurate 
knowledge of consequence types than 
environmental experts (p  < .0005), non-
environmental experts (p < .0005), policy 
advisers (p  < .0005), and managers (p  
< .01); and that policy advisers had 
significantly more accurate knowledge of 
consequence types than non-
environmental experts (p  < .01) and 
managers (p  < .01). 
See Figure 21. 
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Table 43: Knowledge of climate change consequences 
Group Weather Sea level and 
glacier 
New Zealand Health 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Environmental 
experts 
(N = 190) 
0.64 0.29 0.77 0.19 0.82 0.33 0.86 0.27 
Non-env. 
experts 
(N = 208) 
0.57 0.34 0.72 0.22 0.75 0.38 0.81 0.30 
Policy advisers 
(N = 103) 
0.66 0.27 0.79 0.17 0.89 0.25 0.90 0.22 
Managers 
(N = 103) 
0.52 0.33 0.71 0.22 0.79 0.35 0.76 0.31 
Farmers 
(N = 31) 
0.39 0.35 0.55 0.31 0.52 0.46 0.56 0.40 
(The highest mean scores are in bold.) 
Figure 21: Mean levels of knowledge of consequences  
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Confidence results  
Confidence in knowledge of state, causes, and consequences  
This analysis found that environmental experts had the highest confidence in their 
knowledge of climate change, followed by non-environmental experts, then policy 
advisers, managers, and finally farmers (see Table 46 and Figure 22). 
Table 44 shows the main ANOVA findings. This analysis shows that, overall, 
participants had higher confidence in their knowledge of the causes of climate change 
than of the state or of consequences. Of the five groups, environmental experts had 
significantly higher confidence in their knowledge than all of the other groups. 
Table 44: Summary of ANOVA findings for confidence in knowledge type 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 5 (group) x 3 (knowledge type) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with repeated 
measure on knowledge type. 
The groups were: environmental and 
non-environmental experts, policy 
advisers, managers, and farmers. 
The knowledge types were: state, 
causes, and consequences. 
Main effect of 
knowledge type 
F(1.92, 1172.99) = 135.53, p < .0005, 
Greenhouse-Geisser ? = .96 
Confidence levels significantly varied 
by knowledge type. 
Main effect of 
group (job type) 
F(4, 610) = 6.50, p < .0005 Confidence levels significantly varied 
by group. 
Interaction effects None  
Bonferroni on 
knowledge type 
Pairwise comparisons between 
confidence in knowledge of state and 
confidence in knowledge of causes were 
significant (p<.0005), as were those 
between confidence in knowledge of 
causes and confidence in knowledge of 
consequences (p<.0005), but not between 
confidence in knowledge of state and 
confidence in knowledge of consequences 
(p=.69). 
Participants were significantly more 
confident in their knowledge of causes 
than of state or consequences. See 
Figure 22. 
Bonferroni on 
group 
Environmental experts had significantly 
higher confidence in their knowledge of 
state, causes, and consequences of climate 
change than: non-environmental experts 
(p<.01), policy advisers (p<.01), 
managers (p<.01), and farmers (p<.01). 
See Figure 22. 
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Table 45: Confidence in climate change knowledge 
Group Confidence in state Confidence in causes Confidence in consequences 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Environmental 
experts 
(N = 190) 
4.46 0.75 4.99 0.60 4.50 0.66 
Non-env. 
experts 
(N = 208) 
4.24 0.91 4.73 0.73 4.24 0.74 
Policy advisers 
(N = 103) 
4.13 0.96 4.59 0.95 4.20 0.86 
Managers 
(N = 103) 
4.19 0.91 4.55 0.81 4.21 0.81 
Farmers 
(N = 31) 
4.06 0.96 4.35 0.84 4.08 0.91 
Figure 22: Confidence in knowledge of climate change 
 
Confidence in knowledge of different consequences 
Comparing participants’ mean levels of confidence in their knowledge of consequences 
shows that environmental experts again had the highest confidence levels, followed by 
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policy advisers, then non-environmental experts, then managers, and finally farmers 
(see Table 47 and Figure 23). 
Table 46 presents the ANOVA findings for confidence in consequence type. This 
analysis found that, overall, participants had lower levels of confidence in their 
knowledge of weather consequences and of health consequences, but higher levels of 
confidence in their knowledge of sea level and glacier consequences and of 
New Zealand consequences. Of the five groups, environmental experts had significantly 
higher confidence in their knowledge than non-environmental experts. 
Table 46: Summary of ANOVA findings for confidence in consequence type 
Statistical test Finding Explanation 
Type of ANOVA 5 (group) x 4 (consequence type) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with repeated 
measure on consequence type 
The groups were: environmental and 
non-environmental experts, policy 
advisers, managers, and farmers. 
The consequence types were: weather, 
sea level and glacier, New Zealand, and 
health. 
Main effect of 
consequence type 
F(2.93, 1786.20) = 106.58, p < .0005 Confidence levels significantly varied 
by consequence type. 
Main effect of 
group (job type) 
F(4, 610) = 4.28, p < .01 Confidence levels significantly varied 
by group. 
Interaction effects None  
Bonferroni on 
consequence type 
All pairwise comparisons were 
significantly different (p<.0005), except 
for those between sea level / glacier 
consequences and New Zealand 
consequences (p=1.00). 
Participants were significantly more 
confident in their knowledge of health 
consequences. See Figure 26. 
Bonferroni on 
group 
Environmental experts had significantly 
higher confidence in their knowledge of 
the types of consequences of climate 
change than non-environmental experts 
(p<.05). 
See Figure 26. 
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Table 47: Confidence in knowledge of consequences 
Group Confidence in 
weather 
Confidence in sea 
level & glacier 
Confidence in New 
Zealand 
Confidence in health 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Environmental 
experts 
(N = 190) 
4.13 0.87 4.61 0.78 4.53 0.96 4.96 0.83 
Non-env. experts 
(N = 208) 
3.80 0.96 4.41 0.87 4.24 1.04 4.77 0.87 
Policy advisers 
(N = 103) 
3.79 0.97 4.27 0.97 4.42 1.06 4.76 1.08 
Managers 
(N = 103) 
3.92 0.97 4.24 0.92 4.30 1.18 4.70 0.94 
Farmers 
(N = 31) 
3.76 1.01 4.17 1.00 4.19 1.09 4.50 1.12 
(The highest mean scores are in bold.) 
Figure 23: Confidence in knowledge of consequences 
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Relationship between knowledge and confidence  
Overall, policy advisers had the best match between knowledge and confidence, 
knowledge of causes was the best-matched knowledge type, and knowledge of health 
consequences the best-matched consequence type.  
As Table 48 shows, the match between knowledge and confidence was best for policy 
advisers, followed by environmental experts, then managers, then non-environmental 
experts, and lastly farmers. Of the three main knowledge types (state, causes, 
consequences), environmental experts had a better match for state and causes, while 
mangers had a better match for causes and consequences. Policy advisers had a good 
match for all three, and non-environmental experts only had a significant match for 
causes. Farmers had no significant matches. Of the four consequence types, 
environmental experts, policy advisers, managers, and farmers all had the best match 
between knowledge and confidence for health consequences, followed by sea level and 
glacier consequences.  
Policy advisers had the best match between knowledge and confidence of all the groups 
examined in this thesis (see Section 5.5.1). 
Table 48: Relationships between knowledge and confidence in knowledge  
 Env experts Non-env 
experts 
Policy 
advisers 
Managers Farmers 
State .14* .10 .32** .14 .09 
Causes .22** .15* .42** .32** .28 
Consequences .07 .11 .38** .23* .32 
— Weather -.06 .02 -.02 .06 .05 
— Sea level and glacier .18* .20** .55** .30** .31 
— New Zealand .11 .10 .33** .19 .09 
— Health .20** .15* .56** .32** .41* 
(Significant scores are in bold. Asterisks indicate the degree of significance.) 
** = p < 0.01 
*   = p < 0.05 
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Appendix E: Additional multiple regression analyses 
Concern for climate change regressions with separate measures of perceived 
efficacy and responsibility 
Study 1 
Independent variable Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
 Beta Beta Beta 
Ethnicity (Pakeha) -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 
Gender (male) -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 
Education 0.04 -0.04 0.02 
Income 0.01 0.08 0.02 
Age -0.13* -0.11 0.00 
Religious service attendance 0.06 0.09 0.07 
Support for Labour 0.11 0.00 0.03 
Support for National 0.07 -0.13 -0.14 
Political ideology 0.08 0.07 0.10 
Environmental values 0.33*** 0.18* 0.19** 
Perceived knowledge level 0.08 0.04 0.09 
Perceived efficacy 0.26*** 0.19** 0.11* 
Humans responsible 0.22** 0.27*** 0.18 
Trust media 0.03 0.01 0.05 
Trust experts -0.03 0.09 0.14 
Confidence in scientists 0.11 0.04 0.09 
(Significant scores are in bold. Asterisks indicate the degree of significance.) 
*** = p < 0.001 ** = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
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Study 2 
Independent variables Beta 
Gender (male) -0.10*** 
Education -0.03 
Income -0.02 
Age 0.02 
Support Labour -0.00 
Support National -0.10*** 
Perceived knowledge level -0.04 
Actual knowledge level 0.24*** 
Perceived efficacy 0.20*** 
Humans responsible 0.23*** 
(Significant scores are in bold. Asterisks indicate the degree of significance.) 
*** = p < 0.001 ** = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
Study 2: Perceived efficacy regression for total sample 
Independent variables Beta 
Gender (male) -0.14*** 
Education -0.03 
Income 0.02 
Age -0.04 
Support Labour 0.21*** 
Support National -0.10*** 
Perceived knowledge level 0.05 
Actual knowledge level 0.51*** 
(Significant scores are in bold. Asterisks indicate the degree of significance.) 
*** = p < 0.001 ** = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
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Appendix F: Study 2 participants’ feedback on climate change 
knowledge survey  
Below is a selection of quotes from survey respondents. These are grouped under 
general themes, but all of the comments could not be included, nor could the pages of 
detailed graphs, references, and detailed refutations of each of the survey questions be 
included. The questions in the survey were taken from Sundblad et al.’s survey, to allow 
comparison of the two studies.  
No such thing as anthropogenic climate change 
‘I have spent hundreds of hours researching man-made global warming (aka climate change aka 
climate disruption) over the last year. I have performed an academic's task and followed most 
claims and counterclaims back to the original sources, read journal papers and books. I have 
taken the survey but will score very badly on accuracy. This is because most of the answers in 
the survey, while reflecting the view of many prominent climate scientists, go against common 
sense and common science. If I were to take this survey again in another 5 years I'm sure the 
'correct' answers would be very different. I am not mad, crazy, a big oil shill, or a denier in the 
holocaust sense. I am merely a sceptic as any scientist should be (well, engineer actually). There 
is nothing available to science today to disprove the null hypothesis that global warming is not 
caused by man. Models are not evidence and global warming is not proof of a man-made 
cause.’ 
‘What evidence do you have to say climate change is caused by greenhouse gasses? [sic] To go 
back one further and considering the problems now apparent, what irrefutable evidence do you 
have to say that climatic change recently is not within normal variations? Could I respectfully 
suggest that you might get a copy of Carter’s book and Wisharts if you have not already read 
them both and then compile a survey which starts from a different position…’ 
‘As you must/should be aware the climate changes naturally. Over the next few months it will 
almost certainly cool driven by the SOI.  Over the next few years, it will almost certainly cool, 
driven by the last, unusually long sunspot cycle. The fact that you do not have an objective view 
on the subject is obvious from the way your have slanted the questions. I suspect that, as a 
result, your research will not be of much value.’ 
‘Obviously being a student you are heavily influenced by your lecturers. As a result you may be 
unaware that Anthropogenic Global Warming (if that is what you are meaning when you say 
climate change) is a theory and has yet to be proved. A great number of your answers to your 
survey are in dispute, I would therefore question any results of the survey. Because of your 
confusion of the terms AGW and climate change you have resulted in a survey that is 
redundant.’  
Climate change models are flawed 
‘Having taken your 'survey', I think the questions are too loaded. That you assume that current 
models are accurate indicates a large degree of hubris -I have personally looked into these 
models. In my opinion they cannot fore and backcast -because their physics is incomplete and 
possibly fatally flawed (e.g. there is NO radiative balance in the lower atmosphere and 
convection is the major transport process  there).  I object to being sent a PDF that suggests that 
the crystal ball projections of the IPCC models are the 'correct answers' to many questions. Is 
this not you distributing pro-AGW propaganda?’ 
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The IPCC is incorrect and discredited 
‘Your answers are based on one source which has been found to be in error on a number of its 
statements and produced by a small group of select scientists who conspire to hide declines and 
pressure journals not to publish dissenting views.’ 
‘It's worth noting as well that there is a shift occurring in attitude towards the rather confident 
conclusions made previously by the UN's IPCC and other bodies.  For example, the Royal 
Society was forced by many of members to re-issue their previously bland statement endorsing 
the IPCC's conclusions with this one (see attached).  While it still holds dear to a lot of what the 
IPCC says, for the first time it also addresses some of the cloud of uncertainties that surround 
such a complex subject.’ 
‘I have considered filling in your survey but I am astounded that a perhaps independent survey 
can load questions and vainly state that you know the answers to the questions you ask, based 
on the sources of Panchuri and IPCC. In addition it does not surprise me that Wellington 
University would come up with a survey like this. The IPCC’s reputation is in tatters. There are 
31,000  scientists including 9000 PHD SCIENTISTS that do not agree with Panchuri and IPCC. 
To say that or infer the science is agreed or settled is like saying that apples fall upwards. To ask 
questions then subsequently give answers based on IPCC etc is in itself more of the ongoing 
nonsense of the biggest scam in the history of mankind. IPCC wants to take trillions of dollars 
from the West on the basis of an unproven theory which is in tatters… It is the information 
provided by this organization that you seek to examine our knowledge of and presumably 
“mark” on the basis of the worthless view of IPCC. That in itself really is rather insulting to us. 
Science does not deliver truths from on high by concocted consensus as IPCC does, science is 
the facts.’  
‘I would seriously disagree with about 50% of your true or false answers. If one looks at all the 
distorted temperature figures, sea level measuring distortion in Hong Kong, tree ring 
information from Russia, Urban Heat Island effects not corrected for, inadequate assessment of 
C02 ex volcanoes above and below sea level, world cooling since 1998, computer programs that 
can not accurately predict historical trends when loaded with actual historic information, - there 
is not a lot that IPCC say that can not be seriously questioned.’  
‘Why is it that IPCC has to distort data? Why will they not let anybody review their computer 
programs? Why cant the computer programs predict actual historical changes if fed historical 
data? …We have been cooling since 1998 how much more cooling do you want to say the 
world is not warming.’ 
‘At the finish, you present the "model answers". These are not all correct. You have based them 
on publications by people who have been discredited by reliable and proven science. The worst 
of these is Pachauri, who has a huge financial vested interest in the IPCC outcomes. He has 
been asked to resign because of this (though, to be politically correct, the required resignation is 
disguised as having served on the IPCC for too long). I could work through them all, but that 
would be pointless. Suffice to say that far too many of the 'model answers' are incorrect. This is 
not my view, but that of reputable experts in the field based upon hard scientific fact.’  
Scientists can’t be trusted 
‘Your questions all presume that 1) members of the scientific community who are providing 
data generally have integrity 2)  the mechanisms for informing the public are unbiased and have 
the our [sic] best interests at heart 3) human beings across all strata of capability are in general 
good, well meaning and seeking the betterment of mankind I have strong evidence that these 
assumptions are false. Before you leap to the preprogrammed 'conspiracy theorist' response, I 
invite you to consider that there is no such thing as a conspiracy theory (however a case may be 
made for including the false theory that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction). Claims are 
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either true or false. How many Y2Ks, 911s, Birdflus, Swineflus and Global warmings will it 
take for intelligent people to figure out that there is a dark agenda behind most of these 
propaganda - and the perpetrators are experts at offering 'evidence' bolstering their propaganda 
and negating the true information. Your choice is to intelligently question and investigate, or to 
become a quisling minion by compliance.’ 
Climate change not such a bad thing 
‘Your survey offers no scope for anyone to express an opinion, via answers to questions, that 
they believe that there are benefits from climate change. Your survey and the thinking behind it 
seems to come from a pre conceived view that climate change is bad.’ 
‘One implication of the survey is that climate change is a malignant process. This is dissonant 
with our cellular awareness.’ 
Information that contradicts anthropogenic climate change is suppressed 
‘I can quote many well-founded articles written by reputable experts in their field that have 
been submitted to the media, but they have all been refused, since they debunk the published 
scare stories. I wish you well in your thesis, but I urge you to risk being controversial and to 
present both sides of the argument, not just the politically acceptable version that may please 
your professors, for such theses stay with you forever (as witness that of Jim Salinger, which is 
now subject to a High Court action due to its misuse of and manipulation of data). It could come 
back to bite you in the proverbial nether regions.....’ 
‘You see we have all been fed the pro warming garbage for 15-20 years with very little 
recognition of any other point of view. Partly because, in the EU for instance, and other 
countries, you can not get research funding unless it is pro global warming.’ 
‘I would suggest that you have a look at the links below. They are only a few of the many that I 
have looked at. Quite often, they come from extremist publications, but those who oppose the 
AGW brigade can only be published in such media. On the major cause of climate change, it is 
now being accepted that the prime cause is solar radiation, tied in with solar flares. Even US 
Government bodies, such as NASA, are conceding this.’ 
 
